Eng Cn Translate this page:
Please select your language to translate the article


You can just close the window to don't translate
Library
Your profile

Back to contents

Philosophy and Culture
Reference:

Materialism as a worldview position. The second article is about the missing requirement for scientific theories and the ideological vulnerability of the basic ideas of non-classical physics.

Popov Nikolai Andreevich

PhD in Philosophy

Materialist Philosopher

LV-1057, Latviya, g. Riga, ul. Lokomotives, 64, kv. 10

n_popov@inbox.lv
Other publications by this author
 

 

DOI:

10.7256/2454-0757.2024.4.70027

EDN:

XQDWWY

Received:

02-03-2024


Published:

17-04-2024


Abstract: The subject of this study is materialism, understood in the broadest sense of this concept: both as a philosophical doctrine and as a way of life corresponding to a certain worldview position. The aim is to clarify the objective role of this worldview position in various fields of human activity. At the center of the research is the question of the essence of materialistic ideas about the world hiding behind the sensually given reality to man. The study consists of two parts, published in separate articles. The first part is devoted to the origins of the materialistic worldview and the main question of philosophy, and in this, its second part, the question of the philosophical problems of non-classical physics is considered, the root of these problems is revealed, a comparative worldview analysis of the basic concepts of classical and non-classical physics is carried out and the overall result of the research is summarized.The methodology of this research is the principle of materialistic monism, according to which absolutely all phenomena of the human-cognizable world can be based only on something material, "influencing". The general conclusions of this study are as follows: the roots of the materialistic worldview go back to the origins of life, to such a condition of successful vital activity of living beings, which is inherently ideological; this condition, called by the author the Main Question of Life, is the historical forerunner of the Main Question of Philosophy; the worldview position, equivalent to the materialistic solution of the OVF, is inherent in the vital activity of absolutely all living beings; all people in their daily and practical activities are born materialists. In addition, this study clarifies the idea of the essence of materialistic teaching; shows the exclusivity of the materialistic worldview as the only true worldview; provides a refined definition of the concept of matter; proves the need to shift the "center of gravity" of modern materialistic teaching from dialectics to the principle of materialistic monism; formulates the missing requirement for scientific theories to ensure their ideological viability; shows the ideological inconsistency the main ideas of the new, non-classical physics.


Keywords:

matter, materialism, dialectical materialism, fundamental question of philosophy, the basic question of life, ideological position, principle of materialistic monism, reality, objective reality, philosophical problems of physics

This article is automatically translated. You can find original text of the article here.

Introduction.

The article presented to the readers is the second part of the study of such a complex phenomenon that is hidden behind the concept of "materialism". In the previous part of this study, it was shown that materialism is not only a philosophy. The roots of materialism lie in the ideological condition for the survival of living beings, associated with the recognition of an external world independent of any consciousness, in which everything that exists manifests its existence through interaction with its environment. At the same time, the so-called basic question of philosophy is by no means far-fetched or accidental. It has its roots in the question, called by the author the Main Question of Life, which consists in how a living being reacts to the sensations he experiences: either as something that is the result of external influence, or as something that has nothing to do with the existence and influence of external factors. And thanks to natural selection, this issue is solved by all living beings in the course of their life exclusively in accordance with the materialistic worldview position. On the basis of the universal spontaneous recognition of the external world, independent of any consciousness, a corresponding materialistic philosophy arose. In the course of the study, it was very important to come to an understanding of the origins of such spontaneous confidence of all people. As well as to the realization that the idea of matter was developed on the basis of just these ideas about the world. At the same time, a clear awareness of the inextricable link between the objectivity of the world known by man and its materiality allows us to move on to the stage of realizing the need to take into account in human scientific activity not only the objectivity, but also the materiality of this world.

About the missing requirement for scientific theories and the underestimation of the principle of materialistic monism.

As A. Einstein emphasized, expressing the prevailing opinion of scientists, "the belief in the existence of an external world independent of the perceiving subject lies at the heart of all natural science" [1, p. 136]. At the same time, with regard to theorists, he believed that "the researcher should find out from nature clearly formulated general principles reflecting certain common features of the totality of a multitude of experimentally established facts" [2, pp. 5-6]. And one can only agree with all this. However, is it enough to rely only on facts? After all, there may be a shortage of facts, and their selective selection, and their different interpretation-an explanation in favor of the proclaimed principles. Hence the logical question: what other requirement, besides conformity to facts, should scientific theories meet in order that they, inevitably going beyond the individual facts, do not go beyond compliance with the position of recognition of the outside world (which, as it was shown in the first part of this study, underlies the survival of both an individual and and humanity as a whole) and thus did not push science on the path of error?

And after all, it is not necessary to go far for an answer to it at all. It is quite obvious that in order for scientific theories not to go beyond the conformity of the position of recognition of the external world, they must be compatible with the basis of this world, thanks to which this world is independent of any consciousness, i.e. objective in the broadest sense of this concept. And such a basis for it, which "guarantees" both the objectivity of its existence and its cognizability with the help of sensory organs and devices, is nothing more than the materiality of all its objects and processes. It is materiality, as a property of manifesting their existence through interaction and mutual change, that allows them to "determine their entire behavior" completely independently of any consciousness and at the same time "inform" the subject who knows the world about their existence. Moreover, the world cognized by man (of which man is an integral part) also owes its materiality to the general patterns of manifestation of all the properties and characteristics manifested in it. After all, the materiality of all its objects and processes means that they possess all their properties and external characteristics manifested during interactions BEFORE their manifestation-observation (otherwise there would simply be nothing to show-observe). I.e., all properties and characteristics in this world are inherent in the VERY carriers of these properties and characteristics as an integral part of them existence, and they are inherent in the inseparable unity of their qualitative and quantitative certainty (which determines the unambiguous certainty of any interaction-interchange). All this finds expression in the general patterns of their manifestation of their properties and characteristics (for example, in such a pattern of their manifestation as their sameness for different observers and their observation-measurement systems, with which, as shown in the article [3], the basic principles of A. Einstein's SRT are incompatible. More details about such patterns will be discussed in the next part of the article).

But it follows from what has been said that scientific theories created on the basis of facts about the external world, cognizable with the help of sensory organs and devices, will only correspond in their content to the recognition of the objectivity of this world if their content is compatible with the recognition of its materiality. This is the missing requirement for scientific theories, arising from the awareness of the role of the materiality of the world known by man in its objectivity, sensualistic cognizability and the inherent patterns of manifestation of all properties and characteristics. A requirement that allows at the highest level of cognitive and adaptive human activity to remain within the framework of compliance with the ideological condition of successful life activity. At the same time, it should be noted that the concepts used in this study are "the human-cognizable world", "the external world", "the objective world", "nature" and "the material world" conceal the same thing. All these are synonyms for denoting everything that lies behind the sensually given reality that arises in the activity of the human brain as a result of the influence of external factors on a person.

And to ensure the indicated compatibility of theories with the recognition of the materiality and thus the objectivity of the world known by man, there is also a reliable means, a reliable guideline in the person of the principle of materialistic monism. A principle that requires not only an appropriate decision of the OVF, but also unswerving adherence to such a decision, since "monism means the requirement of its strictly unambiguous solution, involving the recognition of the primacy of either matter over spirit or spirit over matter, followed by the derivation of one of these principles from the other... This requirement resolutely excludes all and any manifestations of dualism, which, from the point of view of monism, is presented as a simple inconsistency allowed in solving the main ideological problem, as a complete inability to definitely solve it or as a desire to evade such a solution" [4, p. 489]. And as noted by V. I. Lenin, "Engels showed by the example of D?ring that any consistent philosophy can deduce the unity of the world either from thinking... or from that objective reality that exists outside of us, which has long been called matter in epistemology and is studied by natural science" [5, p. 169].

