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Conflict Studies / nota bene
Reference:
Parlanova A.T.
Turkey vs Egypt in the Eastern Mediterranean
// Conflict Studies / nota bene.
2023. ¹ 2.
P. 1-11.
DOI: 10.7256/2454-0617.2023.2.40119 EDN: TYKDWW URL: https://en.nbpublish.com/library_read_article.php?id=40119
Turkey vs Egypt in the Eastern Mediterranean
DOI: 10.7256/2454-0617.2023.2.40119EDN: TYKDWWReceived: 31-03-2023Published: 07-04-2023Abstract: The object of the study is Ankara's foreign policy strategy. The subject of the study is the positions of Turkey and Egypt in the Eastern Mediterranean region. The aim is to identify the possibility of a Turkish–Egyptian alliance in the region after the extremely tense relations recorded since 2013, the establishment in Egypt of a new president A.F. Al-Sisi, the ideological antipode of R.T. Erdogan. The relevance of the study is evidenced by changes in the rhetoric of Turkey's top officials and the demonstration of readiness to build a dialogue with Cairo. Particular attention is paid to Ankara's position on the establishment of maritime borders in the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas on the basis of bilateral agreements. Research methods: analysis of strategies, official documents, logical-heuristic and system methods, as well as analysis of political events in the region. Based on the analysis of primary sources (foreign policy strategies 2020-2023), it was revealed: since 2020, the Eastern Mediterranean region has been the main vector of Ankara's foreign policy. As noted in the reports of the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, the country is 70% dependent on foreign energy supplies, which explains Ankara's uncompromising position on securing its right to extract gas from the depths of the Eastern Mediterranean. Attempts to restore relations with Egypt are a geopolitical necessity. However, Cairo found itself in the position of Turkey's competitor in an effort to turn into an energy hub when exporting gas from Israel to Europe. Egypt attaches paramount importance to the issue of energy security, which is confirmed by the Egypt Vision 2030 strategy. The most advantageous for Egypt is the preservation of the Egypt-Israel-Greece-Cyprus block. Based on the conducted research, it can be concluded that there is an extremely low probability of a Turkish-Egyptian rapprochement. The findings of the study can be taken into account when studying and forecasting Turkey's foreign policy. Keywords: Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey, Egypt, Energy Sources, Blue Homeland, Gas Forum, Aegean Sea, continental shelf, Maritime Law, energy securityThis article is automatically translated. You can find original text of the article here. IntroductionSince 2021, the Eastern Mediterranean has been considered as a separate region in the foreign policy strategies of the Republic of Turkey. After the introductory sections in the documents of 2021-2023 (? avu ? o ? lu M. 2021GirerkenGiri?imci ve ?nsaniD Politikam?z// T.C. Di?leriBakanl; ?avu?o?luM. 2022 Girerken Giri ? imci ve I nsani D ? ? Politikam ? z // T.C. D ?? i ? leri Bakanl ; 2023 Girerken Giri ? imci ve I nsani D ? ? Politikam ? z // T.C. D ? ? i ? leri Bakanl ?) follows a chapter dedicated to the Eastern Mediterranean, i.e. the region priority is given to all areas of foreign policy, which indicates the urgency of the problem. In 2019, after the discovery of oil reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean, R.T. Erdogan signed agreements with the Libyan NTC (Government of National Accord) on military cooperation and demarcation of maritime borders, according to which Ankara began to claim significant territories in the Mediterranean Sea rich in hydrocarbons. In contrast to Turkey, the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum was created. The headquarters of the forum is located in Cairo. Despite the fact that Turkey and Egypt are on opposite sides of the barricades in the Mediterranean, since 2020, after eight years of tense relations between Turkey and Egypt, R.T. Erdogan (Turkish President) and M. Cavusoglu (Foreign Minister) in their rhetoric demonstrate Ankara's readiness to conduct a political dialogue with Cairo, which is already significant a breakthrough, because since 2013, after the overthrow of M. Morsi (a representative of the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization banned in the Russian Federation) and with the coming to power of President Al-Sisi, the ideological enemy of R.T. Erdogan, any possibility of intensification of Turkish-Egyptian relations was automatically excluded. The changes in 2020 indicate that there is a deep strategic benefit, and also confirm the urgency of the problem. In the strategy of Turkey's foreign policy for 2020 (? avu ? o ? lu M. 2020 Girerken Giri ? imci ve I nsani D ?? Politikam ? z // T.C. D ?? i ? leri Bakanl?) "deep historical and humanitarian ties" with Egypt are noted. In terms of trade turnover, Egypt is Turkey's largest partner in Africa. The strategy states that despite the current state of political relations, Ankara "strives to preserve trade relations and ties between the two peoples" [1, s.83]. The strategy for 