Rehabilitation of the idea of German regional hegemony in German political thought (1989-2013)

Tret'yakov Artemii Dmitrievich Postgraduate Student, Department of Modern and Contemporary History of European and American Countries, Lomonosov Moscow State University M.V. Lomonosov 121552, Russia, Moscow, Kolmogorova str., 1 tretyakov.10501@gmail.com Other publications by this author

After the end of the Cold War, in the mass consciousness of European residents, as well as in a number of works by foreign and domestic researchers, Germany was perceived as a hidden European hegemon. This is due to the historical memory of the First and Second World Wars, as well as the economic success of Germany in the second half of the twentieth century. At the same time, German post-war political thought treated the idea of domination in Europe with understandable caution. Thinkers such as T. Mann, Y. Habermas and V. Repke^[1] warned the Germans about the danger of new aspirations to the status of a great power.

Nevertheless, the unification of Germany in 1990 caused the expectation of a multiple increase in the weight of Germany in the system of international relations. Such forecasts, formulated initially by American realist researchers C. Ballmer, W. Paterson^[2] and J. Miersheimer^[3], were actively discussed in Germany. However, a significant number of German thinkers (M. Shtak^[4], H. Muller^[5] F. Rittberger^[6] et al.) linked the possible strengthening of their country's influence, first of all, with leadership in international institutions and integration processes in the European Union.

During the period of the "unipolar moment" (the time period from 1990 to 2001, highlighted by the American political scientist Ch. The idea of German regional dominance, embedded in the world hegemony of the United States, was gradually confirmed in the works of scientists.  Changes in the European balance of power after the unification of Germany have given rise to fears and hopes that Berlin will increase its political ambitions in accordance with its economic potential. The unconditional termination of the formal occupation and the willingness to defend national interests after unification re-energized the debate about what constituted German "normality"^[7].

The so-called "Normalization debate" that took place in the expert community in the 1990s was a discussion about the gradual return to Berlin of the attributes of full sovereignty, in particular military power. German thinkers discussed the further role of Germany in world and, especially, European politics. During this period, the traditionally important role of "memory politics" for German public thought was replaced by "euphoria from unification"^[8]. German researchers, proponents of different approaches to international relations, generally welcomed the "normalization" of Germany's foreign policy, subject to active participation in the work of the institutions of the European Union^[9].

In the early 1990s, there was a search for consensus among non-German political scientists on the problem of the potential role of a united Germany in Europe. A number of questions about the future policy of Germany became relevant: why does Berlin not have political power commensurate with its economic potential? What would the "normalization" of Germany's foreign policy mean for the future of the European Union? Would Germany be able to exert a stabilizing influence on the European region as a whole? German researchers, unlike some American colleagues, did not claim that Germany claimed the status of a new global power. However, the idea of local leadership within the European Union ceased to be politically incorrect and became extremely relevant.

The concept of German hegemony in Europe has deep historical roots. However, in its most relevant form, it began to form in the first half of the twentieth century, when representatives of German political thought were actively engaged in studying the very concept of "hegemony". The works of G. Tripel, L. Dehiyo and R. Stadelman laid the foundations of a realistic approach to the role of the dominant power in the system of international relations. Through German-speaking researchers who emigrated to the USA, such as G. Morgenthau, these views on hegemony became an organic part of the theory of hegemonic stability developed in the USA. This theory, taking into account various alternative approaches to it, is based on the fact that the hegemon state is a subject dominating the economy, the military sphere and culture. Although there is disagreement over whether a State can claim hegemon status in the absence of military superiority or whether economic power is a sufficient condition for establishing rules, the three aforementioned elements of power are common to most approaches. This is ideological (cultural) dominance, providing justification for the adoption of the international hierarchy by other players, military potential (the ability to coerce and protect) and economic power (financial potential, market control and active participation in the establishment of trade rules and regulations).

Calls for German leadership after the Cold War were, in part, based on the theory of hegemonic stability. According to it, the hegemon sets norms, but at the same time creates a system of incentives for those countries that are lower in the hierarchy. This is required in order for them to benefit and stay in the system. In particular, the hegemon makes short-term concessions to those on whom it relies to ensure its long-term interests. Such an interpretation of the theory of hegemonic stability is fixed in the political thought of the united Germany.

