Kant's approach to understanding space from the perspective of modern natural science

Minasyan Larisa Artavazdovna ORCID: 0000-0003-4302-5438 Doctor of Philosophy Professor, Department of Physics, Don State Technical University 344022, Russia, Rostovskaya oblast', g. Rostov-Na-Donu, ul. Zhuravleva, 102/105, of. 128 larmin1@mail.ru

Leshcheva Ol'ga Aleksandrovna ORCID: 0000-0001-6223-8899 Senior Lecturer, Department of Physics, Don State Technical University 34403, Russia, Rostovskaya oblast', g. Rostov-Na-Donu, ul. Pl. Gagarina, 1, of. 437a olga_l_78@mail.ru

The widespread definition of space and time as forms of existence of matter is well known. However, this definition is not justified in science. At the same time, there are active statements in modern physics about the possibility of the existence of empty space without matter at the early stages of the evolution of the Universe ^[1,2]. We start from the point of view according to which the above definition received its completeness due to the criticism of Kant's concept of space and time, largely fulfilled by Hegel, which later became widespread in Marxist philosophy. A meaningful study of the relationship and interdependence of the categories of essence and form in the context of the question posed will be considered by us in subsequent works. In this article, two tasks are performed: 1) what is the path that led Kant to postulate space and time as pure forms of sensory intuition as principles of a priori knowledge ^{[3, p. 129]}; 2) does Kant's concept have truth and what are the limits of its applicability in terms of trends in the development of modern science, or does it have only historical interest. The interpretation of the above definition raises questions about what, in Kant's understanding, is a form, a pure form, a priori knowledge.

The concepts of form and matter were introduced into scientific discourse by Aristotle. Speaking about the way nature is defined, he notes that it is the first matter underlying each of the objects that have in themselves the beginning of movement and change. In another way, it is a form (morphn) and a kind (eidos), according to the definition of a thing [4. Book one]. Epistemologically, Aristotle's form is an idea existing in the bodies themselves. In an ontological context, form is the "essence of being", the reason "for what" [4. The second Book].  Form in Aristotle's philosophy acts as an acting force that ensures the formation of matter, its transition from possibility to reality. Aristotle's space is a collection of places that is neither matter nor form. The identification of space with matter is possible for mathematics, it is unacceptable for physics ^{[5, p.183]}. In the Renaissance, in the development of the medieval attitude that the universe was created by God according to a mathematical plan ^[6,7], an intermediary arises between mathematics and empirical realities, as it is profoundly presented in ^[8]. V.M. Rozin singles out the "doctrine of the breadth of forms" as an intermediary, mediator, "which, on the one hand, had properties similar to mathematical objects of mathematical ontology, on the other – properties that allowed to make connections in the empirical and organize it" ^[8].  Modern times continues to focus precisely on the mathematization of the use of the concept of form.  This marks the works of both rationalists and empiricists (sensualists), in some cases preserving the tonality of the Aristotelian interpretation. At the same time, there is no critical reflection of the concept of form in their works. 

We have given this brief historical background on the pre-Kantian functioning of the concept of space in science in order to emphasize the uniqueness of the position of the Koningsberg thinker. In Kant's philosophy, the category of form acts as a nodal concept, but before we talk about the role that this concept plays in the legacy of a scientist, we should focus our attention on the concept of the existence of a priori knowledge. The term "a priori" (Latin – from the preceding) is used to denote the primacy of any knowledge in relation to experience. Kant's use of this concept is the same, following his predecessors. He defines a priori knowledge as unconditionally independent of any experience; at the same time, he strengthens this understanding by saying that pure a priori knowledge is knowledge to which "nothing empirical is mixed at all" ^{[3, p.106]}. In this interpretation, Plato's philosophy of the primacy of ideas and his doctrine of memory (anamnesis), Descartes' intellectual intuition, based on the unconditional reliability and universality of innate ideas, immediately come to mind. Descartes' innate ideas are consistently developed in the classical rationalism of Modern times, being modified into the concept of the existence of a priori knowledge. Leibniz tries to give the doctrine of a priori the status of "truths of reason" as opposed to a posteriori knowledge - "truth of fact". It is clear that the "truths of reason" are elevated by him to the rank of the most significant, since they are determined using logical analysis and represent a priori analytical judgments ^[9].  Thus, a priori is considered in one connection with analytical judgments, which requires special consideration.

