The genesis of the new science and Christianity in the light of the problem of infinity

Filatova Mariya Igorevna ORCID: 0000-0002-8032-3816 PhD in Philosophy teacher of the Department of Philosophy of the Kursk State Agricultural Academy Ðîññèÿ, 305021, ã. Êóðñê, óë. Êàðëà Ìàðêñà, 70 m.philatova@yandex.ru Other publications by this author

The problem of the genesis of a new science remains open in the history and philosophy of science. One of the main difficulties on the way to its satisfactory solution is the incommensurability of the scale of the change or transformation of nature that technoscience has led to today, and those explanations of the essence of its genesis that have been (and, as one can judge, can be obtained) on the basis of historical-scientific and historical-philosophical studies. The appearance of the world surrounding man and the possibilities of interaction with him have changed radically, but it has not been possible to find a satisfactory explanation for this radicality. Modern historians of science emphasize that in studies of the genesis of a new science it is impossible to specify a single, clearly defined and historically coherent event of the late XVI - early XVII centuries., which became so revolutionary and decisive that radically and irrevocably changed people's ideas about nature and methods of obtaining this knowledge ^[1]. Moreover, the participants in this complex process demonstrate a much more continuous connection with the past and much less uniformity in assessing the "novelty" of their own approach. Therefore, as E. Agazzi notes, "the real problem is to understand what this novelty consisted of and to what extent it is novelty, without claiming that its solution will consist in specifying several clearly formulated "factors" ^[1].

Consideration of the philosophical foundations of a new science at the stage of its genesis gives researchers the opportunity to link the origins of a new science with almost any of the currents of thought known in antiquity. Thus, a connection is established between ancient philosophy and the new science, whereas the essence of the problem of the genesis of the new science presupposes, on the contrary, the clarification of the grounds for a radical difference between the possibilities of interaction with the outside world that a person had before the XVII century and those that opened up for him after. In addition to the most obvious and easily identifiable influence on the genesis of science of Platonism, the philosophical ideas of Stoics and Epicureans are among the prerequisites of the new science. L. M. Kosareva connects the scientific fruitfulness of the XVII century with the fact that scientific research for Descartes, Boyle, Hooke, Newton became a means of implementing their ethical metaprogram ^{[12, p. 46]}. According to L. M. Kosareva, the value motivation of their scientific research, which is amazing in strength, goes back to the ethical principles of the Stoics and Epicurus. Descartes fully shares the maxim of the Stoics and Epicurus: "To know nature in order to live properly" ^{[12, p. 46]}. Lyudmila Mikhailovna also points to the denial of the division of the Universe into "top" and "bottom" borrowed by the thinkers of the XVII century from the physics of the Stoics and Epicureans ^{[12, p. 53]}. According to L. M. Kosareva, the radical separation of two worlds characteristic of the Stoics – external, corporeal and internal, spiritual, became one of the intellectual prerequisites for the emergence of the Cartesian concept of opposing substances – corporeal, extended, and disembodied – the substance of thinking ^{[12, p. 51]}, and the atomistic-corpuscular representations of Epicurean physics formed the basis Cartesian mechanical model of the world ^{[12, p. 55]}. At the same time, all such statements are not able to give an answer to the main question arising in connection with the problem of the genesis of a new science about the new quality that all this syncretism of ideas acquires in the XVII century and which so clearly divides the history of mankind into two periods – "before" and "after".

