The significance of the Russo-Japanese War in the fate of Japan and Asia in the XX century

Eremeev Anton Alekseevich ORCID: 0009-0007-4703-9833 Bachelor's Degree, Department of Chinese Studies, Far Eastern Federal University 690922, Russia, Primorsky Krai, village Ajax, Prospect Universitetskiy, 6.1 anton-eremeev@inbox.ru

The modern appearance of international relations is largely determined by the results of the Second World War. The condemnation of Nazism and imperialism, the memory of millions of victims act as guarantees of non-repetition of crimes committed by the aggressor States in the 1930s and 1940s. However, to this day there are still controversial issues affecting the relations of states, for example, the territorial dispute over the Kuril Islands.

After 1945, Russia (USSR) and Japan turned out to be parts of different world systems — socialist and capitalist. Despite this, relations between the two countries proceeded quite peacefully, and after 1991 repeated attempts were made to further develop and deepen them towards cooperation. All the more surprising is the fact that more than seventy-five years after the end of World War II, there is no peace treaty between Russia and Japan. The reason for this is the problem of the "northern territories". Since the beginning of the 1950s, the Japanese side has not stopped challenging the affiliation of the South Kuril Ridge to the Russian Federation, considering the possibility of a peace treaty only in connection with the transfer of these territories to it, as noted in the official brochure of the Japanese Foreign Ministry in 2014. The Kuriles, along with southern Sakhalin, became part of Russia as a reward for the victory over Japanese militarism, and Japan's loss of these territories is a consequence of Japan's militaristic policy before 1945. At the same time, the phenomenon of Japanese militarism itself did not arise by itself. It directly comes from the results of the Russian-Japanese war of 1904-1905.

The historical role of this conflict still has no unambiguous assessment. This issue is relevant in many respects because in Russia it is often perceived either as a private problem of Russian-Japanese relations, or as a phenomenon that has manifested Russia's internal problems, as a local conflict, with the prolongation of which Japan would inevitably lose ^{[1, pp. 348-349]}. Now the outcome of this war is recognized as a prerequisite for Japanese militarism, although little has been written about its long-term consequences, and the bulk of the scientific literature is devoted to the course of hostilities. It is important to see its international, global significance. This article examines the impact of Japan's victory in the Russian-Japanese war on the development of Japan and neighboring countries in the first half of the 20th century within the framework of the idea of Asian peoples' confrontation with an external, European threat — a concept in which Japan's conflict with Russia is defined as the initial link of anti-colonial processes in Asia.

The origins of the Russian-Japanese clash originate from the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. On November 21, 1894, Japan captured the key point of the Liaodong Peninsula — the city of Port Arthur ^{[1, p. 67]}, which it intended to leave under its control as one of the conditions of the peace treaty. The Russian Empire was seriously worried about the strengthening of Japan and its possible penetration into Manchuria close to the borders of Russia, another reason for interest was the desire to acquire a non-freezing port in the Far East ^{[1, pp. 68-69]}. Therefore, under the pretext of protecting China's sovereignty, together with Germany and France, Russia demanded that Japan abandon this fortress. Just three years later, part of the peninsula with Port Arthur was leased to Russia itself.

Historians' opinions on the development of Russian-Japanese relations in the pre-war years differ. Oleg Airapetov, a prominent specialist in the military history of Russia, believes that Russia's intervention in the conflict with China indicates the inevitability of a clash that had the character of a colonial redistribution ^{[1, p. 9]}, American international relations specialist Benjamin Mainardi argues that Russia and Japan were equally unwilling to make concessions and intended to absorb Manchuria ^{[2, p. 10]}, Japanese authors believe that both countries sought a peaceful settlement of the issue of spheres of influence ^{[3, p. 18-19]}. In general, from the Japanese point of view, what happened was Russia's interference in the internal affairs of Asian countries, affecting the interests of not only Japan, but also China and Korea.