But it was precisely the strict consistency in drawing the line of materialistic monism that dialectical materialism lacked. The widespread opinion that "consistent materialistic monism is characteristic of dialectical materialism, proceeding from the fact that the world is inherently material, that all phenomena in the world are derived from moving matter" [6, p. 406], seems erroneous, because in fact there was only a proclamation of this principle, and what happened as-that is, in passing, in a conversation about the objectivity of space and time and in a form that causes some confusion. The corresponding Lenin statement reads: "There is nothing in the world but moving matter, and moving matter cannot move except in space and time" [5, p. 171]. But, first of all, is there really nothing in the world except moving matter? Are ideal, spiritual phenomena not of this world? Or are they also moving matter? I.e., the very form of proclamation of the principle of materialistic monism is not an example of scientific rigor. And secondly, in this statement, space and time appear not as something derived from moving matter, but as some external conditions of its movement, as some additional entities to moving matter, providing the possibility of its movement. This form of proclamation of the principle of materialistic monism did not at all contribute to its recognition. And as a result, this principle of diamat remained only proclaimed. It did not come to full confidence in him and widespread use.

But F. also pointed out the materiality of the general basis of all phenomena of the world known by man. Engels, who argued that "the real unity of the world consists in its materiality, and this latter is proved not by a pair of conjuring phrases, but by a long and difficult development of philosophy and natural science" [7, p. 43]. However, it seems that this thesis of diamat, which is essentially just the reverse side of the principle of materialistic monism, its semantic equivalent, was still lacking in persuasiveness and evidence. What kind of proof of the material unity of the world on the part of philosophy and natural science can we talk about, if in fact all questions of natural science were solved on the basis of recognizing only the objectivity of the known world, and its deep and inextricable connection with its materiality as a condition of its objectivity has not yet been clearly identified by philosophy? In both fields of knowledge of the world, its materiality was obscured by its objectivity. There was a lack of confidence that absolutely all of his phenomena were really based only on something material. In addition, this thesis of diamat is also interpreted in the philosophical literature in a bad way. According to, for example, one of the modern philosophical encyclopedias, "... the unity of the world lies in the fact that all objects and phenomena in the world represent different states and properties of moving matter... There is nothing in the world that would not be a specific form of matter, its property or a manifestation of properties and relationships" [6, p. 215]. But can any immaterial phenomenon (spiritual, ideal) be a specific form or state of matter, its property or manifestation of properties? How, then, does it differ from the material?

In fact, the ideal is qualitatively different from everything material. However, this does not prevent the ideal from having material roots. As shown in the article [8] on the example of the operation of automatic doors, the form of the presence of the ideal in the material world is the correspondence of the behavior of self-governing systems of this world to any goals, knowledge and other "spiritual" attitudes, which is provided by the materially conditioned ability of these systems to take into account stable connections and dependencies of some material factors on others. The brain of such a system, showing this ability (without which no management activity is possible), thereby inevitably introduces ideal phenomena into its management activities. As we can see, the functioning of self-governing material systems (represented in nature by living beings) is fundamentally impossible without ideal phenomena in the work of their self-governing bodies. I.e., in fact, there is no irreconcilable antagonism between the material and the ideal, which gives rise to many philosophers distrust of the principle of materialistic monism.

However, it seems that confidence in the principle of materialistic monism was hindered not only by the unresolved question of the mechanism of the appearance of the ideal in the material world, but also by insufficient clarity on the question of what exactly lies behind the main concept of matter for materialists. Lenin's definition of matter, which is guided by Diamat (and which, undoubtedly, is an important milestone in the development of materialism), nevertheless requires clarification. It states: "...Matter is that which, acting on our sense organs, produces sensation; matter is an objective reality given to us in sensation" [5, pp. 141 - 142].

But, first of all, it is not matter that acts on something, but something material, i.e. its specific representative, which in this effect manifests its materiality. You can touch and feel only something material, but not matter, because the concept of matter hides only the product of abstraction, represented by the verbal image of the carrier of a single characteristic - "that which acts on the senses", while you can touch only such a carrier of this characteristic, which has many other characteristics, necessarily inherent in everything concrete, singular, only which can affect anything. This, as noted by many materialistic philosophers, is as abstract a concept as the concept of man. However, this circumstance has not been reflected in the textbooks of dialectical materialism. (And such inaccuracies, flaws, allowed, among other things, to attribute to materialism something that is completely not inherent in it internally. For example, G. D. Levin, on the pages of the New Philosophical Encyclopedia, presents materialism as follows: "Materialism asserts that the basis of the qualitative diversity of the world is an absolutely homogeneous primary matter" [9, p. 508]. Ignoring the opinion of materialists, who understand by materiality the most general property of all that is accessible to the senses and devices, he presents materialism as such a doctrine in which matter is considered "the substance of all things" [ibid.].) And on the other hand, just as any particular person is only a person, but is not a person (because it has not only characteristics common to all "people"), so everything concrete that acts on the senses is not matter, but only IS, appears, turns out to be matter it turns out to be what the characteristic "that which acts on the senses", highlighted by philosophers using the concept of matter, is applicable to (in more detail about the difference between "is" and "is" in the article [10]). I.e., to identify matter with that which acts on the senses means implicitly identify the abstract with the concrete.

Secondly, it is equally rash to identify matter with objective reality, since the product of abstraction has only a subjective, verbal form of expression and therefore can only be present in human consciousness (just as only an abstract person is present in human consciousness -in general).

And thirdly, it is not only the lack of rigor of Lenin's definition of matter, but also its one-sidedness and narrowness associated with its anthropocentric sensualism. After all, in fact, all material things act not only on the senses, but in general on their entire environment, capable of interaction. This allows all material things to manifest their existence completely independently of the consciousness of the subject cognizing the world, or of any global consciousness. From which it follows that only with such a refined, broader and deeper understanding of materiality does the inextricable connection of the materiality of existence with the independence of this existence from any consciousness become noticeable. Moreover, the inner source of self-development of the material world is also revealed. And without seeing all this, it was very difficult to get rid of the shadow of distrust of the principle of materialistic monism.

Objectively, the need for a consciously chosen means of taking into account the materiality of the world known by man has been overdue in science for a long time. Especially in physics. And this is despite the fact that all classical physics developed in line with the materialistic view of the world. The fact is that this correct ideological orientation of hers was provided by nothing more than a spontaneously formed style of thinking in her, containing such general ideas about the world known by man, which generally corresponded to its patterns predetermined by its materiality. These are, for example, the following ideas: all the properties and characteristics of the bodies and processes of the world cognized by man are the same for all observers, both qualitatively and quantitatively; all changes in the world are the result of physical, forceful interaction, in which the same causes generate the same effects; everything in the world happens it is necessary somewhere and sometime, and the simultaneity of events is absolute. These ideas about the world order, embodied in the style of classical scientific thinking, set the correct ideological orientation of classical physics, without requiring anyone to answer the question of what is primary matter or consciousness. The materialistic orientation of the judgments of this physics was most naturally woven into the very course of these judgments. However, the spontaneously formed and therefore vulnerable style of scientific thinking from the side of its validity ultimately could not prevent the emergence of such "revolutionary" ideas that are incompatible with these ideas about the world order. Moreover, new ideas also appeared under the banner of recognition of the outside world. As a result, insufficiently substantiated classical ideas about the world were declared prejudices of their time. At the same time, physics turned out to be virtually without any means of taking into account the materiality of the world it cognizes. And this happened in the conditions of the "conquest of physics by the spirit of mathematics" [5, p. 300], which finds expression in complete indifference to the origin of the carriers of all those properties and characteristics, the values of which appear in mathematical equations. This spirit of physics allowed physicists not to be interested in the "opinion" of the carriers of properties themselves when putting forward various hypotheses about the nature of the manifestation of these properties. But this character is predetermined by the materiality of the "developers" of certain properties! Consequently, physics is faced with the task of regaining a spirit sensitive to the materiality of the world known by man. And in the conditions of abandoning the classical style of scientific thinking, this can be done only on the basis of the principle of materialistic monism. A principle with inexhaustible heuristic potential.

