Polish campaign A.V. Suvorov 1794: truth and myths

Bogdanov Andrey Petrovich Doctor of History Senior Research Associate, Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences Dmitriya Ulyanova ulitsa 19, Moscow 117036 Russia bogdanovap@mail.ru Other publications by this author

Alexander Vasilyevich Suvorov (1730-1800) is a textbook figure. His detailed biographies began to be published during the generalissimo's lifetime ^[15] and have been diligently published to this day ^{[2] [19] [4] [71] [53] [39] [62] [8] [68] [3] [30] [38] [45] [18] [50] [6] [55] [57] [41] [73] [74]}. Major works are devoted to certain periods and aspects of the life and military activities of the commander ^{[71] [31] [17] [59] [50] [40] [46] [47] [58] [27] [43] [42] [37] [25] [69] [63] [35] [56]}. The deeds and military thought of Suvorov are considered in solid collections of articles ^{[67] [9] [11] [65]}. Countless anecdotes about Alexander Vasilyevich have been published, among which there are valuable notes by people who knew him well, such as Prince P.I. Bagration (in the transmission of his adjutant Starkov) ^{[21] [34] [70] [28] [61] [64] [14] [54] [11]}. The review of the extremely extensive, but mostly journalistic literature about Suvorov takes up entire books ^{[49] [12]}. The written legacy of the commander himself, describing in detail his life, thought and works, has been published since the 19th century. ^{[26] [51] [52]}. To date, it has been fully published in scientific publications ^{[24] [10] [66]}.

Despite the solidity of research and publications about Suvorov, we cannot state that the life, military thought and deeds of Russia's best commander are well known and understandable to us today. Even the basic facts of his biography, including his date of birth, were doubtful until recently. It was only at the end of the 20th century that it was finally established that the greatest Russian commander was born on November 13, 1730, and not 1729. But the main drawback of the literature about Suvorov was and remains not factual, but the refusal to explore his own thought in its beautifully expressed development by himself.

The situation is paradoxical: all the significant materials about his life and work have been diligently identified and perfectly published. The main editions of Suvorov's documents and letters adhere to the chronological principle of the arrangement of the material. They directly indicate that Suvorov's thought should be studied in its development. Nevertheless, there is no such attempt among the numerous books about the generalissimo. It seems that the greatest Russian commander did not think at all, but was simply born with a set of victorious ideas. But what kind of ideas?

We can truly understand any human thought only in its development, and in the formulations of the thinker himself. However, historians, depicting Alexander Vasilyevich as a bronze monument, did not limit themselves to a detailed description of his deeds. For two centuries, they have replaced Suvorov's life and thought with the myth of the initially invincible commander without any shadow of doubt. And, in my opinion, cynically, they changed his words in a way that seemed more beautiful to them.

A classic quote in literature: "Every soldier should know his maneuver." But Suvorov wrote differently: "Every soldier must understand his maneuver" ^{[10, vol. IV, No. 24]}. – Evaluate the difference between the concepts of "know" and "understand"!

Describing Suvorov's tactics, his credo is quoted: "eye, speed, onslaught." The true dictum of the commander reads:

                                 "Here's my tactic:

                                 bravery, courage,

                                 insight, foresight,

                                 order, moderation, charter,

                                 the eye, the speed, the onslaught,

                                 humanity, pacification, oblivion" ^{[66, p.386]}.

First, the military spirit, then a sophisticated mind and discipline, after them – an accurate, swift and strong attack, and finally, as the goal of defeating the enemy – a humane world.

In myth-making, colleagues were helped by a huge literature of pseudo-memories and anecdotes about Suvorov, published in the first half of the XIX century. Few, like D.A. Milyutin ^{[39] [40]}, I.I. Rostunov ^[57] and V.S. Lopatin ^[35], managed to get away from her, immersed in the original documents and letters of the commander, who thought about his every word with the greatest seriousness.

Suvorov considered the reliability of all data and figures, the accuracy of expressions and careful choice of words to be one of the cornerstones of military art. Suvorov's attitude to the word was enthusiastically studied by philologists. The commander left behind a large number of texts in several languages (mainly in Russian, French and German). He also wrote poetry. And good ones. Here is a friendly epigram on Prince Potemkin:

"He plays chess with one hand,

                       With his other hand he conquers the nations,

                       With one foot he strikes friend and foe,

                       With another he tramples the universes of the shore" ^{[66, pp. 468-469]}.