2023 (2023 Girerken Giri ? imci ve I nsani D?? Politikam ? z// T.C. D?? i ? leri Bakanl) recorded "significant progress in the normalization of bilateral relations with Egypt based on the principles of respect for sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs" [2, s. 24]. At the same time, Egypt is considered as a state of North Africa, and not a regional player of the Eastern Mediterranean. Perhaps this is due to historical practice, because since the time of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt has been represented as part of North Africa. The second possible interpretation is a shift in focus to the African continent, where Egypt can claim to be a regional leader in order to subsequently achieve concessions in the Eastern Mediterranean. The subject of this study is the positions of Turkey and Egypt in the Eastern Mediterranean region. The purpose of the work is to consider the positions of the parties on the basis of official doctrines and analyze the possibility of Turkish–Egyptian rapprochement. A sufficient amount of scientific research has been devoted to the interests of individual regional and external actors in the Eastern Mediterranean, and bilateral relations between Turkey and Greece, Turkey and Egypt, Egypt and Greece, Egypt and Israel have also been studied. However, the topic of Turkish-Egyptian bilateral relations in the region has not been studied in the domestic literature. Research methods: analysis of strategies, official documents, logical-heuristic and system methods, as well as analysis of political events in the region.
Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey's position For Turkey, the problem of the delimitation of maritime zones is a matter of restoring historical justice after the First World War. Territorial issues and borders of modern Turkey were established by the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923 (Treaty of Peace with Turkey Signed at Lausanne // World War I Document Archive), while part of the islands in the Aegean Sea came under the protectorate of Italy. The Second World War changed the geopolitical situation in the region, the Dodecanese Islands came under the sovereignty of Greece, and with the adoption of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea // un.org ) due to these islands, the KSH (continental shelf) of Greece has expanded. The UN Convention also gave the islands the right to form an EEZ (exclusive economic zone), as a result, the maritime zones of the Greek islands located in the immediate vicinity of the Turkish coast closed with identical zones of the Republic of Turkey. Recognition of the provisions of the convention would mean for Turkey to give up most of the water area, airspace, bottom and subsoil of the Aegean Sea, which was actually turning into an intra-Greek one. Turkey has not signed the Convention, and when deciding on the delimitation of borders, Ankara refers to the principle of "natural continuation" of the land territory of the coastal state, according to which part of the Greek islands of the Aegean Sea are considered "continuation" of the Anatolian land [3, pp. 475-477]. In addition, despite the frequent criticism of the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923 (Treaty of Peace with Turkey Signed at Lausanne // World War I Document Archive) by the current Turkish authorities, it is in accordance with this treaty that "islands located less than three nautical miles from the Asian coast remain under Turkish sovereignty" [4], but at the same time, it remains possible to establish new borders on the basis of bilateral agreements while respecting the principle of "justice". In the strategy of Turkey's foreign policy for 2021 (? avu ? o ? lu M. 2021 Girerken Giri ? imci ve I nsani D ??Politikam ? z// T.C. D?? i ? leri Bakanl) once again, Greece's right to expand its territorial waters to 12 miles is not recognized, the illegality of Greece's actions on "islets and reefs", whose ownership is still "not established by international law, is noted. In particular, "violation of the demilitarized status of the islands in the eastern Aegean Sea" is mentioned [5, s.7]. The discovery of gas fields has increased the economic attractiveness of the Mediterranean. In 2004 The University of Seville (Spain) presented the "Seville Map", which defined the maritime border of the EU. The main discontent of Turkey was caused by the fact that the Greek island of Kastelorizo (tur. Meis), located in close proximity to the Turkish port of Kash, during the formation of the EEZ and KSH allows Athens to claim the vast maritime space between the islands. Rhodes and the Republic of Cyprus, thereby blocking Turkey's only access to the Mediterranean Sea [6, p.8]. In the strategy of Turkey's foreign policy for 2021 (? avu ? o ? lu M. 2021 Girerken Giri ? imci ve I nsani D ?? Politikam ? z// T.C. D?? i ? leri Bakanl) the goal is determined: to achieve non-recognition of the Seville Map by the EU and the USA and demilitarization of the island of Kastelorizo (tour. Meis) [5, s. 8]. The theoretical formulation of Ankara's claims at earlier stages was the concept of "Blue Motherland" (Yayci C. Deniz Subaylari icin Temel Deniz Hukuku // Istanbul: Deniz Basimevi, 2011), formulated in 2006 by Turkish Admiral Cem Gyurdeniz and finalized by the commander of the Turkish Navy, Jihat Yajji. According to Russian researchers, the concept was also put forward as a response to the decision of the Republic of Cyprus to issue licenses for hydrocarbon exploration in areas that it considered to be under its jurisdiction [7, pp. 110-112]. The ultimate meaning of the "Blue Homeland" (Yayci C. Deniz Subaylari icin Temel Deniz Hukuku // Istanbul: Deniz Basimevi, 2011. 