G.G. Mayorov notes that the XVII century, in search of a solid foundation on which to erect a building of science, in the natural sciences finds it in the laws of mechanics, and in philosophy – in the concept of substance, which was considered as a self-sufficient being, investing itself as an entity in a variety of phenomena. This approach determined the development of the analytical method: "The philosophical thought of this epoch was almost completely ruled by the analytical formula "predicate is contained in the subject" ("praedicatum inest subjecto"), in which substance acted as the subject, and all the variety of properties put in its concept as predicates" ^[9]. Criticism of rationalism gives rise to the direction of sensualism, whose representatives believe that the main role is played by sensory, experiential cognition. Locke's critique of innate ideas looked particularly convincing, pointing out that general agreement on any principles cannot be considered as the main argument in favor of innateness ^{[10, p. 103]}. It should be emphasized here, and this is confirmed by the opinion of most researchers, that there is no fundamental difference between the directions of sensualism and rationalism in the issue under consideration. Thus, both the wing of rationalists and representatives of sensualism believed that experience could not fully provide unconditionally universal and necessary (apodictic) knowledge; that the truths of mathematics have only an intellectual origin.  A.V. Gulyga notes: "Neither one nor the other school saw a fundamental difference between the two types of cognition. For sensualists, logical cognition was only an improved sensuality, for rationalists, sensuality acted as a kind of intellect in potency. Kant emphasized the irreducibility of one "trunk of knowledge" to another" ^{[11, p.53]}.And this was due to Kant's critical revision of the concept of a priori.

The key point in Kant's revolution is the fact that his predecessors rejected the empirical origin of apodictic knowledge in mathematics, but at the same time associated a priori with the analytical nature of mathematics, and this a prioriism "concerned only the mind(intelligence), not sensuality"^{[3, p.34]}. The introduction of the "Critique of Pure Reason" is devoted to the consistent elaboration by the thinker of the concepts that he lays the basis for his proposed method: 1) On the difference between pure and empirical cognition, where he states that "no cognition precedes experience in time, it always begins with experience" ^{[3, p.105]}. 2) As true signs of a priori knowledge, he points to the necessity and strict universality, inextricably linked with each other. 3) But at the same time, unlike his predecessors, he distinguishes between analytical and synthetic judgments, proving that all empirical judgments are synthetic, since "experience itself is a synthetic binding of contemplations" ^{[3, p.113]}. A priori synthetic judgments are devoid of such an auxiliary tool as experience, meanwhile, all theoretical sciences based on reason contain a priori synthetic judgments as principles. The thinker conducts a proof that all mathematical judgments are synthetic by their logical construction. Natural science includes a priori synthetic judgments as principles. Metaphysics, according to the scientist, for its purpose consists of a priori synthetic propositions. There is a well-known criticism of this position of Kant regarding space and time ^[12]. The basis of the scientist's conclusion is his conviction in the absolute reliability of mathematical judgments ^[13]. Here we cite the work of A. Einstein "Remarks on Articles" ^[14], where he specifically dwells on the premise on the basis of which Kant identifies a priori synthetic judgments in mathematics. Such a message is Euclidean geometry, which in the halo of the Kantian era was considered as a necessary and absolutely reliable knowledge ^{[14, p. 306]}.   It is clear that non-Euclidean geometries could not be discussed. Meanwhile, we will cite here the work of V. Bazhanov, where he says that "Kant's ideas about the a priori nature of certain mathematical categories related to the status of space and time [geometry and arithmetic], which were questioned as a result of the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries, turned out to be very much in demand and overestimated as a result of the intensive development of cognitive and cultural neuroscience ^{[15, p.50]}. It is important for us to emphasize that a priori synthetic judgments were a bridge to the postulation of a priori forms of sensuality.

Investigating the question of the conditions of reliability of mathematical knowledge, Kant comes to the conclusion that spatial intuition is sensory intuition, but this intuition cannot be empirical intuition, otherwise all the provisions of mathematics would be deprived of unconditional necessity and universality. Thus, the synthesis of mathematical judgments should be based on the a priori form of sensuality, that is, the thinker for the first time raises the question of the existence of a priori forms of sensuality. At the same time, he emphasizes that it is not about the content, but about the form: "That in the phenomenon that corresponds to sensations," the thinker writes, "I call matter, and that thanks to which the manifold in the phenomenon can be ordered in a certain way, I call the form of the phenomenon.  Since the only thing in which sensations can be ordered and brought into a certain form, in turn, cannot itself be a sensation, then, although the matter of all phenomena is given to us only a posteriori, their entire form must be ready for them in our soul a priori and therefore can be considered separately from any sensation." ^{[3, p.128]}. There are two pure forms of sensory contemplation as principles of a priori knowledge – space and time. Kant consciously follows the path of separating form from matter, in a certain sense, even in the direction of contrasting these concepts. Let us consider the prerequisites and reasons for this in Kantian philosophy.