Moreover, the author was convinced of the inexhaustibility of this potential by his own experience. And first of all, when solving the centuries-old problem of the essence of time (which is presented in the article [10] and which shows that the derivation of time from material processes does not in the least prevent it from being independent of the specific characteristics of these processes). But the author relied on the same principle in solving another important philosophical problem - the problem of the origin of the ideal and spiritual in the material world (as described in detail in the article [8]), which is directly related to the psychophysical problem. Materialistic monism also helped the author in many other cases: when solving the problem of free will in conditions of unambiguous determinism (see [ibid.]); and when solving the problem of absolute predetermination of events (see [ibid.]); and when identifying the nature of randomness and probability of events (see [ibid.]); and when proving the fallacy of the "informational" picture of the world (see [11]); and when discovering a whole class of "quasi-objective" phenomena mistakenly attributed to objective reality (see [10]); and when proving the fallacy of the widespread opinion about the relativity of properties (see [3]); and in the philosophical analysis of SRT and GRT A. Einstein (see [ibid.]). The author proceeds from the same principle in this study.

However, it is still far from universal awareness of the true role of philosophical materialism in human cognitive activity. Moreover, under the conditions of the hypnotic influence on Russian philosophers of the ill-fated perestroika, fostered by the architects of the ill-fated perestroika, the illusion of some kind of internal inferiority of that philosophy, which in the Soviet Union was officially recognized as the only scientific one. Thus, G. D. Levin, already mentioned by us, on the pages of the encyclopedia published under the auspices of the IF RAS, states: "The task of explaining the world as a whole from itself, set by materialism, is natural and therefore extremely difficult to implement. A consistent subjective idealist, a solipsist, declares only his own consciousness to exist, thereby removing the question of his attitude to the outside world. The objective idealist, recognizing the objective world, preserves the problem, but solves it through a kind of circle: the consciousness of the subject deduces from the world outside of it, and this latter from the "world idea". The dualist, asserting the mutual independence of the material and the ideal, circumvents the problem by rejecting one of the fundamental scientific principles monism. But materialism pays a heavy price for this "intellectual honesty." It is precisely the globality of the program of materialism, the unwillingness to simplify it, that explains the small number of outstanding scientific results obtained within its framework and, as a result, the small number of great materialists in the history of philosophy. Hence, the attempts to wishful thinking, to declare the program of materialism realized, so discredited dialectical materialism" [9, p. 508]. However, in fact, in any "programs of materialism" the task of explaining the whole world from itself has never been set. The task of materialism has always been only to proceed from materiality, and not from any spirituality, of the world represented by these phenomena, when explaining the phenomena observed by man. And this task has been solved and is being solved by materialism (including spontaneous) - in the person of materialistic-minded representatives of all natural science and throughout the history of natural science - quite successfully! Therefore, only those who have not yet reached the realization of the essence of materialism, the forms of its presence and its role in all fields and at all levels of scientific science can talk about some kind of small number of outstanding results obtained within the framework of materialism and, as a result, the small number of great materialists in the history of science (which is far from limited to philosophy). activities. In fact, everything is just the opposite, because for man and humanity, only such creations of the human mind are of real value, which allow a person to adapt as best as possible to the world in which he lives and which is favorable only to those who treat him as such a world that exists independently of any consciousness and in which all properties are manifested through the interaction of their carriers. But it is also noteworthy that this arrogant judgment about materialism is made from the position of spontaneous materialism, which is poor for a philosopher.

This is just an illusion, as if natural science is satisfied with what is represented by the senses and the readings of instruments. An illusion that manifested itself already in Newton's call for physicists to avoid metaphysics, and in the nineteenth century embodied in the teachings of positivism. In fact, natural science is also based on a certain worldview attitude to everything that is represented by the senses and supplemented by devices. The attitude that corresponds to the recognition of the external world affecting the senses and devices, and which is commonly called the materialistic worldview. Only a lack of awareness of the presence of this worldview attitude creates this illusion. At the same time, the positivists, calling for the "banishment" of philosophy from science, simply do not notice that all the sciences of nature, identified with the outside world, affecting the senses and devices, can be said, by definition, to be "thoroughly saturated" with a materialistic worldview. Even at the stage of describing the observed phenomena, since these phenomena are recognized as objective and reflected with the help of sensory organs and devices. It is also overlooked that science in its development cannot be limited in principle to observations and experiments, since nevertheless its main function is to penetrate into the essence of phenomena and discover certain general principles of the universe. Therefore, at its highest, theoretical level, specifics inevitably give way to abstractions and global generalizations of a philosophical and philosophical nature. From the position of this philosophical paradigm, the pinnacle of science is the organization of the activities of all its lower floors. Therefore, it is very important that here, in this general scientific paradigm (which forms the scientific picture of the world, but is largely influenced by ad hok ideas), the ideological position that underlies all natural science and which is inseparable from the recognition of the materiality of the world known by man is reflected, and as an invariant. This means that it is inseparable from the laws inherent in this world, due to this materiality of it. The doctrine of such laws is the philosophy of materialism. Therefore, it is not philosophy in general that should be "expelled" from science, but such philosophies that are in no way compatible with the recognition of the materiality of the world described in them. And it is precisely to such philosophies that Lenin's words refer: "The genius of Marx and Engels manifested itself, among other things, in the fact that they despised the Gellerite game of new words, tricky terms, cunning "isms", but simply and bluntly said: there is a materialistic and idealistic line in philosophy, and between them there are different shades of agnosticism. Attempts to find a "new" point of view in philosophy characterize the same beggary in spirit as attempts to create a "new" theory of value, a "new" theory of rent, etc." [5, p. 143].

How could another wave of attacks on materialistic teaching have risen if there had been a clear awareness of its function in scientific activity, how to be a means of identifying and consciously taking into account the laws of existence of exactly such a world, which is known by man with the help of sensory organs and devices? Now there is a situation where the materialistic decision of the OVF, indicating a conscious choice of a materialistic position, does not have any noticeable effect on the results of scientific activity. Which obviously plays into the hands of the opponents of materialism. But, the question is, how can awareness of the choice of a materialistic worldview influence the course of thought of scientists, if they were materialists before such a choice (spontaneously proceeding in their scientific activities from the recognition of an external world independent of any consciousness, manifesting itself by influencing the senses and devices), and their conscious choice of this worldview position is it not complemented by a conscious and unswerving adherence to the principle of materialistic monism, which forces us to check every thought for its compliance with the material conditionality of absolutely all phenomena observed and studied by man?

But, speaking about the purpose of materialistic philosophy, I would like to touch upon the question raised by V. I. Lenin about the partisanship of philosophy. At the same time, in the light of what has been said, the struggle between materialists and idealists appears primarily as a struggle between those whose innate spontaneous materialism turns into conscious materialism at the level of philosophical judgments about the world order, and those whose "everyday" materialism at the level of such judgments gives way to philosophical idealism. This is not a struggle between the interests of different classes, not progressive and conservative strata of society, not communist and bourgeois ideology, but a true and erroneous philosophical idea of the origin of the sensually given reality to man. Moreover, it is impossible to do without the correspondence of philosophical judgments to one or another of these ideas. And only in this sense, "modern philosophy is as partisan as it was two thousand years ago" [ibid., p. 348]. At the same time, "the fighting parties, in fact, are materialism and idealism, covered by the gelerter-charlatan new nicknames or a half-witted non-partisanship" [ibid.]. Therefore, those who assert are undoubtedly right: "Dialectical materialism as a philosophical worldview is by definition broader than any political views, beliefs and positions; it is irreducible to the interests of any social class, political party or narrow group of people" [12, p. 143]. However, recognizing the special nature of philosophical partisanship, we also have to admit that all philosophies alternative to materialistic one should be called in dialectical materialism not "bourgeois" (although there were reasons for this), but "erroneous due to their inconsistency with the ideological condition of the survival of man and humanity." And due to the fact that in the twentieth century, materialistic philosophy was actively developed, propagandized and considered primarily by communists (thereby showing its ideological consistency and foresight), it also did not cease to be a philosophy that starts from the only true worldview position for all people and epochs and therefore objectively claims to be a universal philosophy. In addition, it is not necessary to enroll in the materialists at all. It is enough to be consistent in your innate, "God-given" materialism.