In 1992, German economists A. Markowitz and S. Reich argued that already in the 70s–80s of the twentieth century, the economic hegemony of Germany in the European Union was formed. This was due to the fact that the European market was "captured by German exports" and, thanks to this, had greater stability. The authors understood hegemony, according to G. Trippel, as a hierarchical system in which the leading state exerts a "determining influence" and sets the rules of the game, and subordinate countries agree with this provision^[10]. In this context, hegemony in international relations was perceived as a degree of influence located between "influence" (der Einfluss) and "domination" (die Herrschaft). The researchers predicted for Germany the establishment of not only economic, but also cultural primacy in the long term. Its cause should have been the close ties of Bonn, and later Berlin, with Eastern Europe ^[11]. In their next work, the authors developed the thesis of German regional hegemony, which, in their opinion, intensified in the 90s. The study provides statistical data that German direct investments in Eastern Europe amounted to 3 billion in 1995. German marks. Thus, they corresponded to the level of US investment in this region^[12]. On the basis of economic and potential cultural superiority, Markowitz and Reich predicted Germany's dominance on the European continent.

An alternative view of the source of hegemony was proposed by the German scientist H. Maul, a researcher of post-war politics in Germany and Japan. In his works, "role expectations of other states" play an important role in determining the course of the FRG^[13]. These expectations contributed to the formation of cultural and institutional hegemony through Berlin's desire to "civilize" international relations and comply with international law, even to the detriment of short-term national interests. In Maul's concept, the value leadership of post-war Germany exerted almost more influence on increasing its role than the economy. 

During this period, the main task of German regional leadership was the expansion of the European Union to the East. In the context of this, the so-called "Schaeuble–Lamers Plan" is interesting - a project of a group of Bundestag deputies from the Christian Democratic Union. (?berlegungen zur europ?ischen Politik // Webarchieve. 1994. [electronic resource]. URL: https://web.archive.org/web/20160318173446/https://www.cducsu.de/upload/schaeublelamers94.pdf). Germany was to play a leading role in this project and increase its political influence in Europe in accordance with its economic potential: "Germany could be called upon, or, based on the need to ensure its own security, try to independently ensure the stabilization of Eastern Europe," the text of the draft states. It is important to note that V. Schaeuble, one of the authors of the plan, was not only a conservative politician, but also a public supporter of the Theory of hegemonic stability in the interpretation of Ch. Kindleberger. During the European debt crisis in 2010, while serving as Finance Minister, Schaeuble said that, in his opinion, the conclusions of a well-known American theorist should be applied in current policy: "Kindleberger's central message in 2010 is more important than ever. And this message reads: "In order for the world economy to be stable, it needs a leading nation, a benevolent hegemon or a "stabilizer"" (Speech by Federal Finance Minister V. Schaeuble at the Sorbonne University 02.11.2010 [Electronic resource].URL:http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Reden/2010/2010 11-02 sorbonne.html?view=renderPrint). The Schaeuble-Lamers plan was a reflection of the concept of Germany as the "Core of Europe" (Kerneuropa), an economic leader launching centripetal processes of European integration, which was relevant in the 1990s.

Despite the fact that the hegemonic Schaeuble-Lamers project was not implemented, Germany, in accordance with its interests, for a while turned into an exponent of the position of Central and Eastern European candidates for membership in the European Union. Already in 1995, according to German researcher E. Cooper, Germany played an important role in the accession of Austria, Sweden and Finland to the EU, striving to fulfill for Europe the consolidating function that the United States performed for the entire Western world^[14]. An example of Germany's new policy as an integration leader was the Weimar Triangle, a joint project with France on the political and economic integration of Poland into the structures of a united Europe, launched in 1991 by Foreign Minister H.D. Genscher. Also in this context, numerous programs of the Eastern Partnership with the countries of the former USSR, primarily with Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and the countries of Transcaucasia, were considered. The studies of political scientist M. Ecker-Erhard show that during this period it was the expansion of the European Union that the Germans perceived as a mission and attribute of the new "moral hegemony" of Germany, which was supposed to complement its economic power^[15].

At the same time, in the first half of the 1990s, a number of German scientists were more skeptical about the possible German hegemony in Europe. F. Ritberger^[16] and K. Wolf^[17] in their works assumed that the course of a united Germany would be fundamentally unchanged: a strong economy, but a passive foreign policy. However, the armed conflicts in Yugoslavia and in the republics of the former USSR, as some researchers show, caused the Germans to fear the destabilization of Eastern and Central Europe. This could require Germany to be more active, including a power policy^[18]. The German historian and biographer of K. Adenauer H. P. Schwartz published his work "The Central Power of Europe in 1994. Germany's return to the world stage", in which he criticized the German elite for indecision and called for playing a leading role in a united Europe, including in the settlement of regional conflicts^[19].