Suvorov was no stranger to social and literary life, so the research of philologists helps to understand his character. But first of all, he was a genius who made a revolution in the art of war on such a scale that at the end of his life he estimated himself simply: "He is not equal to anyone. Do I want to be equal? – he asked again, highlighting the importance of the conclusion, and repeated: "Judge – I am not equal to anyone" ^{[66, p. 395]}.

What does this "not equal" mean? We know that the commander admired his predecessors and sought to catch up with them: Prince Eugene of Savoy and Marshal Turenne, Hannibal and Caesar. He called General Fermor his second father, and General Weissmann his equal. He rejoiced when he bypassed military geniuses. "I am better than the late great king of Prussia," he remarked to Paul I, an admirer of Frederick the Great – I, by the grace of God, did not lose battles" ^{[10, vol. III, No. 593]}. And after the victorious Italian and Swiss campaigns, he proudly said: "Choose a hero, catch up with him, overtake him! My hero is Caesar. The Alps are behind us and God is in front of us! Russian eagles have flown over Roman eagles!" ^{[70, p. 140]} But at the end of his life, summing up its results, he really did not know any examples above himself. And therefore he ordered to write on his grave: "Suvorov lies here." – No rank, the highest in the army. No title of Count of the two empires. Not even initials.

He hoped that his descendants would understand him. Philologists, by the way, appreciated the power and reliability of the Suvorov word. And they, unlike historians, emphasized that Alexander Vasilyevich is not just a "General Forward!", but an extremely intelligent and prudent man who did not hope for military happiness and the indomitable steadfastness of his "Miracle Heroes". Commanding "Forward!", even at the peak of his military career, he carefully prepared everything for a reliable victory, not forgetting the ways of possible retreat.

Suvorov "was proud because he commanded the sword" ^{[10, vol. II, No. 272]}. He answered court slander with irony: "Today is happiness, tomorrow is happiness, God have mercy, one day one must have the ability"! ^{[10, vol. II. No. 209, 210]}. But how did he manage to defeat everyone, everywhere and always? What was the secret of Suvorov's military thought? This, oddly enough, is a question that I had to answer on my own when writing a book about the great commander ^[16].

Military historians did not respond to it for various reasons, including political ones. For example, who could write that the sacred commander very often did not command his troops? We have descriptions of battles in which Alexander Vasilyevich did not interfere at all, because he won the battle before it began. There are documents where the commander requires officers not to report to him, not to wait for orders, but to act according to the situation within the framework of the most general disposition. The initiative of those who fight should have won, and the whole army should act as a single organism. This organic theory was developed by Suvorov in great detail. But the bottom line is that all his ideas were organic to this unified theory, which the reader will be able to understand from my book. And no idea can be considered in isolation from it.

The mighty personality of Suvorov, who by his very appearance on the battlefield changed the psychology of Russian and even Austrian soldiers – and these miracles are recorded in the sources – obscured from historians the fact that it was not one small, dry general who won, who laughed at his own infirmity, but the mighty mental structure that he created for decades, and which was centuries ahead of his time. It has outstripped both in general and in some of its aspects, for example, logistics.

Everyone has heard about the incredible Suvorov campaigns, when his soldiers, as if on wings, flew huge distances at an impossible speed. Suvorov made no secret of his method. Starting with the transfer of the Suzdal infantry regiment, which rushed to Smolensk from Staraya Ladoga in 30 days, having overcome 927 km. due to bad roads in November-December 1768, Rumyantsev's army, which will advance next year from Ryabaya Grave to Larga and Kagul, will lose a third of its composition at three times less distance. Suvorov's result is different: one soldier died, Rodin fled and three were left on the way in hospitals, but mostly "people and horses are healthy" and ready for new campaigns. There is no secret: the regiment, according to Suvorov, overcame the transition "on wheels". He simply put soldiers on carts, and the whole problem was to repair "very bad" crossings and the proactive work of quartermasters ^{[66, No. 4]}.