On the ideological vulnerability of the basic ideas of non-classical physics.

Among critics of non-classical physics, there is an opinion that "... the denial of objective reality is one of the most important starting points of both relativity theory and quantum mechanics, it is openly proclaimed on the relevant pages of relevant textbooks" [13, p. 2]. However, it is difficult to agree with this opinion by the fact that neither in the theory of relativity nor in quantum mechanics, the denial of objective reality is still not postulated, is not an integral part of these teachings. Moreover, the creators and supporters of these teachings assure everyone that these teachings represent precisely the objective world, cognizable with the help of sensory organs and devices: in one case - at a speed of movement close to the speed of light, and in the other at the level of microscales. But what is noteworthy is that the question of whether this world can be like this has not even been raised by any of the creators and supporters of the new physics. And it is not surprising, because this "metaphysical" question could arise in the minds of only those who had a fairly clear idea of what the general basis of such a world is, and what depends on it in it. And none of them had such an idea.

For example, A. Einstein, being one of the founders of the new physics, in his book "Physics and Reality" [2] identified the world known by man with reality, without giving any definition of reality. But the reality of man is not at all the external world, the belief in the existence of which, as Einstein emphasized, lies at the heart of all natural science. As shown in the article [8]), at its core, human reality is a subjectively expressed product of the active reflective activity of the human brain, from which it, the brain, repels in its management activities aimed at adapting to the outside world. I.e., human reality is something that arises and exists (in a subjective form of expression) only in a person's head. At the same time, the objective reality of a person differs from his subjective reality in that it is a product of the reflective activity of the human brain, which reflects the properties, characteristics and patterns of what exists outside and independently of the activity of the brain itself (having a natural, materially conditioned form of expression). And as revealed by the author in the article [3], those verbally expressed realities, which are represented by the content of the special and general theories of relativity (SRT and GRT), do not correspond to the necessary condition of objectivity of realities.

As follows from the memoirs of Einstein himself, given in the above-mentioned book, he came to the idea of the universal constancy of the speed of light by no means by generalizing relevant observations and experiments. At first, there was an idea waiting for the relevant facts to confirm it. And they were not long in coming. Michelson's experiments, which confirmed the independence of the speed of light from the direction of motion of the Earth, were immediately presented as proof of the truth of this idea. And the fact that the results of these experiments have other explanations, and that the universality of the proclaimed constancy of the speed of light inevitably implies the dependence of the speed of motion, lengths and durations on the choice of observers (or, what is the same thing, "reference systems"), Einstein was not at all confused and could not be confused, because, without taking into account the materiality of the world known by man, he could not take into account all that followed from it and to which this dependence contradicted. Without going beyond the spontaneous recognition of the objectivity of the known world in the materialism of his scientific style of thinking, Einstein was far from realizing all those laws of this world that are predetermined by its materiality as the basis of its objectivity and cognizability. Under these conditions, Einstein found himself in a situation that can be called factual self-deception (and which, as will be shown below, is typical of all non-classical physics). And as a result, the dispute about the special theory of relativity has long crossed the turn of the century, whereas the fallacy of this theory could be discovered even at the stage of its creation by checking whether its content corresponds to the recognition of the basis of the world, which ensures its objectivity and cognizability. But the article also shows in detail the ideological inconsistency of the general theory of relativity, which allowed Einstein to assert that "space, figuratively speaking, is now taking revenge and "eats" matter" [14, p. 243]. Therefore, let's move on to the philosophical analysis of such a worldview-problematic part of modern physics as quantum mechanics.

As the philosopher V. P. Bransky notes in the book Philosophy of Physics of the twentieth Century, "... the basic idea of quantum mechanics is that the movement of microobjects is qualitatively and radically different from the movement of macroobjects: if any macroobject always moves along a certain trajectory (for example, the Earth moves around the Sun in an ellipse), then the movement of a microobject is not It has trajectories (for example, the motion of an electron in a hydrogen atom cannot be described using the idea of an orbit, but can only be described using some kind of "probability cloud" surrounding the atomic nucleus") [15, p. 35]. But it is already clear from Bransky's words that the conclusion about the absence of a trajectory of motion of micro-objects is made on the basis of the impossibility of a trajectory description of their movement. I.e., the nature of the description of movement is attributed to the nature of the movement itself. Not being able to track the location of an electron at any moment of its existence-movement, physicists are simply forced to describe this movement with the help of a "probability cloud". But we are not interested in how the movement can be described, but how it happens. Movement can occur only in accordance with the essence of this phenomenon.

And here we draw attention to the fact that the movement of an object can only be talked about if there is a change in its location, a change in the places of its existence. From which it follows that the essence of movement is the change of places of existence, which is carried out by a moving object by turning its current location from one to another. This means that the movement of any object is inseparable from the formation by this object of a sequence of alternating locations of this object. But after all, the totality of such locations of a moving object (in the order of their appearance) It is customary to call it the trajectory of its movement. And this, in turn, means that there can be no vector-free movement, by definition. Moreover, all this also applies to the microcosm, since the essence of movement as a change in their location does not change from the scale of moving objects. And isn't the Wilson camera, which makes the trajectory of the microparticles accessible to direct observation, eloquent enough evidence of this?

However, physicists were prompted to think about the non-vector motion of microparticles not only by difficulties in tracking their movement, but also by certain wave properties of these particles. As stated in the handbook of physics, "an important conclusion follows from the wave properties, revealing the inner nature of the properties of microparticles: a microparticle (just like any wave) does not have an exact coordinate and momentum value at the same time. This means that it is impossible to imagine the movement of microparticles along a certain trajectory with a certain speed at each point (like the movement of ordinary, classical particles), any wave does not have a trajectory in the form of a geometric line" [16, p. 373]. And indeed, the wave does not have a trajectory in the form of a geometric line. But we are still talking about a particle. And the particle differs from the wave in that it occupies a "point" place in space, and by changing its location forms the trajectory of its movement. In other words, when talking about particles, it is necessary to take into account the attributes of particles, not waves. On the other hand, it should also be borne in mind that in the new mechanics we are talking not only about particle waves, but also about waves of probability of their location. Proponents of the new mechanics argue: "If, in the classical approach, a wave represents a state of motion of a continuous medium, then, in quantum consideration, particles propagate and are distributed in the interference pattern as if they belong to a certain wave. As de Broglie wrote, "the new mechanics does not allow us to attribute to a corpuscle the position in space it occupies with complete certainty. She only claims that the corpuscle is necessarily located in the area of space occupied by the wave. The greater the amplitude of the wave at a given point, the more likely it is to detect a particle at that point." In this regard, de Broglie introduced the concept of a probability wave" [17, pp. 121-122].

With regard to particle waves, the opinion has been established that "... it is to this dualism that we owe the fact that the accuracy of measurements has a natural absolute lower limit. Heisenberg showed this by the example of light diffraction... The deflection of a photon passing through the slit means that the photon has a sideways momentum. In this case, each point of the interference pattern corresponds to its own value of the lateral component of the pulse... However, no one knows in advance exactly where this particle will go. Only one thing is known for sure: the smaller the width of the slit, the further away the interference fringes are on the screen. The width of the slit and the lateral component of the particle momentum are inversely proportional to each other, or, in other words, the product of these quantities is constant. Heisenberg showed that it is equal to Planck's constant... This ratio is called the Heisenberg uncertainty ratio and reads as follows: the coordinate and momentum of a microparticle can never be determined simultaneously with any accuracy. The more precisely the particle's coordinate is determined (i.e., the smaller the slit width), the less accurately its momentum (in fact, velocity) can be measured simultaneously. Planck's constant puts an extreme limit on all physical measurements. A moving particle obeys the laws of wave mechanics, not Newtonian mechanics" [ibid., pp. 123 - 124].