The study of the genesis of the new science is further complicated by the fact that there is still no satisfactory understanding of why this event became possible in the Christian civilization, and moreover at a certain stage of its history. Should this circumstance be considered accidental and insignificant, or should it be recognized that it is crucial here? Most researchers are inclined to the latter opinion. However, the development of research on the genesis of a new science in this direction is hampered by the fundamental diversity of religious and scientific ontologies, and the essence of the issue in this case rests precisely on the ontological problem of discovering new possibilities for transforming reality. Within the framework of the historical and philosophical approach, the study of this issue is necessarily limited by the limits of human views on the problem of changing ontological conditions, that is, the views of "mere mortals", who, despite their high scientific authority among other people, by and large do not cease to remain primarily the same people, that is, do not cease to be limited in their possibilities of cognition and the worldview of their era, and dependence on the previous level of knowledge, and many others. This does not detract from the importance of the contribution of outstanding thinkers who have entered the history of philosophy and science. On the contrary, this consideration becomes an excuse for why the rapid change of natural science concepts in the history of New European science does not cause much perplexity and is perceived as a completely normal phenomenon. For example, when the inconsistency of the concept of empty space, which is so important for the formation of physics, and has not only natural science, but also theological significance, was recognized, other ideas were adopted instead, while it went into the history of science, which continues to develop rapidly further, and therefore received something from this concept, which has now ceased to be necessary here, as well as from many others who shared his fate. The question of this "something" goes beyond the competence of the history and philosophy of science, dealing with the explicit views of scientists. Although it is this question that can lead to an understanding of the most important thing that drives the real development of science and multiplies its possibilities of changing the world.

§ 1. Approaches to clarifying the influence of Christianity on the genesis of a new science: the problem of the diversity of religious and philosophical ontologies

The insufficiency of conceptual means for expressing the ontological problem associated with the genesis of the new science becomes especially obvious in the context of the question of the influence of Christian ideas on the genesis of the new science. With Christianity came a completely new form of revealed knowledge ("non-human" knowledge), unknown in antiquity, which presupposes the corresponding ontology of the uncreated reality of God the Creator. And if in theology itself the correspondence of this ontology was somehow maintained, then difficulties arise when transferring theological ideas into the context of the problem of the genesis of science. In what language (in a broad sense) build a discourse here? This question is of fundamental importance here, and it is from one or another of its solutions that much depends on understanding the problem of the genesis of a new science. However, it is not even put here, since by default the problem of the genesis of a new science is investigated in the language of science itself. For example, P. P. Gaidenko, considering the problem of the influence of Christian ideas on the genesis of the new science, points to the transformation of the ancient division into natural and artificial under the influence of Christian ideas about the Creator; the dogma of God Incarnation, weakening the ancient opposition of the heavenly and earthly worlds; but at the same time, the distance between the transcendent God and the created world, conditioned by the consciousness of human sinfulness ^{[3, p. 55]}. This latter circumstance became an obstacle to the emergence of experimental mathematical natural science, when all the other necessary prerequisites for its emergence already existed in the Christian world of the V, X, and even more so of the XIV centuries. In view of this, P. P. Gaidenko notes that the magico-occult currents of the Renaissance, with their characteristic belief that there are magical means of cleansing a person capable of returning him to the state of innocence that Adam possessed before the fall, were crucial for the genesis of the new science ^{[3, p. 56]}.

However, it should be noted that, by and large, in this case, in considering the contribution of Christianity to the formation of the philosophical foundations of a new science, there is a mixture of two ontologies – theological and philosophical. P. P. Gaidenko adheres to an entirely philosophical approach in interpreting the issue under consideration. However, if we evaluate the influence of Christian ideas as a justification, or a basis for revaluation of the division of everything into natural and artificial, as well as the rigid opposition of the supralunar and sublunar worlds, then it should be noted that such a revaluation in itself does not have the necessary connection with Christianity and, by and large, could occur under another, extraneous influence to Christianity. And despite the fact that P. P. Gaidenko quite justifiably in this case connects it precisely with the ideas of Christianity, but since these ideas are taken in isolation from the integral Christian teaching and its ontology (reduced to the philosophical level), so in this case the Christian God appears only as some semantic concept of "God-The Creator", then the ideological changes that have occurred under the influence of such reduced ideas should be of the same order as all other changes in philosophical ideas and lead to equivalent consequences. However, in the case of the genesis of a new science, this is not the case. The consequences that the development of science has led to are unprecedented in history. It is hard to believe that the effect produced by this confluence of ancient and Christian ideas arose by chance. Surely there must be an explanation for it, but the framework of philosophical consideration does not accommodate it. And it seems more likely that this confluence of ideas only indirectly indicates that in the course of the genesis of the new science, one way or another, this kind of truth about reality was touched upon, which remained inaccessible to philosophical thought. And that is why within its limits it is impossible to find an answer to the question of what this truth is and what it is.