There is only one way to understand the true greatness of a commander who left nothing to chance. This is a thorough study of documents, an understanding of Suvorov's thoughts and an assessment of his decisions as a whole, with all the previous considerations prompted by decades of difficult practice. You will say that this is the natural way of scientific analysis. Right. Moreover, it is necessary to follow this path in studying the thoughts and deeds of a commander who did not want anything for himself and gave his whole life to the glory of Russia.

*          *          *

The salvation of Warsaw and the liberation of Poland from the rebels in 1794 is a great and undeservedly overlooked feat of Suvorov by historians. There are a lot of lies and shameful omissions piled up around him. This is strange. Suvorov himself, who put humanity at the forefront and revered "virtue", without which "there is neither glory nor honor," was proud of his second Polish campaign. The army, which he formed and trained during the campaign, brilliantly fulfilled the main task of the armed forces: she swiftly eliminated the war.

It was the war that was Suvorov's main enemy. She demanded the blood of soldiers and countless victims from the civilian population. The soldier's task was to protect civilians, and all of them, not just Russian citizens. And to protect not just in the process of war, but by "overcoming" the disasters inevitably entailed by the continuation of the war. The second main value after the life and well-being of peaceful people was for Suvorov the life and health of his soldiers. The third, almost equally important– was the life of the enemies who fought against the Russians with weapons in their hands. Only the rapid defeat of their main forces allowed Suvorov to make do with minimal casualties among opponents, whether Turks, Poles or the French.

The tasks of the army, which Suvorov formulated by the end of the first Polish campaign of 1769-1772 and persistently developed in the future, were to stop the war and save people's lives – in the specified sequence – by rapidly defeating the main forces of the enemy, depriving him of the ability to resist and appeasing with mercy.

In the Polish campaign of 1794, the main tasks of the army were carried out perfectly. Suvorov reduced the duration of military operations to a shocking minimum. The civilian population was minimally affected by the war, which at first seemed long and bloody to everyone. The losses of the Russian troops were small even for Alexander Vasilyevich. The losses of Polish soldiers and militia did not exceed 15%. Most Poles laid down their arms and gained freedom "with the oblivion of everything that happened."

Only the ambitions of a part of the nobility suffered. But they have suffered regularly in recent centuries. And they could not help but suffer, because they did not correspond to historical realities in the slightest. Unable to fight against Suvorov with weapons, the rebel leaders released by the victor, as well as their foreign allies, spread ridiculous rumors throughout Europe about Alexander Vasilyevich's bloodthirstiness, especially when he liberated Warsaw. They do not correspond to Suvorov's character and beliefs, his behavior in all other campaigns, as well as reliable facts about the losses of the Russian and Polish sides during the storming of the fortified suburb of Warsaw – Prague.

Accusations against the commander from those whom he defeated and released – on horseback, with personal weapons (many for the second and some for the third time, in order to meet them in Italy in 1799, defeat them and release them again on "my word of honor", which meant an empty phrase for the nobility) – a wonderful an example of historical irony. Russian Russian newspapers were especially active in exaggerating this absurdity, invariably pouring mud on Russians at times when British politicians did not save their country with Russian blood.

After Russia rendered a service to England by defeating Napoleon, the Times broke out an article on Suvorov on 01/26/1818: "Although the ferocity of his orders is well known from the terrible sacrifices of Ochakov, Izmail and Prague (where 60,000 Poles were sacrificed to his vindictiveness), sometimes he demonstrated a much more extravagant fervor of cruelty. With regard to the French, in particular, he felt a kind of fierce disgust," etc. – The version is funny, given that in the Italian campaign of 1799 Suvorov spared the French and released their officers, and Ushakov quarreled with Nelson because of the bloodthirstiness of the British, who killed prisoners...

In general, Suvorov's accusations of bloodlust have become a litmus test of impotence and a guilty conscience. Napoleon Bonaparte, who treacherously abandoned his troops in Egypt to carry out a military coup in Paris, justified himself by saying that Suvorov, this "barbarian, drenched in the blood of Poles, brazenly threatened the French people." "The terrible Russian field Marshal Suvorov, this half–man and half–demon in one person," Napoleon defended himself, "was going to cross Saint-Gotthard ... The situation was not just bad – it was very bad. No one could hold back the Russian Field Marshal Suvorov, who defeated any army sent against him."