But, firstly, from the fact that new mechanics does not allow particles to be assigned a certain position in space, it does not follow at all that they do not occupy it. Let's not forget that we are talking about particles of the material world, which means that they manifest their presence by interacting with their equally material environment. But you can interact with something and thereby show your properties and your location only somewhere and sometime in relation to the environment and what is happening. This means that all observable objects are necessarily localized in both space and time. At the same time, due to the material conditionality and thus the objectivity of all properties, a particle exhibiting wave properties is not deprived of properties that allow it to be considered a particle. Moreover, due to their materiality, particles cannot suffer from any uncertainty of their properties and characteristics (otherwise they would not "know" how to behave in the world of universal interactions). Therefore, the ratio of uncertainties to these objects is also not an indication. Moreover, in fact, it refers to the lack of certainty of the results of reflecting the properties and characteristics inherent in particles and the mutual dependence of the certainty of these results. This is actually the dependence of the accuracy of the reflection of one value on the accuracy of the reflection of another. The dependence that arises at the level of the microcosm, where the means and methods of reflection very significantly affect the state of the reflected objects. The reflected values, due to the presence of their natural form of expression (which is the form of their manifestation, as described in more detail in the article [10]), cannot be indefinite. And only in the absence of awareness of the materiality of absolutely all observable processes and phenomena, it can also be argued that "the ratio of uncertainties means the rejection of determinism and recognition of the fundamental role of randomness in processes involving micro-objects" [18, p. 129].

Secondly, as Heisenberg himself argued using the example of light diffraction, photons passing through a slit acquire deflecting, lateral pulses, following which they create a diffraction pattern on the screen. And this clearly indicates the subordination of moving particles to the laws of Newtonian mechanics. Moreover, this leads to the idea that it is precisely the characteristics of the lateral pulses that explain the system of parallel diffraction bands that arises in this case. The fact is that the closer a photon passes to the edge of the slit, the stronger the lateral momentum it acquires. And in the event that the magnitude of the pulses acting on photons increases not smoothly, but in leaps (and such a discontinuity, "quantization" of quantities is just inherent, according to physicists, in the microcosm), this should lead to the fact that photons passing through the slit will fit unevenly on the screen, forming diffraction and interference patterns paintings. And all this does not prevent photons from being separate particles, which are microscopic quanta of electro-magnetic fields (with different frequencies of their transformation into each other), which propagate relative to their source at a speed of 300,000 km/sec.

And thirdly, it is not the Heisenberg ratio that sets the limit to measurement accuracy. All it establishes is the dependence of the measurement accuracy of one quantity on the measurement accuracy of another, leaving the observer the right to choose the accuracy of each of these measurements (i.e., without setting any accuracy limits for any of the separately performed measurements). As for the limit of measurement accuracy, such a limit is set by nothing more than the presence of a certain amount of ambiguity, uncertainty, blurring of the boundaries of material bodies and processes expressed by the bodies and processes themselves (as described in more detail in the article [8]). Both their spatial and temporal boundaries are far from absolute, not ideal in their clarity, unambiguous certainty. The structure of boundaries in the material world is such that these are not some vanishingly thin and continuous lines or faces separating an object from a non-object, one state from another, but zones of transition from one to another (as a result of which there is a certain proportion of conditionality of all boundaries attributed to observed objects and processes). Moreover, we are talking about the boundaries of not only micro-objects and processes. Where, for example, are the absolutely clear boundaries (spatial and temporal) of our galaxy or solar system? And where are the "real" borders of the Earth with its atmosphere and gravity, without any share of conditionality? Or some kind of cloud, forest, city? However, this does not in the least prevent material objects and processes from occupying an unambiguously defined place in space and time, nor from unambiguously interacting with each other, while obeying unambiguous dynamic patterns.

According to N. Bohr, in the manifestations of wave-particle dualism and in the ratio of uncertainties, what he called the principle of complementarity finds expression. According to this principle, at least two mutually exclusive sets of classical concepts must be used to fully describe quantum mechanical phenomena. In formulating this principle, Bohr emphasized: "...In accordance with the very nature of quantum theory, we must consider the space-time representation and the requirement of causality, the combination of which characterizes classical theories, as additional, but exclusive features of describing the content of experience" [19, pp. 31-32]. Which, in principle, is quite consistent with the real state of affairs with the description of the processes of the microcosm. However, Heisenberg presented the principle of describing the characteristics of physical processes as the principle of possessing these characteristics. He followed the path of ontologization of this principle and argued: "The spatial-temporal description of processes, on the one hand, and the classical law of causality, on the other, represent additional, mutually exclusive features of physical processes (highlighted by me N. P.)" [20, p. 51]. Moreover, a similar understanding of the complementarity principle is inherent in the so-called Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, according to which the dynamic characteristics of a microparticle borrowed from classical physics are not inherent in the particle itself. These are, they say, the objective properties of the physical systems of the microcosm. If, for example, no observation is made over the nucleus, then its state is described by a superposition (mixing) of two states a decayed nucleus and an undamaged nucleus (i.e., in Schrodinger's figurative expression, a cat sitting in a closed box is both alive and dead at the same time). At the same time, in the Copenhagen interpretation of the physical meaning of the wave function, the physical system ceases to be a mixture of states and chooses one of them only at the moment when observation occurs.

However, in a world cognizable with the help of sensory organs and devices, all its particles and processes, due to their materiality, possess only such properties, characteristics and states that are inherent in these particles and processes as an integral part of their existence or course and have a natural, material form of expression-manifestation. I.e., a form that affects the results of the interaction of carriers of certain properties, characteristics and states. This means that in the material world, all its particles have all their properties and characteristics simultaneously and before their observation-measurement, and all its processes can neither be "in a state of confusion" of their states, nor choose them at the moment of observation. In addition, the wave function does not control the behavior of individual particles or processes themselves, but only the statistics of their behavior, which is not the same thing. Indeed, in fact, the wave function (expressing "probability waves") is essentially just a means of guessing a particular location of a particle or a state of a system, the behavior of which, due to their materiality, is dictated only by material interactions and thus only by unambiguous dynamic patterns. Therefore, it is possible to agree with the principle of complementarity only in its understanding, which is associated with the possibilities of only reflecting various properties or characteristics of the microcosm, and not possessing them.

Moreover, the erroneous interpretation of the results of observations of the behavior of micro-objects has been pointed out for a long time. Thus, Academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences V. F. Mitkevich emphasized: "The main mistake that some of our physicists dealing with quantum mechanics make is that they are not critical enough of the obviously Machistic theoretical and cognitive attitudes of Bohr, Heisenberg and other foreign physicists. And these attitudes, as is known, are based on the fundamental denial of the possibility of considering any microphysical object as an object that actually exists in space and time completely independently of the observing subject and in general from any auxiliary observational devices. In this case, we should not be talking at all about whether we are able or not able to accurately determine the localization in space and time of a particular microphysical object that we are studying. This is a favorite topic of physicists who idealistically interpret the ratio of uncertainty and the principle of complementarity. We are talking about something completely different, namely, that any real object it does not matter whether it is of a macrophysical or microphysical scale at any given moment in time must necessarily and unconditionally occupy a certain place in space, i.e. it must have a completely definite spatio-temporal localization. If something fundamentally cannot be localized in space and time, therefore, this "something" does not exist objectively-really outside of our consciousness and independently of our consciousness, but represents a fantastic fiction of an idealistic nature, which can only serve as the subject of pseudo-physical speculation" [21, p. 101]. As we can see, the above criticism of the theoretical and cognitive attitudes of the new physics is based on a firm belief in the impossibility of the objective existence of a "real" object without its spatial and temporal localization. But why is the materialist talking about the "real" and not about the "material" object and all that follows from its materiality? Instead, the accusation is made of an allegedly idealistic interpretation of the ratio of uncertainty and the principle of complementarity. An accusation for which there is no basis, since formally the proponents of the new physics also proceed from the recognition of a world that exists independently of any consciousness. Therefore, in fact, this interpretation of them is not idealistic, but implicitly contradicts such a generally accepted axiom of all natural science as the recognition of a world independent of any consciousness. However, to detect such contradictions, a clear awareness of the inextricable link between the objectivity of the world and its materiality was just not enough. As well as the realization that the position of recognition of the external world inherent in spontaneous materialism does not prevent the emergence of such ideas about it that are incompatible with the recognition of its materiality.