In 1995, the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany abolished the provisions that a military threat should never again come from the territory of Germany (even corresponding to Article 115 "Case of defense"). This previously determined the limited nature of the German army's participation in NATO's foreign operations. The effect of Articles 53, 77 and 107 of the UN Charter on "aggressor states" was also revised, which pointed to Germany as the legal successor of the Third Reich^[20].   Also during this period, Germany sought to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Having the status of a non-permanent member in 1995-1996, Berlin actively participated in initiatives to reform the Council. The foreign policy activity approved by the population and the expert-analytical community made it possible to temporarily end the "debate on normalization" and legitimize the use of military force by Germany abroad.

In G. Hellman's essay "Goodbye, Bismarck? The Foreign Policy of modern Germany" (1995) was aimed at systematizing German political thought in the period after the unification of the country and determining what positions the German establishment has on the future of their state in Europe and the world. The author noted that the first five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall significantly changed the outlook and self-consciousness of the Germans. In his opinion, within the framework of the "normalization debate", the idea of an active foreign policy and Germany's central place on the continent was accepted by most of the German elites^[21].

The NATO military operation against the Bosnian Serbs in 1995, as well as the aggression against Yugoslavia in March – April 1999, were the first examples of the use of the Bundeswehr outside Germany, which caused a rather mixed reaction in the German expert and analytical community. Berlin in the mid-1990s, during the culmination of the unipolar moment, sought to refute the status of a "stowaway" and "security importer". In Bosnia, Kosovo, and later in Afghanistan, about 10 thousand German troops were involved. As noted by political scientist G.I. Gissman, "Germany sees NATO primarily as a community of states based on common values and a political alliance, not a military pact"^[22]. This was due to the fact that the post-war German political culture provided for a more cautious use of force, in comparison with the American one. The Bundeswehr soldiers in Afghanistan mainly trained the local military contingent and engaged in intelligence, and sending them to Afghanistan was associated with serious debates in the Bundestag.

Nevertheless, according to a number of analysts, despite the fact that Germany's active Balkan policy generally corresponded to national interests, and the Bundeswehr's participation in Afghanistan was extremely limited, German moral leadership was called into question^[23]. The debate about the dominant role of Germany in Europe after 1999 again inevitably ran in parallel with the theme of historical politics and the correct perception of the country's past^[24].

The conclusions of some German thinkers about the change in the perception of Germany's active foreign policy and the rehabilitation in the public consciousness of its use of military force turned out to be too hasty. By the beginning of the XXI century, the rejection of Berlin's participation in conflicts abroad caused a reaction in the form of a resumption of the "normalization debate"^[25]. At the end of the 1990s, there was a process that the political scientist V. Hilz calls the "subsidence of integration euphoria" (Integrationseuphorie) (Hilz W. Perspektiven der deutschen Au?enpolitik seit 1989 / BBP. 2009. [Electronic resource] URL: https://www.bpb.de/shop/zeitschriften/izpb/7917/perspektiven-der-deutschen-aussenpolitik-seit-1989/). In addition to a new understanding of Germany's moral right to hegemony in Europe, its role as a locomotive of regional integration was reviewed. The process, which can be described as the "renationalization" of foreign policy, coincided with the arrival of the government of Chancellor G. Schroeder, significantly changed the course of Berlin. According to Hiltz, Germany could no longer act as the main beneficiary of the expansion of the European Union to the East, where the United States began to play a more active role. In this regard, Berlin's foreign policy in Europe gradually shifted to an alliance with Paris and mutually beneficial cooperation with Moscow.

From the point of view of X. Such a turn indicated the loss of Germany's regional influence in the first half of the 2000s and the loss of cultural and ideological hegemony in Europe^[26]. Berlin, he believes, has also unjustifiably jeopardized its traditional reputation as a guarantor of European integration. According to the researcher, good relations with Russia and China could not compensate for the loss of these positions. In the debate about the new normality at the beginning of the XXI century, the problem of the price that Germany should pay for the role of the "locomotive of the EU" was identified.