But on the other hand, considering the question of the influence of Christian ideas on the genesis of the new science from the standpoint of the theological approach and within the framework of the ontology corresponding to it seems to be able to clarify the problem of the radical and unprecedented ontological changes associated with the genesis of the new science. However, this only advantage of this approach fades against the background of numerous complications that burden the consideration of the problem of the genesis of a new science from theological positions and make this path unpromising. First of all, it must be said that the ideas of human purification characteristic of the magico-occult currents, which were crucial for the genesis of the new science, when translated into the theological "coordinate system" entail axiological complications. In the theological tradition of Christianity, along with the doctrine of God-likeness (unity), which is the essence of Christian life and Christian thought, there are references to violations of the method established in Christianity to achieve the state of deification and its consequences. However, due to the fact that this path is undesirable here, he, as is quite understandable, did not receive here the full disclosure that the desired path to Christian holiness received. The most significant among the testimonies about this undesirable path is the gospel parable about the wedding feast (Mt. 22:1-14). In it, the Kingdom of Heaven is likened to a man who called those invited to his son's wedding feast. When they refused, all the others who came and reclined at the feast were called together. But one of them, who did not have a wedding robe, that is, dressed as it is and did not consider it necessary to transform for such an occasion, but considered himself worthy to attend the feast, was expelled and plunged into outer darkness. Apparently, he had some reason to recognize himself as equal to everyone else present and dressed like them. But these grounds were not genuine, which was not slow to show up.

In other words, it is assessed here as an illegal method of purification unintended by Christianity. It entails consequences that can be recognized as a radical and unprecedented change in ontological conditions. The "outer darkness" (the outer place) is a "different place", another ontological state, or a new world, both in relation to the world from which the "old" person (i.e., a person who is not renewed and does not have a wedding robe) dared to come to the wedding feast, and in relation to the feast itself. However, if the theme of the "feast" and the corresponding change in ontological conditions was revealed in Christian theology, and the theme of the "world" and its ontological possibilities was discussed by ancient philosophers (who agreed on the opposition of heaven and earth), then the theme of "outer darkness", that change in ontological conditions that accompanies the transition from the world through illegal presence on the marriage feast into outer darkness, was not revealed either in philosophy or in theology. In the first case – because of the different order of the ontologies of philosophy and theology, and in the second case – due to the fact that in theology such a path is illegal. One prohibition to follow it is enough here, and such a prohibition makes it unnecessary to reveal and comprehensively explore all the depths of the outer darkness.

Thus, although on the one hand, the consideration of the problem of the genesis of science within the framework of the theological approach seems to be able to answer the question, unsolvable within the framework of the philosophical approach, about the grounds for the radical and unprecedented ontological changes associated with the genesis of a new science, the new quality of reality that science deals with. However, the answer to this one question entails complications in the form of a number of other related equally complex issues. Among them is the question already mentioned above about the language of discourse, in which in this case the genesis of a new science should be investigated. Within the framework of the theological approach for such research, it is necessary to solve the question of translating the language of religious ontology into the language of the philosophical foundations of science, somehow bring them under some "common denominator", establish a direct connection between them. This task is complicated by the fact that the area of theology that is relevant to this problem, namely the topic of "outer darkness", being a theological topic, as already mentioned, remains undisclosed in theology itself. In addition, such an approach to the problem of the genesis of a new science gives this problem a sharply negative connotation, presenting the achievements of a new science as the fruit of following an illegal path.