Nevertheless, since these contradictions did not lie on the surface, most philosophers nevertheless believed in the new possibilities of the human-cognizable world, allegedly discovered by new physics. For example, V. P. Bransky states: "In the history of science, there are cases when new fundamental theories arose on the basis of a solution... quite a few "naive" questions. So, in the XVI century. a "naive" question was posed: what would the world look like if an observer were in the Sun? ...The answer to it led to the creation of the Copernican heliocentric system. At the end of the 19th century, another "naive" question appeared: what would the world look like if an observer moved at the speed of light? ...As you know, the answer to this question was the reason for the creation of a service station. It is quite natural that at the end of the XX century a third "naive" question arose: what would the world look like if the observer shrank to the "size" of an elementary particle?" [15, pp. 231-232]. However, in fact, the world known by man, due to its materiality, is exactly the same for all observers, regardless of their location, their speed, their size, or their means and methods of reflecting it. Therefore, the very wording of the question, which allows for the possibility of such dependence, is erroneous.

As academician V. A. Fok writes, "the main feature of the classical method of describing phenomena is the assumption of complete independence of physical processes from observation conditions... Quantum mechanics has shown, however, that in the case of microprocesses this will no longer be the case; there, the very possibility of observation presupposes the presence of certain physical conditions that may be associated with the essence of the phenomenon" [22, pp. 9-10]. However, it seems that in fact, firstly, they do not "can" turn out to be related to the essence of the phenomenon, but are necessarily related to it. The physical conditions of the phenomenon must contain the cause of this phenomenon, otherwise it would not have arisen. But the reason for the phenomenon is precisely its essence. And secondly, the same thing takes place in the well-known macrocosm. It's just that in it, the conditions of observation are formed mainly in a natural way (thereby giving rise to the illusion of independence of macro processes from the conditions of observation). Thus, we have to admit: yes, the observer of the microcosm sees in it first of all what is generated by the conditions of observation created by the observer himself. But this does not mean at all that the microcosm is qualitatively different from the macrocosm. The high sensitivity of microprocesses to the conditions of observation does not make them any less material and thus less subject to the prevailing patterns in the entire material world.

As for the facts underlying non-classical physics, the following should also be borne in mind: no one has ever measured the speed of movement of the same ray of light relative to several reference frames at once, but this did not in the least prevent the proclamation of the principle of universal constancy of its speed and a priori (i.e. ahead of the facts) recognition of all the strange consequences of this principle, even for physicists themselves; no one has ever measured the force of the impact of "curved space" on the behavior of material objects, however, this did not in the least prevent the proclamation and recognition of a GRT that allows such an impact; no one has ever measured time in units of space, however, this did not in the least prevent the proclamation and recognition of a single space-time (while not confusing the measurement process with the calculation process); no one has ever measured the force of the impact "waves of probability" on the behavior of any material objects, however, this did not in the least prevent the attribution of probability to the function of the determinant of the behavior of such objects and processes; no one has ever observed a vector-free movement, but this did not in the least prevent the proclamation of the possibility of such a movement.

It is generally believed that new physics appeared with the advent of new, revolutionary ideas about the world order. But wasn't Copernicus' idea of the heliocentricity of the solar system revolutionary? Or were the ideas that forced the abandonment of the concepts of phlogiston and hydrogen not revolutionary? In fact, as can be seen from this study, it was not just the revolutionary nature of the newly appeared ideas that led to the new physics, but their revolutionary nature, which forced them to abandon the general ideas spontaneously developed by classical physics about the world known by man, which "surreptitiously" limited the creative imagination of theoretical physicists to the limits of conformity with the materiality of this world. What kind of constantly emphasized continuity between new and old physics can we talk about if the basic ideas of the new physics are incompatible with the recognition of the foundation of the world, in accordance with which the entire building of classical physics was built? Physics turned out to be on the path of delusion, ideological. And only philosophy can help her in this situation, and it is materialistic, since it is the only one that allows physicists to start from the facts they have established in a direction that corresponds to the general basis of the world, cognizable with the help of sensory organs and devices. Ironically, the ideas of the physicists themselves turned out to be the "metaphysics" that, according to Newton, physics should be afraid of. The universal constancy of the speed of light, the dependence of lengths and durations on the choice of observers, the possibility of measuring time in meters, a single spacetime, the curvature of this spacetime, vector-free movement, the uncertainty of properties and characteristics, the so-called mixing of states, the probabilistic form of determinism all these are concrete examples of such ideas. These are steps towards delusion, since all this is incompatible with the recognition of the external, material world, whereas compliance with such recognition is the most important condition for the viability of all living beings. Worldview.

Conclusion.

The main conclusion of the conducted philosophical research is that it is impossible to do without a materialistic worldview. Neither in everyday life and practice, nor in science. Therefore, the prospects for the presence of this worldview in human life are limitless. But this means that the prospects for the corresponding teaching are just as limitless. Moreover, this also applies to historical materialism as the doctrine of the laws of the sustainable functioning and development of such material systems, which are represented by a community of intelligent beings. However, speaking about the teaching of materialism, it should still be borne in mind that (to paraphrase Hegel's thought noted by Lenin in the Philosophical Notebooks about the relationship of logic with the process of thinking [23, p. 79]), materialism teaches a correct worldview no more than physiology teaches correct digestion.

As it has been shown, natural selection has taught a person to be a materialist in everyday and practical life, i.e. to recognize a world independent of any consciousness. But in order to look for the causes of phenomena in the properties and patterns of this world, and not of any consciousness, it is important to be a materialist in scientific activity. And here, especially at the theoretical level, the materialistic position should be expressed by recognizing not only the objectivity of this world, but also its materiality, since the general patterns of manifestation of all the properties and characteristics manifested in it are predetermined by it.

As for the fighters for the liberation of science from the "dogmas of materialism", they simply do not see that such liberation deprives its theoretical field of the possibility of consciously taking into account those laws of the world known by man, which are predetermined by the very foundation of this world. And they also do not see that it is not the OVF, but the instinct of self-preservation, that makes a person choose a certain worldview position; nor that in the form of OVF a person gets the opportunity only to consciously choose this position; nor that ignoring this issue in theoretical activity generates a situation of ideological disorientation in it, fraught with scientific misconceptions. And therefore they do not see all the stupidity, senselessness and futility of their struggle with materialistic teaching, because a person has to adapt to the material world.