A difficult moment in the formation of the idea of German European leadership was the refusal of Chancellor G. Schroeder to support the US intervention in Iraq in alliance with French President Jacques Chirac and Russian President Vladimir Putin. This alliance was the culmination of a brief period of "renationalization" of Berlin's foreign policy, which meant the priority of German national interests over integration tasks and the place of a regional leader in the system of Washington's global hegemony. In addition, there were disagreements between Germany and the United States on issues of interaction within the framework of the Kyoto Protocol, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and other arms control initiatives. Also, one of Schroeder's important initiatives was the creation of the G4 group represented by Germany, Japan, India and Brazil, whose goal was to expand the UN Security Council. Here, the policy of the new chancellor continued the previously started line on UN reform and Germany's attempt to gain a foothold in the Security Council^[27].

The stage of "renationalization" coincided with a surge of interest in the concept of hegemony in German political thought. Researcher of international relations Sh . Robel published the monograph "Hegemony in International Relations: lessons from the failure of the Theory of Hegemonic Stability"^[28] (2001), where he studied in detail the provisions of the theory, criticizing its supporters for economic determinism and inattention to the internal social factors of states. Robel suggested paying attention to transnational factors and the theory of the democratic world, pointing out the numerous shortcomings of the concept of the United States as a superpower shaping the current world order. (It is important to note that later Sh. Robel will change his attitude to this theory and in later works will develop its provisions, pointing to the key role of the "inner circle" - the allies of the hegemon^[29]). At the same time, P. Nitsch's work "Germany as a European Power" (2002) was published^[30]. Nitsch believed that in international politics, the power of the hegemon is a form of government, the basis of which, first of all, are not armies, but markets, not physical force, but attractive ideas and ideas about values. Such a view again brought German thought back to the positions of Markowitz and Reich.

However, "renationalization" became a temporary stage in the evolution of the perception of German regional hegemony, laying the foundations for the subsequent development of Eurosceptic sentiments. After A. Merkel's government came to power, new steps towards Germany's European leadership began. In 2007, Berlin played an active role in the development and signing of the Lisbon Treaty. The global economic crisis of 2008 (the "great recession") It did not have a serious impact on the perception of the position of Germany in Europe. However, the subsequent European debt crisis of 2009-2013, according to a number of researchers, became a turning point for the idea of German regional hegemony. Germany's active participation in the formation of the "austerity policy", the signing of the Brussels Agreement and the European Budget Treaty confirmed the stabilizing role of Europe's strongest economy. There were calls for Germany to act more boldly, for example, from the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland, R. Sikorski. In his speech in Berlin in November 2011, he stated that he was less afraid of German power than of German inaction, and publicly called on Berlin to assume a leading role in Europe (Deutschland soll Euro-Zone retten // Spiegel Aussland. 2011. [electronic resource]. URL: https://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/rede-von-polens-aussenminister-deutschland-soll-euro-zone-retten-a-800486.html). An example pointing to the partial realization of German regional hegemony was the Fiscal Pact that the European Council agreed in December 2011, which stipulated that all Eurozone countries should include in their constitutions provisions similar to the "debt brake" mechanism previously adopted in Germany. In the same year, the leader of the CDU/XXC faction F. Kauder said in an interview with Der Spiegel: "Now they will speak German in Europe" (Jetzt wird in Europa Deutsch gesprochen // Spiegel. 2011[Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/kauders-euro-schelte-jetzt-wird-in-europa-deutsch-gesprochen-a-797945.html). Such statements, impossible in Germany during the Cold War, were no longer perceived negatively by German political culture. 

Following the results of the European debt crisis of 2009-2013, German lawyer K. Schoenberger unequivocally stated: "Now more than ever it is clear to what extent the Federal Republic has become the hegemonic power of Europe." From Schoenberger's point of view, hegemony is the main subject of a federal entity. While, in his opinion, the United States was increasingly withdrawing from Europe, and France no longer claimed primacy, Germany gradually occupied a position similar to that of Prussia in the united Germany of the period after 1871. German "involuntary" hegemony in the European Union, according to Schoenberger, could not be equated with German dominance in Europe. The Federal Republic was still too weak for such domination. Germany, in his opinion, was stronger than any of its neighbors, but not strong enough to dominate its neighbors as a whole. Carefully managed hegemony within the framework of federal integration into the European Union was the best option for realizing the German potential. At the same time, the researcher urged to fear the "self-commercialization" of Germany, surrounded by friendly countries, the same members of the European Union. Hegemony in the European Union demanded from the German elites and the German public what Germany's position in the center of Europe has always demanded from them: the rejection of "national introversion". Germany, according to Schoenberger, could not afford to "mentally and institutionally descend to the selfish management of its own possessions, which an aging country may be prone to. She must bear the burden of hegemony, even if she feels it painfully on her shoulders."