In Kant's work "On the first basis of the difference of sides in space" ^[16], dated 1768, the scientist stops his view on such a property as spatial incongruence. He addresses this issue again in his dissertation in 1770 and in "Prologomena" (1783), in "Metaphysical principles of Natural Science" (1786) and in "What it means to orient oneself in thinking" (1786). A. Nuzzo, analyzing Kant's attitude to the problem of asymmetry for non-congruent subjects, notes that the thinker refers this not to observation as such, but to the "original inner feeling of one's own body" ^{[17, p. 163]}: "After all, only by correlating any perceived external object with our left and right sides with our hands can we know the difference that constitutes the essence of space and which alone serves as the complete determining basis of external objects" ^{[17, p. 164]}. V.V. Vasiliev notes that this important argument, which influenced Kant's concept of space and time, was not included in the central block of evidence of his dissertation and was completely excluded from the "Critique of Pure Reason" ^{[18, p.9]}. This argument reappears in the Prolegomena. It should be said that Kant initially did not share the Leibnizian approach to the nature of space, according to which any relations in space are reduced to the activity of the mind. But since his early works, he has not accepted the Newtonian version of absolute space either. Thus, in the article "New concepts of motion and rest" (1758)  ^[19] Kant notes: "Now I'm starting to realize that I'm missing something in the expressions movement and peace. I should always understand it not in an absolute, but in a relative sense. I should never say that a body is at rest without adding in relation to which bodies it is at rest, and I should never say that it is moving without at the same time indicating those objects in relation to which it changes its position. And even if I wanted to imagine a mathematical space, free of any objects, as a kind of container of bodies, then this would not help me at all.  For how can I distinguish parts of this space and different places in it, since they are not occupied by anything corporeal?" ^{[19, p.378]}.   In the essay "On the first basis of the difference of sides in space"  Kant is just discussing the property of incongruence for the first time, but takes it as the basis of anti-Leibnizian criticism in favor of just the reality of Newtonian absolute space: "In fact, the position of the parts of space relative to each other presupposes a certain direction in which these parts are located exactly this way, and not otherwise; this direction, taken in the most abstract sense, is not in relation to one thing in space to another, which, in fact, constitutes the concept of position, but in relation to the system these provisions relate to the absolute world space" ^{[16, p.371]}. And further, "precisely because absolute space is not an object of external perception, but is one of the basic concepts that only make all such objects possible, we can recognize everything that in the figure of a body depends only on the relationship to pure space, only by comparing it with other bodies" ^{[16, p.377]}. The thinker's hesitations lead him to concretize the concept of form, which, in fact, is evidenced by the title of Kant's dissertation "On the form and principles of the sensually perceived and intelligible world" (1770).  First of all, as already noted, Kant divides the concept of matter and form. Matter is the parts that are taken for substances. Form consists in the coordination of substances, but by no means in their subordination. "The fact is," the thinker writes, "that coordinated things are treated as additions to the whole, and subordinates as action and cause" ^{[20, p.386]}. The world, through all successive states, while remaining the same world, retains the same form. Sharing after Bruno the idea of the multiplicity of worlds, Kant emphasizes that "in each world there is given a certain form inherent in its nature, constant, unchangeable, as if the eternal principle of any random and transient form that relates to the state of the world" ^{[20, pp.387-388]}. At the same time, he understands coordination as real and objective. Space and time are another matter. The philosopher specifically emphasizes the difference between the principles of the form of the intelligible world and the form of the sensually perceived world: "The form of the intelligible world admits an objective principle, that is, some reason due to which there is a connection between things. And the world, considered as a phenomenon, that is, in relation to the sensuality of the human mind, admits only one formal subjective principle, < > thanks to which it is necessary that everything that can be an object of feelings (in their quality), necessarily seems to belong to the same whole" ^{[20, p.396]}. And he distinguishes two such formal principles of the world of phenomena – time and space, considering them as schemes and conditions of everything sensible in human cognition. So, according to Kant, space is not an empirical concept deduced from external experience, but is a form of all phenomena of the external senses, that is, a subjective a priori condition of sensuality. The thinker emphasizes that only from the point of view of a person can we talk about space, about extension.  The thinker's emphasis on the concept of form is required in order to emphasize, strengthen the objectivity and reality of phenomena given in experience, only forms of knowledge are experienced. Therefore, Kant speaks about the reality of space in relation to everything that can meet us outside of us as an object, but at the same time shows the ideality of space in relation to things if they are considered by themselves, i.e. regardless of the properties of our sensuality ^{[3, p. 134]}. And this is a very important remark, since the philosopher emphasizes that it matters which subject contemplates things that appear to us externally. "We cannot judge the contemplations of other thinking beings, whether these beings are subject to the very conditions that limit our contemplation and are significant for us" ^{[3, p. 134]}. Thus, he clearly indicates the limits of the applicability of his position - this is the only possible a priori (innate) sensory ability of a Person in the conditions of our Universe. From the perspective of modern theoretical searches in fundamental physics, based on the concept of the multidimensionality of space-time, of which only three spatial dimensions expanded with the Universe, causing its adaptability to the appearance of Man, we can say that Kant's transcendental aesthetics is a brilliant foresight. It is clear that Kant's contemporary natural science was still very far from even hinting at such problems. In modern cosmology and elementary particle physics, the priority is the program for building a unified field theory, which includes the concept of superstrings, based on the idea of the multidimensionality of space-time. It is worth drawing attention once again to the fact that Kant shared the idea of the existence of a plurality of worlds. And if, as it is assumed in one of the models for constructing a unified field theory, some spatial dimensions were compactified, namely, three dimensions expanded, then this was a necessary condition for the emergence of Life and Mind specifically of our Universe with a Person who, according to his physiological characteristics, is able to cognize this world of phenomena visually only in three-dimensional projections. And the penetration into the essence of the geometrodynamic features of the forms of existence of the entire physical diversity of our Universe is the main intrigue and task of modern natural science. Such a statement of the problem appeals already to the dialectic of matter and form, to the formulation of the question of how form joins essence, and this directly leads to the Hegelian methodology ^[21]. In Kant's table of categories ^{[3, p.175]}, there is no pair of categories of essence and form or content and form. It is introduced subsequently by Hegel. The dialectics of matter and form, essence and form can become a methodological key to the question of the status of an energodominantly disturbed vacuum, claiming the role of the initial abstraction in physical theory ^[22]. The main question is how the mechanism of the chain of spontaneous violations of the symmetry of the vacuum, which led to the emergence and formation of the entire diversity of the physical world of our Universe, and the mechanism of self-closure (or compactification) of additional spatial dimensions are mutually conditioned. What is the role of each of these dimensions, what are the temporal and topological scales of their folding, how does this determine the quality of the material objects of our world, what is the mystery of the expansion of exactly three spatial dimensions. It can be said that the tasks set in science provide weighty prerequisites for determining space-time as a form of existence of matter. The main subtext here is to identify how the form joins the essence. 