What dialectical materialism really lacked, as follows from this study, was a more convincing justification of the principle of materialistic monism (for which, as it was shown, a more precise, broader and deeper definition of matter was required in comparison with the anthropocentric sensualistic one). Without this, the principle proclaimed by diamat did not arouse sufficient confidence and did not become a universally recognized guideline either in solving scientific problems or in creating scientific theories. Dialectics appeared in the foreground of materialism. The teaching, the essence of which, according to Lenin's statements, is "the bifurcation of the one and the knowledge of its contradictory parts" [ibid., p. 316]. At the same time, since there are undoubtedly opposites in the cognizable world that complement each other and are inseparable from each other (for example, it is both one and multiple, and the common thing in it is contained in the concrete, singular), the enrichment of materialism with dialectics as the art of taking into account the opposites inherent in the world was an important and necessary step in the development of this teaching. However, at the same time, these opposites (with their "identity and struggle") were given an unusual role in this teaching as a "source of self-movement of all things" [ibid., p. 317]. Which, it seems, was a rash step, since there are quite good reasons to believe that all changes in the world occur not because of opposites or contradictions, but because of interactions (for example, two bodies are attracted to each other not because they are opposite each other or combine the general with the specific, singular, but because they interact, they have the force of attraction). In addition, there is reason to assert that in the world itself there can be no contradictions by definition, because such statements are considered contradictory, which combine what is fundamentally incompatible in the world itself; what is connected by the mutually exclusive relationship "either one or the other". Therefore, in reality, contradictions are inherent not in the world itself, but in some erroneous ideas about it (for example, it is not movement that is contradictory, as it is commonly believed, but such an idea of it in which the movement of an object appears as its movement relative to its own places and moments of existence, whereas in fact it is not it moves and does not rest in them, but transforms by its movement relative to other objects some of its current places and moments of its existence into others. And no "inconsistency of movement", as it is shown in detail in the article [10], is observed at the same time). And all this means that the idea of the source of self-movement of the world known by man, which has developed in materialism in the conditions of an anthropocentric, sensualistic definition of matter, must be corrected. Such a source is not the opposites of this world (with all the importance of taking them into account), but its materiality, manifested in universal interaction, mutual influence and thereby interchangeability. The unjustified elevation of the opposites studied by dialectics to the rank of a source of self-movement of matter led to the fact that the place of the real cause of all natural processes turned out to be occupied in materialistic teaching by the apparent cause of these processes. Moreover, at the same time, the very materiality of the world cognized by man turned out to be obscured in the diamat by the dialectic of this world and there was a general shift of the "center of gravity" of materialistic teaching towards dialectical issues. As a result, the main and inexhaustible heuristic potential of this teaching has not been fully revealed, and materialist philosophers have been led by such "dialectical" ideas of new physics, which are fundamentally incompatible with the basis of materialistic teaching.

"Hundreds and thousands of times they declared materialism refuted, and for the one hundred and first, one thousand and first time they continue to refute it to this day" [5, p. 20]. These words were said more than a hundred years ago, but they are fully applicable to today's situation. After all, the fact that today only the Marxist-Leninist form of materialist teaching is being attacked does not change the essence of the matter, because even in this case the sharp edge of criticism is directed not at clarifying materialism, but at rejecting it, even if ridiculous, since even today this rejection is accompanied by a deep and ineradicable commitment of absolutely all people to materialism a worldview, a worldview that hides the only correct solution to the Main Question of Life, confirmed by all the experience of mankind. By the way, it is the immortal soul of materialism.

References
1. Einstein, A. (1967). Collection of scientific works. Vol. 4, 600.
2. Einstein, A. (1965). Physics and reality (pp. 359).
3. Popov, N.A. (2023). Philosophical analysis of the special theory of relativity for the correspondence of its content to the necessary condition of its objectivity.  Philosophy and culture, 2, 49-75. doi:10.7256/2454-0757.2023.2.39819
4. Philosophical Encyclopedia. (1964). (pp. 584).
5. Lenin, V.I. (1969). Materialism and empirio-criticism (pp. 392).
6. Philosophical Dictionary. (2009). (pp. 845).
7. Engels, F., & Marks, K. (1961). Anti-Dühring. (20, pp. 1-338).
8. Popov, N. A. (2021). Unambiguous determinism in captivity of illusory ideas. Philosophy and culture, 2, 12-42. doi:10.7256/2454-0757.2021.2.34741
9. Levin, G. D. (2010). Materialism. New philosophical encyclopedia (2, pp. 508-509).
10. Popov, N. A. (2020). The essence of time and space in the light of the reflective activity of the human brain. Philosophy and culture, 1, 15-38. doi:10.7256/2454-0757.2020.1.31713
11. Popov, N. A. (2022). Computer science and information vision of the world from the position of the principle of materialistic monism. Philosophy and culture, 2, 47-72. doi:10.7256/2454-0757.2022.2.37482
12. Cassidy, F.H. (2009). Heraclitus and dialectical materialism. Questions of Philosophy, 3, 142-146).
13. Ignatovich, V. N. (2014). The main question of philosophy. Economic and philosophical newspaper. Moscow State University. January 16, (Vol. 1, pp. 4). Retrivied from  http:eifgaz.ru/ignatovitch-1-14.htm 
14. Einstein, A. (1966). Collection of scientific works (Vol. 1, pp. 879).
15. Bransky, V.P. (2003). Philosophy of physics of the twentieth century. Saint Petersburg (pp. 254).
16. Karyakin, N.I. (1969). A short reference book on physics (pp. 600).
17. Lindner, G. (1977). Pictures of modern physics (pp. 272).
18. Lugovoi, A.A., Lugovaya, O.A., & Artamonova, E. V. Philosophy and physics (pp. 127-132). CyberLeninka. Retrivied from Ciberleninka.ru/article/n/filosofiya-i-fizika-na-puti-k-dialogu
19. Bohr, N. (1971). Quantum postulate and the latest development of atomic theory. Favorite scientific works, 2, 663.
20. Heisenberg, V. (1932). Physical principles of quantum theory (pp. 146).
21. Mitkevich, V. F. (1939). Materialism and Empirio-Criticism in the modern struggle against idealism in the field of physics. Basic physical views. Academy of Sciences of the USSR (pp. 209).
22. Fok, V. A. (1976). The beginnings of quantum mechanics. Science, 2, 374).
23. Lenin, V.I. (1969). Philosophical notebooks (pp. 752).

First Peer Review

Peer reviewers' evaluations remain confidential and are not disclosed to the public. Only external reviews, authorized for publication by the article's author(s), are made public. Typically, these final reviews are conducted after the manuscript's revision. Adhering to our double-blind review policy, the reviewer's identity is kept confidential.
The list of publisher reviewers can be found here.

In the reviewed article, the author returns to the consideration of philosophical materialism as a worldview position, the emergence of which is conditioned by the needs of life itself, and not by certain theoretical arguments. Of course, one should agree with the latter, emphasizing, however, that within the framework of philosophy, it is not the "truth of life" that matters, but the ability of its apologists to translate the spontaneous "sense of life" into the form of a theory that would fully and plausibly explain those phenomena (for example, cognition or sociality), the connection of which with the material "basis of life" is deeply indirect. Actually, the difficulty of realizing and demonstrating such a connection generates, as the classics of dialectical materialism spoke about in some detail, the opposite of materialism idealism. (By the way, for some reason the author does not mention why idealism in all its varieties arose in ancient times and is still being reproduced, including in connection with modern scientific research.) The author expresses the opinion that within the framework of dialectical materialism, what he calls the "missing requirement for scientific theories" has not yet been presented with due clarity: "scientific theories about the external world created on the basis of facts ... will only correspond to their content to the recognition of the objectivity of this world if their content is compatible with the recognition of its materiality." From the reviewer's point of view, this statement is difficult to recognize as fair, because in Lenin's famous definition of matter, "materiality" is precisely identified with "objectivity" (Engels did not fix this position so explicitly). The author further argues that dialectical materialism lacked "strict consistency in drawing the line of materialistic monism." It is difficult to agree with this again, it is enough to recall the famous words of Engels that Marx's merit in philosophy lies in the fact that he proved the "materiality" of those relations that develop in public life and culture, extended materialism to history and public life. However, the author of the article claims that "in fact, there was only a proclamation of this principle (the principle of materialistic monism, the reviewer), and it happened somehow in passing, in a conversation about the objectivity of space and time and in a form that causes some confusion." The author's last words are clearly inappropriate, the quoted words of Engels did not cause any "bewilderment", it is not entirely clear what should have followed the "proclamation" of this principle, so it would be nice if the author explained what its "implementation" should have consisted of. In short, the author's belief that the classics of dialectical materialism "did not finish something" seems unjustified. The real problem (and, accordingly, the content of the entire materialistic philosophy) is to investigate and reveal the complexity and specific nature of mediation between the "material basis" of the observed processes and their "spiritual epiphenomena" in each individual case, based on the problems of the theory of knowledge, the study of social relations, culture, etc. Despite the comments made, the presented article can be published in a scientific journal as an expression of the author's personal position, emphasizing the insufficiency of the development of the basic principle of dialectical materialism by Soviet philosophers. The author argues his position (although, in the opinion of the reviewer, it is not always convincing), the article meets the basic requirements for scientific publications. In a working order, I recommend removing the remark to the "joke of physicists" ("if the theory contradicts the facts, then so much the worse for the facts"), in fact, this is a "Hegelian legend" about the words of their master, and also shorten the too lengthy conclusion.