The last difficulty among the above, however, is perhaps the least obstacle to the development of research on the genesis of a new science from a theological standpoint. Despite the decisive importance of the new science for modern civilization, anti-scientology sentiments have long been declared. Thus, in Maritain we find a view close to the one we propose on the problem of the genesis of science, in which he tries to combine the ontologies of theology and philosophy. However, the only thing that in this case, as it turned out, can be translated from theology to philosophy is the axiological side of the question concerning the assessment of unprecedented changes associated with the genesis of the new science. Maritain considers the problem of the genesis of science not as a whole and as such, but concerns it only in connection with the contribution to the genesis of science of one of its creators – Rene Descartes. He calls Descartes an angel in the flesh, and he correlates the significance of his contribution to the genesis of science with the second temptation of the Savior, "I will give You all this if you fall down and worship me," to which, according to Maritain, Descartes succumbed. According to Mariten, "Descartes' sin is the sin of angelism" ^{[16, p. 203]}. For Descartes, the only genuine and legitimate prototype of our knowledge is the knowledge of angels ^{[16, p. 207]}. "This is the model according to which the son of Touraine decided to remake the human spirit" ^{[16, p. 205]}, Maritain believes.

However, how does Descartes achieve this goal? According to Maritain, Descartes committed the usurpation of the special virtues of the angelic nature ^{[16, p. 220]}, or the misappropriation of capabilities that do not belong to the human intellect.

Thus, Descartes' discovery of the Ego-cogito and its possibilities, as Maritain shows, corresponds to the scheme of the gospel parable about the marriage feast: the illegal assimilation and recognition of possibilities beyond the possibilities of human nature does not give a person the actual possession of them. Therefore, when a person seduced by an imaginary equality with the angelic mind begins to act and behave as having a real right to such equality, sooner or later the discrepancy between who he is and who he thinks he is will still make itself felt. This scheme, on the one hand, reflects the axiological side of the parable of the marriage feast, and on the other hand, it reveals the axiological context of the path to truth that Descartes took. Moreover, all this is based on a simple parallelism of theological and philosophical ideas that do not touch each other in any way. The chasm separating them is the fundamental diversity of the ontologies of theology and philosophy. It causes the untranslatability of concepts about the reality to which the angelic world belongs to the plane of philosophical discourse. Therefore, when Maritain mentions angels in the framework of philosophical discourse and represents the angelic mind as the prototype of Descartes' I-cogito, it is unclear what such a comparison can mean. If in this case the word "angel" performs the function of referring beyond the limits of human capabilities and is used to simply express the discrepancy between the actual capabilities of the human mind and the capabilities clearly superior to them, which a person nevertheless appropriates to himself, then in this case it would be possible to talk only about an error. But as it is quite clear, the error cannot have such significance for the genesis of a new science, which in fact received the discovery of the I-cogito ^[20].

In this case, it remains to assume that the word "angel" in the context of Descartes' search for the Ego is somehow ontologically loaded, indicates the reality that Descartes comes into contact with in one way or another in his discourse. That is why the usurpation of angelic rights, which Descartes commits, really has power, leads to real changes in the capabilities of the human mind. Another thing is that while remaining an illegal act, it entails corresponding consequences. But in order to deal with this last circumstance, it is necessary first to answer the main question of how the participation (and not only participation, but also the determining influence) of another ontology is possible in the ontology of philosophical discourse – an ontology that is within the competence of religious faith and based on a frank knowledge of another reality. Thus, here we again come to the problem of the language of discourse that we have already outlined above, which we need to speak in this case, that is, in the conditions of mixing two incompatible ontologies, as a result of which something third arises, namely the new reality with which New European and modern science is dealing. In other words, this assumes that one or another (but in any case illegal and undesirable) attitude of a person to the new reality known to him from the Christian Revelation can lead to a change in the reality of the "old" world known to man from everyday experience. However, in what language can the essence of this change be expressed in this case? In theology, which is primarily concerned with the possibility of a real, and not imaginary, godlike person, this topic, as already mentioned, has not been disclosed. Therefore, a language corresponding to this problem was not developed here, the question of the ontology to which this language would be adequate was not raised. Thus, here we cannot get the conceptual resources we need in this case ready-made. On the other hand, it is even less possible to expect to find them within the framework of a philosophical approach. The very unsolved problem of the genesis of science for the philosophy of science is an indirect confirmation of the absence of the necessary conceptual means for this. However, the statement that the philosophical approach does not have such conceptual means ready-made does not mean that they cannot in principle be here. It is hard to believe that in the more than 2500-year-old heritage of philosophical thought it is impossible to find at least one or another indication of the direction to clarify the problem of the genesis of a new science. If the genesis of science itself is a real event in human history, initiated and carried out by people, then already within the limits of human capabilities it must have one or another explanation or at least an indication of the direction to it.