145 s.) consists in expanding the maritime borders of Turkey in the Mediterranean, Black and Aegean Seas and turning the country into a maritime power, "mistress" of the seas and "holder of the keys to the strategically important Bosporus and Dardanelles" [8, pp. 28-30]. In the concept of "Blue Homeland" (Yayci C. Deniz Subaylari icin Temel Deniz Hukuku // Istanbul: Deniz Basimevi, 2011. 145 s.) once again declares non-recognition of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Greek islands in the Aegean Sea, in particular fr. Kastelorizo are considered as part of the KSH of Anatolia, therefore, Turkey does not recognize their right to form independent maritime zones. In addition, the demilitarization of these islands is required. According to Jihat Yajji, the provisions of the UN Convention cannot be applied in the Eastern Mediterranean, because a 200-mile EEZ does not make sense in a closed space dotted with islands [9, p. 150-151]. As noted above, it is proposed to establish maritime jurisdiction in the Mediterranean Sea through the conclusion of bilateral agreements. As a result, in 2011 an agreement was signed on the establishment of an EEZ with Northern Cyprus (T?rkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Kuzey K?br?s T?rk Cumhuriyeti Aras?nda Akdeniz'de Kita Sahanl S?n?rland?r?lmas? Hakk?nda Anla?ma // T.C. Cumhurba?kanl Resmi Gazete) [10, c. 430]. In 2016, the concept of "Blue Motherland" (Yayci C. Deniz Subaylari icin Temel Deniz Hukuku // Istanbul: Deniz Basimevi, 2011. 145 s.) turns into the official doctrine of Ankara. After the attempted military coup in Turkey, Ankara's foreign policy strategy is reorienting towards strengthening the military aspect and the predominance of unilateral and risky actions [11]. The culmination of the implementation of the doctrine was the aforementioned agreement on the delimitation of maritime spaces in 2019 between Turkey and Libya. When delimiting the borders in accordance with this agreement, the maritime zones of the Greek islands were not taken into account, which means that the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Pipeline (EastMed) would have passed through the KSH of Turkey, and not Greece and Cyprus, as was implied in accordance with the gas pipeline construction project [3, pp. 475-476]. As a result, despite the fact that Turkey is not part of the EastMed project, it was precisely because of disagreements with Ankara that the project was frozen, which is confirmed in the foreign policy strategies for 2022 (? avu ? o ? lu M. 2022 Girerken Giri ? imci ve I nsani D ?? Politikam ? z // T.C. D ?? i ? leri Bakanl ) and 2023 (2023 Girerken Giri ? imci ve I nsani D Politikam ? z// T.C. D i ? leri Bakanl ?): "Platform or projects, those who do not take into account our (Turkish) interests in the region are doomed to failure" [12, s. 5]. In accordance with the foreign policy strategy for 2020 (? avu ? o ? lu M. 2020 Girerken Giri ? imci ve I nsani D?? Politikam ? z // T.C. D?? i ? leri Bakanl), Ankara's goal in the Eastern Mediterranean is a fair division of the region's hydrocarbon resources [1, s. 6]. Since 2020, Turkey has begun active exploration of gas fields, which, according to Greece, are under the jurisdiction of Athens. Turkey is one of the ten largest importers of gas, at the expense of its own sources, no more than 30% of the total demand for energy resources is covered [13, s. 210]. According to the report of the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources of Turkey for 2022 (2022 Faaliyet Raporu // T.C. Enerji ve Tabii Kaynaklar Bakanligi), in order to reduce foreign dependence, it is necessary to "accelerate the pace of exploration and production of oil and natural gas, especially in offshore zones" [13, s. 34]. Achieving independence in the energy sector is a matter of national security, which explains Ankara's uncompromising position in the Eastern Mediterranean region. Both EU and Eastern Mediterranean states have not recognized the Turkish-Libyan agreement (Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of National Accord-State of Libya on Delimitation of the Maritime Jurisdiction Areas in the Mediterranean // un.org ). In the Foreign Policy Strategy for 2020 (? avu ? o ? lu M. 2020 Girerken Giri ? imci ve I nsani D ?? Politikam ? z // T.C. D?? i ? leri Bakanl ) it is noted: "The EU's attitude to our hydrocarbon exploration activities in the Eastern Mediterranean caused serious damage to our relations and aggravated the crisis of confidence that arose after the coup attempt on July 15 <...> No pressure from third parties, especially the European Union, will not change our determination to protect the legitimate rights of our country and Turkish Cypriots in the Eastern Mediterranean" [1, pp. 29-33]. In the conditions of the political blockade (non-recognition of the Turkish-Libyan border delimitation) of Turkey, it seems most logical to build a new strategy based on a system of bilateral relations with the states of the region, which explains Ankara's attempts to restore relations with Egypt.