Second Peer Review

Peer reviewers' evaluations remain confidential and are not disclosed to the public. Only external reviews, authorized for publication by the article's author(s), are made public. Typically, these final reviews are conducted after the manuscript's revision. Adhering to our double-blind review policy, the reviewer's identity is kept confidential.
The list of publisher reviewers can be found here.

Review of the article Materialism as a worldview position. Article two: on the missing requirement for scientific theories and the ideological vulnerability of the basic ideas of non-classical physics, the article "Materialism as a worldview position. The second article: on the missing requirement for scientific theories and the ideological vulnerability of the basic ideas of non-classical physics", submitted by the author to the journal "Philosophy and Culture" is the second part of the study. The author points out that in the previous part he considered materialism more broadly, that is, the concept itself is presented as something beyond the philosophical worldview position (apparently we are talking about a scientific approach or the so-called "natural"?). Although without reading the previous article, it is not entirely legitimate to draw such a conclusion. The author begins with the fact that "The roots of materialism lie in the ideological condition for the survival of living beings, associated with the recognition of an external world independent of any consciousness ..." and further: "It has its roots in the question named by the author ...". What kind of question exactly? It is not entirely clear what the author means by the "ideological condition for the survival of living beings"? Perhaps "survival" does not imply a completely biological process, since the article points to its certain ideological condition? Is the worldview position sometimes presented by the author as intuition or direct contemplation? According to the author: "... thanks to natural selection, this issue is solved by all living beings in the course of their life exclusively in accordance with the materialistic worldview position." In this case, can the whole culture be only a form of adaptation and survival? Thus, from the very first paragraph, many questions arise, since a number of logical contradictions appear on the surface, which the author has definitely already resolved for himself, but at the same time considers it unnecessary to introduce the reader into his discourse (perhaps all this explanation is in the first part and then the questions are removed). The main question of philosophy is really not accidental, moreover, he himself has long been the object of constant philosophical discussions, which is proved by the article presented by the author. This alone makes such research an important element of public scientific debate, allowing us to reach a new level in understanding the problem. The problem itself obviously exists in the light of recent scientific discoveries, and especially in the way it is presented in textbooks and, accordingly, taught to students. Relevance is not specifically highlighted by the author, since this is the second part of the study. There is also no special explanation regarding the methodology on which the author of the article relies. The work contains a lot of highlighting and focusing on individual phrases that emphasize the author's position, but are not always unambiguously understood by the reader. As for the purpose and objectives of the study, the author is also vague here. But it can be assumed that one of the tasks in this work is "awareness of the origins of the spontaneous confidence of all people" and the need to come "to the realization that the idea of matter was developed on the basis of just these ideas about the world," meaning "awareness of the inextricable connection of the objectivity of the world known by man with his materiality". In this case, it is not at all clear how natural the primitive mythological view of the world with its worship of spirits can be considered? Is their objectification also the result of reductive materialism? Then it is completely unclear why materialism should resist religious views of the world so much? Is it enough to recognize the objectivity of everything that can be directly given to a person in an act of faith, since the presence of these external forces is quite obvious to religious consciousness? Perhaps the main problem stems from the author's main thesis that the identity of "objectivity and materiality" is a sufficient judgment to recognize the universality and naturalness of materialism. Although later in the article the author separates these concepts, pointing out the universality of the material as a universal interaction. Moreover, the author emphasizes that dialectical materialism lacked strict consistency in drawing the line of materialistic monism. This principle has only been proclaimed so far. The section of the article "On the ideological vulnerability of the basic ideas of non-classical physics" is presented, in my opinion, more convincingly, here the author already thoroughly analyzes some of the results of modern experimental science, linking them with the most important provisions of metaphysics. In this part of the article, the author consistently implements his tasks, striving to show that the lack of clear ideas about the material unity of the world inevitably leads to insufficiency and errors in the process of building a scientific picture of the world. The title of the article corresponds to the content, but you can consider an abbreviated version. The article is logically structured. The scientific novelty in the work is defined by the author as an attempt to substantiate materialistic monism in a new way, since, according to the author, this kind of monism has not yet been fully defined and correctly understood. Since the "main question of philosophy" is an open platform for scientific discussions, the author has every right to substantiate his own position and in this sense, novelty is present in the work. However, it seems that the opposite side, namely the idealistic position, is mentioned in passing and is not disclosed in principle by the author, even where polemic is clearly required. That is why there is a lack of critical understanding, of some classical provisions of idealism, which necessarily switch us from the field of ontology to the field of cognition. There are also a number of other questions to the author: 1. Is it assumed that materialism is really universal and the only monism in the field of worldview, which is a natural view of the world and covers all mankind without exception? In this case, the author's statements sound like a statement of fact, but devoid of any argumentation, they appear, in my opinion, not entirely convincing. Or does the author mean that the recognition of the objective world, which the subject of perception encounters at the sensory level, is already a self-sufficient proof? In this case, are we still in the position of simplified sensualism, which was so eager to overcome dialectical materialism? 2. How legitimate is it to consider materialism, contrasting its philosophical and scientific semantic context? 3. The author periodically declares the existence of the "Basic Question of Life", but does not reveal the meaning that he puts into it. 4. The stated reductionism in the study of material processes does not allow modern constructions in the field of epistemology to develop. 5. Recognition of materialistic monism as a consequence of its scientific validity or its natural (ordinary, spontaneous) origin? In other words, does the author associate the acceptance of a particular basis for a worldview with a rational justification, or does he consider it as a simple direct belief? 6. When the author writes about the properties of material objects, does he mean nature? The macrocosm? "It is materiality as a property of manifesting their existence through interaction and mutual change that allows them to "determine their entire behavior" completely independently of any consciousness and at the same time "inform" the subject who knows the world about their existence." Thus, is this property lost at the microcosm level? The conclusion in which the author presents his main conclusions, in my opinion, is very cumbersome and contains not only generalizations about the text, but also additional arguments (for example, on the topic of dialectics). The author is convinced that the only correct one is a consistent materialistic worldview, and its prospects are limitless. All other positions are only disorienting, their struggle against materialism at the same time looks like "stupidity, senselessness and futility" and is a "scientific misconception".
As a kind of proof of his position, the author suggests considering, among other things: human life experience, natural selection and the instinct of self-preservation. He further states: "in the form of OVF, a person gets the opportunity only to consciously choose this position." The previous definitions of materialism are characterized as "anthropocentric and sensualistic." In which, of course, we can agree with the author. However, his position of so-called "materialistic monism" raises no less questions. The bibliography could be expanded to include modern and classical sources. The list of references should be drawn up uniformly. There are typos in the text. Despite the comments made and personal disagreement with a number of the author's statements, I believe that this topic has good prospects and may be of interest to a wide range of audiences. The work, in my opinion, requires formal refinement, but at the same time, it is undoubtedly relevant and can be the subject of scientific discussion.