And indeed, the history of philosophy, in addition to the philosophical teachings included in it, which explicitly reveal the essence of certain philosophical ideas, also contains insoluble paradoxes. Among such mysterious phenomena, first of all, it is necessary to point out the aporias of Zeno of Elea. If an explanation could be found for Zeno's aporias, it would mean that his reasoning completely fits into the framework of philosophical thought, once again confirming the existence of such a framework, insurmountable for meaningful human thought. However, Zeno's aporias entered the history of philosophy in a completely different capacity. The unresolved, moreover, the ambiguity of the foundations of the problem that arises here, manifested in the transition of strict logical reasoning to aporia, somehow calls into question the status of philosophical and broader human thought and its possibilities. And in view of this, one could say that, by and large, the field of philosophical thought is not something that can, in accordance with its own specifics, set the limits of what is permissible for a particular reasoning, but, on the contrary, is something that itself needs to determine its own place in some broader context, the connection with which is somehow otherwise, it is found in the unsolvable aporias and paradoxes known to philosophical thought. Pointing to the way out into this broader context, aporias and paradoxes precisely perform the function of searching for those conceptual means necessary to clarify the essence of the problem of the genesis of a new science, which, as it was said, are not in a ready-made form in the more than 2500-year heritage of philosophical thought.

When we get acquainted with the circumstances that served as prerequisites for the arguments of the historical Zeno, we are surprised to find that they correspond to the very scheme of the "wedding feast" that was highlighted above on the basis of the gospel parable. It is also evident in those interpretations of the genesis of the new science, which, as in the case of Maritain, are based on attempts to combine the ontologies of theology and philosophy. It is possible that the obstacle faced by all such attempts is rooted precisely in the lack of clarity of the essence of the broader (than only philosophical) context to which Zeno's aporias belong and which, as mentioned above, is able to provide the necessary conceptual resources for a satisfactory expression of the essence of the problem of the genesis of a new science.

§ 2. In search of conceptual grounds for the study of the genesis of a new science as an ontotheological problem: the equivalence of Zeno of Elea's reasoning and the Gospel parable of the marriage feast.

Zeno was a disciple of Parmenides of Elea, and to understand the purpose for which he compiled the aporias, one can start from the teachings of Parmenides about the One and mainly from those questions that Parmenides himself left unresolved in his teaching. This is primarily a problem of the connection of the One and the many, that is, being in truth and being as it exists by nature. Parmenides recognized both kinds of being, so he divided his poem "On Nature" into two parts, which, however, he left separate, and the question of how they fit together is open. Reasoning according to the principles of consistent thinking (according to Parmenides, the contradiction does not correspond to the truth), Parmenides did not see the possibility of finding solutions to this issue on this path and, apparently, considered it insoluble. But Zeno took a completely different path in the study of this problem. Using the method of reasoning from the opposite, Zeno neutralized the obstacle in the form of the inadmissibility of contradiction, which stopped Parmenides, preventing him from moving further in the study of the problem implicitly posed by him of the connection between being in truth and being in nature. Having thus opened the way to the study of this question, Zeno conducts it on the basis of an abstract concept of sensually perceived reality, which is the concept of a divisible quantity. Thus, Zeno argues from reality, and not from the principles of consistent cognition, as Parmenides did. In other words, Zeno makes this reality known from experience, or rather the concept of it, an object over which a very extravagant thought experiment is being conducted in this case, namely: contrary to the obvious and known falsity of the original assumption, Zeno, reasoning from the opposite, admits that the divisible consists of the indivisible, that the sensually perceived reality, existing by nature, in one way or another is involved in another kind of reality that exists by truth. And on the basis of the assumption of some kind of connection between them, Zeno, using the logical method of dichotomous division, begins to investigate the question of the existence of a divisible set consisting of indivisible units – a question that belonged to the number containing a contradiction, as it was shown by Plato in "Parmenides" (Plato. Parmenides 127 e1–4). Zeno's antinomy of the set, proved on the basis of a dichotomy, is attested by Simplicius (Simplicius 140.27 (DC 29 B3).