Eastern Mediterranean. Egypt's interestsOn January 15, 2019, in contrast to Turkey, Egypt, Israel, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Jordan and Palestine announced the creation of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), which will consolidate efforts to develop a unified gas policy in the region [14, pp. 65-66]. In 2021, France joined the forum as a full member. The headquarters of the forum is located in Cairo. In 2015, the Zohr hydrocarbon deposit was discovered in the Egyptian EEZ, which allowed Cairo to not only meet the demand on the domestic market by 2021, but also export gas to European markets [7, pp. 110-111]. In addition, Egypt can become a transit hub for the export of East Mediterranean gas, for this purpose an agreement has been concluded with Israel and Cyprus on the supply of gas to Egypt for domestic consumption, with the possibility of re-export. In accordance with the Egypt Vision 2030 strategy (Sustainable Development Strategy (SDS): Egypt Vision 2030 // Gov.eg ), achieving energy security is one of the four main components of sustainable economic development [15, pp. 86-104]. Despite the fact that the goal for 2030 is to reduce the share of natural gas in electricity generation to 27%, currently this indicator reaches 91%, i.e. the demand for gas is still high [16, p. 18]. An additional driver for maintaining energy security is the confrontation with Ethiopia around the Hidase hydroelectric power plant. The complete filling of the hydroelectric power station reservoir may pose a threat to energy security, since in this case Egypt will receive a significant part of water resources, which will affect the operation of the Aswan hydroelectric power station [17]. For external actors, the Hidase hydroelectric power plant in Ethiopia is an additional lever of influence on Egypt, which controls the Suez Canal. Thus, the issue of participation in projects in the Eastern Mediterranean, the conclusion of energy agreements with the countries of the region is a matter not only of energy, but also of national security in general. Ankara's goal is to establish a border between the EEZ of Turkey and Egypt, bypassing the sea zones of the Greek island of Kastelorizo [18, pp. 84-86]. It was not possible to fulfill this goal. In August 2020, Egypt and Greece signed an agreement on the partial demarcation of maritime borders and the establishment of an EEZ. Turkey refused to recognize this agreement, stating that the border runs through the maritime zone of Libya, i.e. the Egyptian-Greek agreement cancels the Turkish-Libyan agreements of 2019 (Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of National Accord-State of Libya on Delimitation of the Maritime Jurisdiction Areas in the Mediterranean // un.org ).Egypt, like Greece and Cyprus, appears to be a competitor in the export of Israeli gas. Despite the fact that Turkey can provide a shorter and more cost-effective route, an agreement with Israel in this area is unlikely. Ankara does not seem to be a reliable partner, because the vector of development of bilateral relations can change instantly in the event of a deterioration of the situation on the Palestinian-Israeli track. Most Israeli experts also agree on the impossibility of cooperation between Turkey and Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean [19, pp. 211-215]. Consequently, the collapse of the Egypt-Israel-Greece-Cyprus bloc is not expected in the near future. Despite Turkey's attempts to normalize relations with Cairo, Egyptian President A.F. Al-Sisi still represents R.T. Erdogan as his main ideological antipode in the region. The situation is aggravated by the balance of power in Libya. In 2019, the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by H. Haftar launched an offensive on Tripoli. In response, the PNS of Libya, led by F. Sarajem has signed an agreement with Turkey on military cooperation and the deployment of the Turkish contingent in Libya. As a result , X . Haftar appealed to the President of Egypt with a request to provide military assistance. By supporting H. Haftar and countering the Turkish penetration into Libya, A.F. Al-Sisi seeks to prevent the strengthening of the Muslim Brotherhood (an organization banned in the Russian Federation). It is this organization that is considered the most loyal political force in the Middle East to Turkey and at the same time the main enemy of the Al-Sisi regime. If H. Haftar captures Tripoli, Turkey will lose its only ally in the region and it will become even more difficult to claim hydrocarbon production in the Eastern Mediterranean [20, p. 101]. There is a situation when neither side (Turkey and Egypt) can't make concessions. Consequently, despite the fact that Ankara publicly announced the possibility of bilateral rapprochement in 2020, this scenario seems impossible in practice.