Ridiculous accusations against Suvorov may be of interest in analyzing the nature and intentions of the persons who put them forward. They are related to Alexander Vasilyevich only in the sense that they are still used by unscrupulous historians and publicists who aim to "refresh" their meaningless judgments about the commander with lies, whose actions and motives they do not know how and do not try to understand.

Studies of the 1794 campaign, both in general works and in special works ^{[75] [62, ch. 2] [29] [44] [23]} they do not give a clear picture of what was happening, first of all, from the point of view of Suvorov's thought. Meanwhile, he revealed in detail the meaning of a complex set of measures to save Poland from the rebels in his letters and documents ^{[10, vol. III. ¹ 354–428] [66, ¹ 465–503]}. It is to them that we will turn.

*          *          *

The catastrophe that happened in Poland in 1794 could have been prevented. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was already in full swing in the summer of 1792. On June 21, Suvorov, while in Finland, petitioned the Empress to transfer to Poland so that the unrest there "would come to an end soon." "Polish affairs do not require Count Suvorov! The Empress wrote back. – The Poles are already asking for a truce" ^{[10, vol. III, No. 130]}. And so it happened. Russian and Prussian troops entered Poland and established the authority of King Stanislaw Poniatowski. On January 23, 1793, the neighbors agreed on the second partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, according to which Catherine the Great received the Belarusian and Ukrainian regions. About 280 thousand km2 and 3 million Orthodox, with the consent of the Polish Sejm, were freed from the power of the Catholic gentry state and reunited with the lands of Ancient Russia.

The beginning of the Polish Uprising in 1794 under the leadership of Tadeusz Kosciuszko ^{[1] [7] [5] [22] [76]} Suvorov met in the South of Russia, where he was sent from Finland in connection with the threat of Turkish war by the rescript of Catherine II dated November 10, 1792 ^{[10, vol. III, No. 175]}. Having led the troops of the Yekaterinoslav province, Taurida and the newly annexed lands between the Bug and the Dniester, Alexander Vasilyevich vigorously engaged in improving the health of soldiers and their training, establishing supplies, building fortresses and long–range reconnaissance - up to the composition of the French squadron moving to the Dardanelles. The rumor of this appointment quickly reached the Turkish government – the High Porte – and, according to the Russian resident in Istanbul, A.S. Khvostov, pretty much removed the possibility of war, which the revolutionary French pushed the Turks to.

In Novorossiya, Suvorov was engaged not only in military affairs. He literally left his mark everywhere in the form of cities, fortresses, ports, public buildings and temples ^{[10, vol. II, ¹ 175-353] [66, ¹ 423-503]}. But his main brainchild, of course, was the army. Arriving in the South, Suvorov was not satisfied with reports on the state of the troops. He conducted a thorough audit of them, dismissing soldiers unable to serve, ensuring the fate of the disabled and drawing up a "table of troops" indicating the number of healthy, sick and seconded soldiers and officers, with the calculation of the required "in addition" to the regular strength of each unit. Shops and warehouses were subjected to no less thorough revision ^{[10, vol. III, No. 196, appendix. 1–2]}. Alexander Vasilyevich made extraordinary efforts to restore the number and supply of troops, primarily by increasing the level of sanitation, improving the work of doctors and hospitals, treating patients and "returning to the units of the wrongly seconded." His concerns concerned every barrel of artillery, every military doctor and student of the military surgical school, every paramedic and wagon wheel, every driver of the army mobile store. Based on a thorough analysis of the causes of high mortality, which Suvorov found in the south, he approved the "Rules for medical ranks" ^{[10, vol. III, No. 257, appendix. 1]} on the protection of the health and life of soldiers during peace and in battle.

The war did not happen, but in order to assess further events, it is important to understand that its absence was a salvation for the Turks. Before reviewing the existing concept of Suvorov's campaign in Poland in the literature, it should be taken into account that before that, in the South of Russia, Suvorov carefully prepared everything for war, received detailed information about the enemy and drew up an accurate military-political plan for the defeat of the Ottoman Empire ^{[10, vol. III, No. 281-282]}. The Turks' preservation of Istanbul, which Suvorov's army and F.F. Ushakov's fleet were supposed to take, turned into the salvation of Poland, in which the affairs of Austria, Prussia and Russia were going terribly badly.