In the article "The category of potential infinity: a new look at the problem of the relationship between philosophy, theology and science" ^[26], where this issue was subjected to a comprehensive in-depth examination, it is shown that as a result of his experiment, Zeno did not come to the proof of the fallacy of the initial assumption (that is, the assumption that the set exists), as, according to- apparently, he had to count, reasoning from the opposite. Instead, he came to the discovery of something fundamentally new, in addition to the two concepts known from the aporia conditions of being in truth and being in nature. This third was the concept of a new potentially infinite reality. Once again, we emphasize that as a result of Zeno's thought experiment, it was not a new reality of a different quality that was discovered, but only the concept of it. But since antiquity did not know of precedents for changing reality into another quality, Zeno's discovery could not then be identified as a concept of reality of another quality, moreover, there could not even be a question about any change in reality initiated by a human "illegal" way of reasoning about it. For a person, the wrong approach to judging reality is just a mistake, a miss, a failure to hit the target, but not the discovery of a new world. Zeno, on the other hand, was faced with a discovery, but it is impossible to understand what its essence is from his reasoning. And here humanity is faced with a phenomenon that proves that only human abilities to judge nature and its possibility of participation in the higher reality of a different quality, only a human decision on this issue is enough to lead, in case of an incorrect judgment, not to an error, but to consequences clearly of non-human origin, exceeding human intentions and expectations, as well as the possibilities of understanding available to a person.

In the era of antiquity, the consequences of Zeno's reasoning could not be fully revealed. There were no serious grounds for assuming the connection of two incompatible realities. As is quite clear, Zeno's reasoning from the opposite is just a technical technique that has been applied experimentally and episodically. However, Zeno's problem has received a completely different severity in the Christian world, where the unity of two incompatible realities – human and divine, natural and supernatural – has become a real possibility. The theme of unity has received a comprehensive disclosure in the Christian East. Here unity appears to be an entirely inhuman act. So, in Gregory Palamas we read: "Ecstasy ... is accessible only to those who have acquired dispassion; and there is no unity yet, unless the Comforter illuminates from above the praying person, who is sitting in the upper room at the height of his nature, waiting for the promise of the Father, and does not delight him through revelation to the vision of light" ^[5].

Thus, waiting for the promised rapture into a new reality to take place is the limit for human possibilities in the matter of unity. However, a person who is initiated into the mysteries of Christianity (that is, a person who is aware of the possibilities of changing the created nature that have been discovered in Christianity unprecedented in history) can deviate from this only true path to unity and follow another one, the one mentioned in the parable of the marriage feast. And what happens to such a person in this case, we can no longer call an entirely inhuman act. First of all, because the decisive importance here is the willingness of man himself to recognize his nature already (that is, before any admiration, which in this case becomes no longer necessary) having the quality of nature of a new, already involved in a new reality. It is this willingness of a person, which is his own decision, in fact, determines in this case his fate to be plunged into outer darkness. However, neither the outer darkness itself, nor the act of being thrown into it, are in any way connected with the actions, expectations and intentions of the person himself and are in this sense inhuman. Thus, with regard to this illegal path to unity, it can be said that human and non-human actions are combined here, and the first causes the second. However, if the gospel parable of the feast immediately reveals the two-sided context of the event of being thrown into darkness, illuminating both human and non-human (divine) actions that occur during this, then the event that actually occurred, as can be expected, will be revealed to the person participating in it, which means that the person who entered the illegal path, only with one, the human side. Therefore, only his determination to recognize himself as a full participant in another higher reality, for which he somehow found justification and justification, and his actions in accordance with such recognition, remain clear to him. Everything else caused by these human judgments and actions turns out to be no longer provided for by them as such and becomes a complete but inevitable surprise for a person, for which, as is quite understandable, he cannot find an explanation.