Conclusion Thus, the Eastern Mediterranean region has been a priority direction of Ankara's foreign policy since 2020. This conclusion was made on the basis of the foreign policy strategies of the Republic of Turkey 2020-2023 (? avu ? o ? lu M. 2020 GirerkenGiri?imci ve ?nsaniD Politikam?z // T.C. Di?leriBakanl; ?avu?o?luM. 2021GirerkenGiri?imci ve ?nsaniD Politikam?z// T.C. Di?leriBakanl; ?avu?o?luM. 2022 GirerkenGiri?imci ve ?nsaniD Politikam?z // T.C. Di?leriBakanl; 2023 GirerkenGiri?imci ve ?nsaniD Politikam?z // T.C. Di?leriBakanl)The non-recognition of Greece's right to expand territorial waters is not limited to the declaration of this position, and has practical implementation and serious consequences in the region. The Turkish-Libyan Agreements of 2019 (Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of National Accord-State of Libya on Delimitation of the Maritime Jurisdiction Areas in the Mediterranean // un.org ) are an additional obstacle in the implementation of the EastMed gas pipeline project. In the strategies of Turkey's foreign policy for 2022 (?avu?o?lu M. 2022 Girerken Giri?imci ve Insani D Politikam?z // T.C. Di?leri Bakanl) and 2023 (2023 Girerken Giri?imci ve Insani D Politikam?z// T.C. Di?leri Bakanl), it is Ankara's position that is considered as the main reason for freezing the project. According to the report of the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources of Turkey for 2022, 70% of the energy resources consumed in Turkey are imported. Turkey's energy security is currently the main component of national security, which is why Ankara takes an uncompromising position in the Eastern Mediterranean. The political blockade of Turkey (non-recognition of the Turkish-Libyan delimitation of borders) forces us to look for new allies, which explains the changes in the rhetoric of Turkey's top officials on the issue of Turkish-Egyptian relations. Egypt is a member of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, which was created in opposition to Turkey. In addition, both Egypt and Turkey are pursuing the goal of turning the country into an energy hub for exporting resources from the Middle East. Due to the high domestic demand for gas, as well as the launch of the Hidase hydroelectric power plant in Ethiopia, the energy issue is a matter of national security, which is confirmed by the Egypt Vision 2030 strategy (Sustainable Development Strategy (SDS): Egypt Vision 2030 // Gov.eg ). Thus, an environment has developed in which Ankara and Cairo are the main competitors in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Libyan issue, where Egypt and Turkey are on opposite sides of the barricades, demonstrates the impossibility of a Turkish-Egyptian rapprochement, since neither side can change its positions. For Ankara , Libya led by F. Sarajem is the only way to legally extract resources in the depths of the Mediterranean. For Egypt, in turn, the strengthening of X. Haftarah is the guarantor of the containment of the Muslim Brotherhood (the organization is banned in the Russian Federation), the political enemies of President A.F. Al-Sisi. The scenario of the Turkish-Egyptian rapprochement is not expected in the near future. The conclusions of this study can be taken into account when studying and forecasting Turkey's foreign policy on the world stage. References
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