Unlike the last Polish uprising, which Suvorov successfully fought in 1769-1772, now the Poles did not act anarchically. The uprising led by Tadeusz Kosciuszko involved well-trained Polish troops led by experienced generals. On Easter night, April 7, 1774, the 12 thousandth Russian garrison in Warsaw, unarmed on the occasion of a solemn divine service, was suddenly attacked, suffered heavy losses and barely escaped from the city. Polish graduates of the best European universities, who led the uprising, clearly organized the massacre of the civilian population: Russians and all those who did not sympathize with the rebellion. Up to 4 thousand people were killed ^{[66, No. 470]}. Having completely taken command of the army, the rebels repelled the Russian and Prussian offensive on Warsaw by August, drove the Austrians out of the Lublin voivodeship and pushed Field Marshal N.V. Repnin's corps in Lithuania.

Of course, the forces of the parties were unequal. There was discord in Poland itself. By moving serious armies there, the three great European powers had every chance to suppress the uprising and literally burn out the Polish land. Suvorov, who realized in his first campaign in Poland that his enemy was precisely the war, which for many of its participants was like a "mother of his own", was sure that the Poles could only hope for a miracle. And it appeared in the person of Suvorov.

Initially, Alexander Vasilyevich, busy preparing for the "real war", was skeptical about the news of the next unrest in Poland and the decree of Catherine II on the disbandment of Polish troops dated April 23, 1794 ^{[10, vol. III, No. 308, 313]}. The decree announcing Prince Repnin's command of military operations in Poland and the separation of part of the troops of I.P. Saltykov's corps from him required Suvorov to stretch his right wing to the Bratslav and Izyaslav provinces. Naturally, Suvorov did not want to do this, which he notified Saltykov on May 6 ^{[10, vol. III, No. 313]}; on the contrary, he himself expected Saltykov to send troops "to the newly acquired regions" along the Dniester ^{[10, vol. III, No. 314]}. Nevertheless, assuming the inevitability of a new rescript of the "Mother Empress", on May 7 he ordered the preparation of troops for relocation ^{[10, vol. III, No. 315]}. On May 8, he already began to act ^{[10, vol. III, No. 316]}. And on the 10th he entered under the command of Field Marshal P.A. Rumyantsev, who led the troops in the South of Russia ^{[10, vol. III, No. 317, 321]}.

This appointment could have tied Suvorov's hands in the Turkish war, but it turned out to be saving for Poland. Transferring responsibility for the security of the South of Russia to Rumyantsev, Alexander Vasilyevich in May became increasingly interested in the peaceful disarmament of Poles in the Bratslav province ^{[10, vol. III, No. 319, 327]}. At the same time, he was instructed to complete the strengthening of the Turkish border ^{[10, vol. III, No. 322]}. But there was a war in Poland, and the Turks, according to Suvorov, were not going to fight yet. It is not surprising that on May 25, 1774, Suvorov reported to Rumyantsev that he had marched to the Bratslav province himself ^{[10, vol. III, No. 329]}, and on June 13 asked him for permission to march to Poland in order to avoid "languid idleness", with an ironic promise to pacify the riot and "keep up with the construction of fortresses" ^{[10, vol. III, No. 331]}. From Suvorov's letter to his old combat comrade I.M. de Ribas, we know that the decision to personally "end the matter in Poland" was made by the commander on June 4 ^{[66, No. 466]}.

Suvorov outlined his motives in a letter to de Ribas dated June 14. He knew that the elder brother of the Empress's favorite, Major General Nikolai Zubov, being a charge d'affaires in Warsaw and fleeing from there, increased the panic at court; that Valerian Zubov, who went to Repnin's troops in Poland, it was advantageous for Achilles to gain fame "not to rush to the end of the case" – as it was in the last Polish the campaign that Suvorov was not allowed to finish with all his might ^{[16, pp. 119-185]}. He could not afford to profit from the war, from the blood of soldiers and the suffering of the population, although he was nobody in the Polish scenario.