Thus, having singled out two components in the gospel parable about the marriage feast – human and divine, it is possible, taking the first apart from the second, to single out the essence of those human actions that entail consequences of a non-human nature. This, as it was said, is an unauthorized and unilateral, and therefore an illegal appropriation of the qualities of another, higher nature to one's nature and actions in accordance with this. At the same time, in this scheme we can easily identify the scheme of actions of Zeno of Elea, already known in antiquity. This gives grounds to recognize Zeno's scheme of reasoning as the philosophical equivalent of the gospel parable of the feast, to recognize that this theological problem has a philosophical equivalent and, conversely, that the philosophical problem that Zeno's aporias represent has a theological equivalent. In both cases, we get an additional resource for solving those problems of both philosophy and theology that cannot be fully understood by means of philosophy alone or theology alone separately.

In the case of Zeno of Elea's aporias, the equivalence with the gospel parable of the feast according to the first, human component becomes the basis for a new look at the unsolved and unsolvable problems associated with Zeno's reasoning only by human means. As a philosophical anticipation of the ontotheological possibilities that opened up in the Christian era, Zeno's reasoning shows exactly under what conditions incorrect expectations from reality (in Zeno's case, this expectation to meet the indivisible among the divisible) lead not to the discovery of the fallacy of the original assumption, as a negative result of the same order with the actions that conditioned it, but to a transition to the realm of another order. Such a transition is associated with a change in ontological conditions, and the problem of understanding it goes beyond the competence of philosophy. The presence of such a transition, on the one hand, explains the unresolved problem of Zeno in the more than 2500-year history of philosophy, and on the other hand, this very uncertainty can be considered as indirect evidence of the existence of such a transition. At the same time, its direct evidence is the ontological side of the question raised by Zeno about the loss of the whole, considered in the article "The category of potential infinity ..." ^[26], an issue related to the possibility of changing, transforming finite reality, inexplicable in a rational way. The article concluded that it is impossible to fully clarify the Zeno problem only within the limits of philosophy, that this problem is a kind of reference to the theological context and that it is necessary to further consider it in this context. In view of this, the establishment of a theological equivalent for the Zeno problem in the form of the gospel parable of the feast is the next step in the direction outlined in this article.

On the other hand, as mentioned above, the theological theme of the possibility of an illegal and undesirable path to unity, reflected in the gospel parable of the marriage feast, includes the problem of changing ontological conditions, which has not been disclosed in theology. The problem of changing ontological conditions is particularly acute and urgent in connection with the research of the genesis of a new science. It has already been said about the prospects of recognizing the influence of Christianity as a determining factor in the genesis of science (and Christianity is not in its socio-cultural projection, but in its ontotheological essence). In Christianity, the unity of heaven and earth, above and below, which became the discovery of the XVII century (this will be discussed in more detail below), is understood either as a sacrament of the 8th day, the anticipation of which is the experience of personal holiness, or suspicions of authenticity arise regarding such unity. In this second case, the imaginary unity, as well as the genuine one, entails a change in ontological conditions, but the direction of these changes is directly opposite. This is not the light of the Kingdom, but the outer darkness. If in the XVII century, with the help of the possibilities opened up in Christianity, the creators of science achieved precisely an imaginary unity, and if we assume that it really entailed all the consequences provided for and reflected in the parable of the marriage feast, then the question arises how we could now identify these consequences as the consequences of just such a the kind of ontological changes that are provided for in the gospel parable about the marriage feast and which are performed with the participation of non-human actions? After all, as already noted above, unlike the gospel parable, where both human and divine actions were revealed to us, only the human side of what is happening remains clear to us here. On what basis can we recognize that the consequences to which the foundation of a new science has led – and we are really facing negative consequences today in the form of a modern crisis of the foundations of science – are precisely the consequences of non-human interference, which could be given a theological interpretation? And here the established equivalence of the arguments of Zeno of Elea and the gospel parable of the marriage feast becomes a valuable resource and may be the only opportunity to clarify this issue.