It is important to remember here that ending Japan's self-isolation (sakoku policy) in 1854, it happened under pressure from the United States. For the Japanese, this was evidence of the danger of losing independence, especially against the background of foreign intervention in China during the Opium Wars. In the second half of the XIX century, the idea of "Asia for Asians" had not yet sounded: this political slogan was actively used only in the 1930s and 1940s. But the prerequisites for pan-Asian sentiments were generated by the obvious interference of European states in the affairs of Asian peoples, in particular, Russia's penetration into Manchuria and Russia's participation in suppressing the uprising of the Yihetuan in 1900-1901 ^{[4, pp. 267-268]}. Thus, the confrontation of Russia turned from a private aspiration of Japan into a factor uniting Asian countries in the face of an external threat. In modern Russia, participation in the global colonial redistribution is denied, however, at the beginning of the last century, Russian public opinion about the eastern neighbor practically copied the Western one, representing both admiration for Japanese elegance and its "original beauty" and contempt for the Japanese for their short stature and peculiar ethical norms ^{[5, pp. 21-22]}. The possibility of failing in the fight against Japan was not considered at all. This position was characteristic of the era, it expressed the attitude of the European states towards the peoples they considered "uncivilized". And despite the fact that trade and cultural ties between the two countries continuously developed after the abolition of Sakoku, the Russian Empire did not understand that its expansion to the East increases the hostility of the Japanese to Russia, did not take into account that attempts to strengthen themselves in Manchuria and Korea are felt by the Japanese as an immediate threat to their security ^{[5, p. 6]}.

The problem of the Liaodong Peninsula has become a catalyst for the coming conflict. Russia's intervention in 1895 had already caused a surge of hostility in Japan ^{[1, pp. 79-80]}, and the transfer of Liaodong under Russian jurisdiction in just three years further undermined trust. Russia itself explained its actions with security issues ^{[1, p. 70; 19, p. 421]}. Japan perceived this as double standards, especially since the Japanese side did not refuse the possibility of a peaceful solution to territorial issues, just as the St. Petersburg Treaty of 1875 was concluded ^{[1, p. 79]}. In fact, Russia, not seeking conflict in any way, pushed Japanese society to moral unification in front of the image of the enemy from the outside, in which Japan found support from Britain, which also did not want Russia to strengthen in Manchuria ^{[6, pp. 419-420]}.

In the end, Japan attacked first in 1904, and after a year of battles, Russia ceded Port Arthur and southern Sakhalin to it. Now this event is often evaluated in favor of Russia, which has not suffered significant losses. Of course, the loss of Port Arthur and the defeat at Tsushima influenced the idea of the so-called "yellow danger" — fear of Asian expansion to the west. It was raised even before the Russian-Japanese war, mainly in the form of mystical and philosophical reflections ^{[7, pp. 137-139]}, but at that stage such a turn of events was not yet obvious: Japan was significantly inferior to the European powers. In addition, Russia's military and financial losses did not cause major damage to the economy and the country's defense capability, although they became "a terrible warning about readiness for a modern war" ^{[8, p. 105]}.

However, the importance of this war is determined not only by the fact that it was the first imperialist war and the first major intercivilizational clash of the XX century, as the famous Japanese historian Vitaly Sovasteev writes ^{[8, p. 105]}, but by the impact that this war had on the worldview of Japan and its Asian neighbors. The fear of being turned into a puppet of Western countries has become a driving force for Japan, pushing it towards rapid modernization. The country adopted advanced European experience, including colonial expansion ^{[9, pp. 6-7]}. The Japanese used this experience against China at the end of the XIX century, which convinced them of the right to have their own empire. At that time, the West did not include Japan in its plans, and the Russian-Japanese war was considered by third countries as a means of fighting against Russia for dominance in Asia ^{[5, p. 4]}, but Japan purposefully became more and more "Western" in order to become a new colonial empire itself ^{[10, p. 20]}.

Describing the impact of the Russian-Japanese war on the perception of the Japanese, Israeli Japanese historian Rotem Kooner says that at the end of the XIX century in Japan there was a strong idea of Europe as the center of the world, and Japan's goal was to join it. The victory in the clash with Russia and the sharp advance of Japan as a colonial power created in European countries the perception of it as a source of danger, which for the Japanese resulted in a sense of disappointment in the possibility of achieving equal treatment, and further spurred the strengthening of pan-Asian views that existed in contrast to pro-European ones ^{[11, pp. 36-37]}. In this context, the significance of the Russian-Japanese war for both the Japanese and the Asian public is conveyed by the words of former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe: "In the nineteenth century, <...>, waves of colonial domination rolled over Asia. Undoubtedly, the sense of crisis associated with this phenomenon has become the driving force of modernization for Japan. <...>. The Russian-Japanese war allowed many peoples of Asia and Africa, who were under colonial rule, to cheer up." The marked rise of pan-Asian sentiment is noted in works on this topic: for example, journalist Faisal Ali quotes the words of the world-famous pacifist Mahatma Gandhi about the Russian-Japanese war as an outstanding act of heroism and unity of Asians, an example for other peoples. In view of this, the attempts of the Japanese to create the appearance of "liberation" of Asian countries from European colonialism and how the "liberated" reacted to this are of particular interest. After entering World War II, Japan resorted to supporting the nationalist movements of the occupied countries within the framework of the concept of the "East Asian sphere of co-prosperity" and "Asia for Asians". This was the case in Indonesia, whose first post-war leader Sukarno worked as an employee of the Japanese occupation authorities and the conductor of its policy: Japan promised Indonesia independence in exchange for cooperation, and Sukarno hoped to use Japanese aid for his own purposes ^{[12, pp. 222-224]}. Similarly, Japanese agents attracted Burmese patriots to their side ^{[12, pp. 218-219]}, for whom the arrival of the invaders was perceived as liberation from the British administration. Formally independent states, entirely subordinate to the Japanese army, were established in the occupied territories. By reinforcing nationalist movements in Asia, the Japanese probably expected to rely on them in the future, but after the war these movements became a real force in the liberation of Asian countries from European colonial authorities. It can be assumed that Japan's actions became a catalyst for the inevitable activation of Asian nationalism, one of the reasons for decolonization in the 1940s and 1950s.