Prince N.V. Repnin, who was much and deservedly disliked by Suvorov, was appointed commander-in-chief in Poland. He was 4 years younger than Suvorov, he was ahead of him in his career, although he shone more in the diplomatic service than in the military. Repnin's victory at Machin in 1791 was decisive and quite "Suvorov", with few losses. However, it was stolen, because it was Repnin who convinced Potemkin, when he left for St. Petersburg, to transfer command to him, and not to Suvorov, who would "lead the army to Constantinople or ruin it" ^{[36, p. 23]}. Most of all, Suvorov was afraid that Repnin would lead the same policy in Poland as before, when he was ambassador in Warsaw and actually led the long-term ruin, if not, as they said, to the Lordly Confederates (1764-1769). "Prince Repnin is the commander–in-chief of the troops in Poland and Lithuania," Suvorov complained, and "I am condemned to be an engineering conductor" ^{[66, No. 468]}.

Alas, the situation was even worse. Appointed commander-in-chief on April 30, Repnin received neither the authority nor the right to leave Riga for the troops, not only in the Warsaw area, but even in Brest. The president of the Military College, General-in-Chief N.I. Saltykov, was completely zero in military affairs (the last time he sniffed gunpowder in 1769), was jealous not only of Suvorov, to whom he spoiled the blood both in Finland and Novorossiya, but also of Repnin. Suvorov could not be controlled accurately, but Saltykov doubted that Repnin could be kept on a short leash if he were in the theater of operations. Saltykov took over the entire management of military operations. Repnin only received permission to leave Riga on June 29, but only to Nesvizh. The result of the guidance of directives from St. Petersburg was disastrous. A month later, Russian troops cleared Poland and Lithuania. On August 1, Repnin took Vilna, but he himself found himself surrounded by partisans. Bound hand and foot, and at the same time responsible in the eyes of society for everything, Repnin resigned. On September 1, Catherine refused him. The Russian troops were ready to take up winter quarters, the war had clearly become protracted.

Anticipating such a development, Suvorov bombarded the field marshal with requests to let him go to Poland. Rumyantsev did not notice Suvorov's petitions, although he accepted him on June 24 and spoke very kindly ^{[66, No. 471]}. On June 30, Alexander Vasilyevich tried to appeal to the favorite of the Empress Platon Zubov, transparently hinting that with his sword he could "extinguish the "fire" of the uprising "in an instant" ^{[10, vol. III, No. 333]}. Without receiving answers, Suvorov informed Rumyantsev about the continuation of the movement of troops to Lithuania ^{[10, vol. III, No. 336, 339, 340]}, not forgetting to perform command duties in the South of Russia. On June 24, he begged the field marshal to release him from his duties as an "engineer" ^{[10, vol. III, No. 346]}, and asked the Empress to let him volunteer for the allied forces (Austria against the French), since the Russian army does not have "military practice" corresponding to his rank ^{[10, vol. III, No. 347]}. Suvorov was really immersed in the war of the British and Austrians against revolutionary France, foreseeing "devastation unheard of since the 12th century" and wanting to help avoid them ^{[66, No. 474]}. On August 2, the Empress replied with an affectionate but firm refusal ^{[10, vol. III, No. 351]}.

Nevertheless, Suvorov's demarches were successful. On August 7, when things in Poland and Lithuania were already worse than ever, Rumyantsev released him for action in Poland and Lithuania, expressing the hope that the commander would defeat everyone with his glorious name; the troops trained by Suvorov were to remain in Southern Russia. However, in the Helm and Lublin voivodeships, Alexander Vasilyevich could subdue two corps, in total 6 infantry battalions, 10 cavalry squadrons, 500 Cossacks and 8 field guns ^{[10, vol. III, No. 354]}. But Suvorov was able to march from Nemirov to Lithuania on August 14 with only 2 regiments and 2 battalions ^{[10, vol. III, No. 355]}. Along the way, he joined scattered detachments. Rumyantsev was right: at the very sound of Suvorov's name, the rebels left Vilna. But at the same time, the Poles drove the Prussians away from Warsaw, and the total number of their soldiers has already exceeded 100 thousand.

Subsequently, Catherine the Great declared: "I sent two armies to Poland–one active, the other -Suvorov." She understood pe