Most of the major researchers of Kant's philosophy repeatedly emphasize that the a priori in Kant does not mean innate ^{[11, p. 52]}. T.I. Oizerman gives two arguments to prove this point of view. The first concerns the difference between Kant's understanding of a priori judgments from the representations of his predecessors, since it is Kant who theoretically loads the boundaries of possible experience ^{[23, p.192]}. The second argument is that the obtained a priori knowledge presupposes the subsequent correspondence, agreement of objects with a priori concepts or judgments to which they relate ^{[23, p. 193]}. Indeed, the Kantian approach differs from Plato's anamnesis and from Descartes' innate ideas, and this directly applies to all forms of the intelligible world. But the forms of perception of the sensory world are another matter.  Agreeing with the above arguments, we once again recall the surprise that it is impossible not to feel about the ideas discussed in modern physical science, in the anthropic principle, that the features of the signature of space-time predetermined the features of the expansion scenario of our Universe in three spatial dimensions and precisely in the direction of the appearance of a three-dimensional-corporeal man. The three-dimensionality of the form of human sensory perception is predetermined by the very fact of the possibility of its existence, an innate characteristic of a person specific to our world.

In terms of this study, from the entire arsenal of problems stated by Kant, it is necessary to single out those that play a transcendental role in modern physical science.

First. Kant, as noted by Hegel, lays the foundation for the concept of matter as a reality that exists before experience and independently of human consciousness.  In the work "Universal Natural History and the Theory of Heaven" ^[24], the philosopher characterizes matter as constituting the primary substance of all things, acting according to the necessary laws, which he reduces to two forces – the force of attraction and the force of repulsion.  And although Kant does not turn away from the concept of the domination of this matter by some root cause, that is, God, the very fact of the independent separation of the category of matter is a significant achievement in the scientific understanding of reality.

Second. Kant introduces the observer into the scientific discourse (in the terminology of physical science) essentially, the principle of relativity. Of course, it is difficult to draw a conclusion about how the synthesis of physical problems and the concept of the Kantian observer took place in the genius spirituality of the author of the theory of relativity. Einstein called philosophy his second love, carefully studied the works of the greatest thinkers and, according to A. Pais, was interested in Kant's philosophy from his youth ^{[25, p.46]}.

The third. Kant, influenced by the rebellious ideas of Giordano Bruno, accepted the concept of the existence of a plurality of worlds. And he emphasizes that only from the position of a person of our world, the world that is revealed to us in experience, it is possible to express any judgments about it and to investigate its laws. In other worlds, something completely different is possible.  The modern reinterpretation of Kant's transcendental aesthetics testifies to the formulation of the problem of the human dimension of our Universe specifically. And the point here is not subjective idealism, but the peculiarities of the physical organization of our world.