With regard to the initial period after the Russian-Japanese war, Shinzo Abe's words briefly but clearly express the essence of the changes that have taken place in the minds of Asian peoples. For the first time, a European power was defeated by an Asian country. Firstly, it entailed satisfying the wounded feelings of China, Korea and Japan — underdeveloped countries facing the threat of colonization. The public opinion of the Chinese was formed by the fresh memory of the suppression by foreign states of the Yihetuan uprising, which for the Chinese looked like aggression. Therefore, the Chinese and Korean public often supported the actions of the Japanese troops ^{[13, p. 94]}, cases of Chinese provocations and refusal of assistance were recorded ^{[4, p. 269-270]}, and the Russian command seriously considered the danger of an attack by Chinese armies. Secondly, Japan's victory actually smoothed out its heavy military losses (between 120 and 300 thousand people, according to various estimates). In this context, if we combine the conflict of 1904-1905 and the armed aggression of Japan in Asia after 1937, we get a picture of a long period of anti-colonial struggle, where the Russian-Japanese war acts as the first step towards the final liberation of Asia from the Europeans.

What is important for Japan is that this victory gave it a sense of being on a par with Europe, a sense of confidence in the right to act like European powers. In this way, it was connected to the world colonial redistribution, which it would not be able to enter in case of defeat, and at the same time, as it were, acted as a luminary of hope for neighboring countries. For Russia, the outcome of the war became a source of strong national irritation: the deaths and injuries of 194,959 soldiers, sailors and officers ^[14], the loss of Port Arthur caused severe moral damage to the state, undermined Russia's prestige in the international arena ^{[11, p. 5]}, and, according to Rotem Kooner, all this served as one of the main the causes of the revolution of 1905-1907 ^{[11, p. 7]} and political instability in China ^{[11, p. 15]}. For Korea, this was a step towards the final elimination of its statehood under the pretext of protection from Russian influence. In 1905-1910 . It was annexed to Japan, and then subjected to economic exploitation and cultural assimilation. After the Second World War, during the liberation of the peninsula, it was occupied by the Soviet and American armies, later splitting into two states, the enmity between which is dangerous for both Japan and Russia ^{[11, p. 18]}, and the Japanese conquest is the reason that this happened. In 1931 and 1937, China became the object of aggression, for which the memory of the anti-Japanese war is now an important unifying factor, and from 1940 to 1945, intervention was carried out in Indochina, the Philippines, Malaya and Indonesia under the guise of assistance in the anti-colonial struggle.

Reality has shown that Japan's goal was not to liberate Asia, but to conquer it. Many war crimes were committed in the occupied territories by the Japanese army, for example, the Nanjing massacre in the winter of 1937-1938, the experiments of Detachment 731 on living people in Northeast China, the forcible sending of Korean and Filipino women to brothels, etc. The final consequence of the imperialist policy was the defeat of Japan in direct confrontation with the Soviet Union and the United States. The country was subjected to atomic bombing and occupied, and to this day pursues a pacifist foreign policy, enshrined in the ninth article of the 1947 Constitution. Other Southeast Asian countries, thanks to the weakening of European colonial administrations, peacefully or by armed means established their statehood in the 1940s and 1960s.

Summarizing the above, it can be argued that the fact of Japan's victory in the war of 1904-1905 is the starting point of the historical fate of East Asian countries in the XX century, in which the most obvious consequences are the catastrophic events caused by Japanese militarism in 1931-1945, followed by the occupation and demilitarization of Japan, the split of the Korean Peninsula, the processes of decolonization in Asia, and so on. It is from the moral uplift experienced by Japanese society after 1905 and superimposed on the pan-Asian idea that the modern history of Japan and other Asian countries after World War II is formed.