One of the most famous works devoted to the topic of German hegemony was the work of W. Beck "German Europe"^[31]. The author quoted the words of the speech of the German writer T. Mann in Hamburg in 1953, who warned against "German Europe" and argued that "European Germany" would be the preferred target for the Germans. However, from Beck's point of view, the picture of Europe after the Great Recession looked like "European Germany in German Europe." In his opinion, Berlin's hegemony, which intensified after the 2008 crisis and the European Debt crisis, was due to the lack of a common economic policy in the European Union. Instead, the German course was forcibly adopted as the position of the main creditor country. Such a situation, according to the author, was established thanks to the "Merciavelli model" – the moderate and compromise course of Chancellor A. Merkel, corresponding, according to Beck, to the ideas of N. Machiavelli.

In his monograph "Why Germany has fallen out of love with Europe", the German economist V. Proysl dated the beginning of the German hegemony in Europe with the rejection of the German mark in favor of a single euro. He, like most German researchers, explained Berlin's leadership primarily by economic reasons^[32]. At the same time, politically, from his point of view, the German elite "went with the flow", being forced to take responsibility for other European countries. He notes that disillusionment with the European project and even the beginnings of euroscepticism affected the leadership circles of Germany after the crisis of 2009-2013. However, according to the author, the task of the Germans was to once again sacrifice short-term national interests for the sake of the European future, since Germany's influence on a global scale is negligible without the EU. Proisl quoted the words of V. Schaeuble: "We are a community bound by one destiny. If things are going well in Europe, Germany benefits from it more than anyone else. Therefore, we best promote our interests by feeling responsible for others. The condition for this is the adoption by other countries of common rules to maintain stability." The author suggested that Germany should take any measures to consolidate the European Union, pointing out the huge long-term benefits for Germany itself in the future if it continues to be a regional leader.

German political scientist E. Krom agreed with Preussl's position and believed that Germany was the main beneficiary of the introduction of the euro. At the same time, she will suffer the most from its possible collapse^[33]. The author sought to emphasize that the hegemony of Germany is hidden, carried out through European institutions and networks of influence, and not through repressive measures from a single command center. However, Krom acknowledged the existence of a conflict between the institutional structure of the EU and the existing German hegemony, believing that the development of this conflict will largely determine the future fate of Europe.

Following the results of the European debt crisis by 2013, the idea of German European hegemony was not only formulated, but also rehabilitated in German political thought. At the same time, it was publicly voiced by a number of German and European politicians, which indicated significant changes not only in the worldview of the expert and analytical community, but also in the mass perception of this concept. Through such stages as (a) the "normalization debate", (b) the leadership of integration processes, (c) the rehabilitation of the use of military force, (d) "renationalization" and (e) the role of the financial leader in the European debt crisis, the German political consciousness gradually accepted the idea of Berlin's European hegemony. Its main features were: a stabilizing role through economic dominance, a hidden character, action through European institutions, a willingness to sacrifice national interests for the good of the system, caution in foreign policy and commitment to transatlantic relations with the global hegemon represented by the United States. Another feature was the civilian character of Germany as a hegemon and the stable German "anti-militarist culture" (in the words of H. Maul), which, however, could fade into the background in case of risks to European security.

The further development of the historical process gradually demonstrated a decrease in expectations from Berlin's European leadership. In 2015, the director of the Center for European Studies in Brussels, D. Gross, published a note where he marked the beginning of the end of Germany's regional hegemony, associated with a slowdown in its economic growth and inability to cope with the European migration crisis. (Gross D. The End of German Hegemony // Project Syndicate. 2015. URl: https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/germany-slowing-growth-by-daniel-gros-2015-10?barrier=accesspaylog). After that, a discussion unfolds in German political thought about the weakening of the authority of the FRG in the process of the development of the Ukrainian crisis^[34]. In an effort to act as an intermediary in it, Germany, according to some researchers, has lost its value leadership. Thus, taking into account the decline in the degree of ideological and economic dominance noted by a number of analysts, Berlin's primacy may become an attribute of the recent past, and not a futurological model. Nevertheless, this trend is not yet unambiguous, while the previous period, from 1991 to 2013, can be characterized as a gradual rehabilitation and adoption of the concept of German European hegemony in German political thought.