But since the characteristic feature of the crisis of the foundations of science is the ontological problem associated with the concepts of a potentially infinite reality accepted today, then, accordingly, one should expect that it is with the category of potential infinity that the answer to the question of the grounds on which we can conclude that the reality with which modern science deals can be connected in one way or another – this is a consequence of ontological changes of a non-human nature. And indeed, in the article ^[26] we showed what a valuable and promising discovery in this regard the category of potential infinity can become.

As a problem, potential infinity has declared itself in history twice: at the dawn of philosophical thought in the aporias of Zeno of Elea and at the present stage in the ontology of constructive realism. In the article it was shown that these two cases are two stages in the composition of a single whole, designated as the universal ontotheological paradigm of Gregory Palamas. At the same time, only the human side of what is happening is revealed in them, which, however, does not exhaust the ontotheological paradigm itself, the central point of which is precisely the non-human component. This non-human component stands in the way of understanding that "metamorphosis" of reality, that transformation of the finite into a new quality of the potentially infinite, the possibility of which was discovered by Zeno at the level of a thought experiment and which was discovered by modern science, but already at the level of its active experience of interaction with reality, as a fact of this experience.

Each of these two moments as part of the manifestation of potential infinity on the part of human actions and human possibilities of understanding is partial and not self-sufficient separately. One refers to the other and points to the other as its effect or as its cause. At the same time, it is impossible to restore or establish a direct connection between them, since it is broken by the above-mentioned intervention from the non-human side. Nevertheless, even taking into account this circumstance, we can assert (and the reasons for this were given in the article ^[26]) that Zeno's thought experiment and the actual experience of modern science have a correspondence with each other and are different aspects of the transformation of the finite into a new quality of the potentially infinite. In the experience of interaction with reality within the framework of modern science, the same thesis was actively applied to nature itself, to reality itself (nature is written in the language of mathematics), which Zeno applied only to the concept of this reality. In both cases, the result turned out to be the same, with the only difference that in the new science it was implemented at the level of reality itself, and in Zeno only at the level of the concept of it. This result was the discovery of potential infinity in modern science and in Zeno's aporias. In the first case – as a potentially infinite reality and in the second case – as concepts of potential infinity. At the same time, these two aspects of potential infinity in isolation from each other remain flawed and untenable. Just as Zeno's aporias, separated by a 2000-year distance from the active realization of the concept of potentially infinite reality implicated in them, remain a mystery in the history of philosophy, so this realization itself, revealed at the present stage, in isolation from the possibility of its conceptual comprehension, remains an unsolvable problem ^{[26, p. 33]}.

Nevertheless, based on the established correspondence between Zeno's reasoning and the experience of modern science, we can fully restore the human side of what is happening during the change of finite reality into a new quality of the potentially infinite. From this we can see that it is completely identical to the human component that we have highlighted in the gospel parable about the marriage feast, while in the gospel parable itself we also see the inhuman side of what is happening, in place of which, in the paradigm of potential infinity that we have highlighted, combining Zeno's reasoning with the experience of modern science, there remains an irreplaceable "white spot". Thus, the established equivalence between Zeno's reasoning and the human side of what is happening in the gospel parable of the Feast of the Kingdom, on the one hand, and the established correspondence between Zeno's thought experiment and its active implementation in the experience of modern science, on the other hand, allows, based on the consequences that led to the foundation of a new science (that is, based on ontology of potentially infinite reality, accepted in the modern philosophy of science), to assert the ontotheological nature of the genesis of a new science, or at least to assert the acquisition of conceptual means for the study of the genesis of a new science as an ontotheological problem (i.e., as a problem having a mixed character and including both human and non-human actions).

In this case, we have approached the question of the ontotheological nature of the genesis of the new science as if from the end, proceeding from its consequences in the form of a modern crisis of the foundations of science, from those accepted in the modern philosophy of science ideas about a potentially infinite reality, which, in fact, prompted us to assume a deeper influence of Christianity on the genesis of the new science than the one that is reflected in historical and scientific research. Based on this assumption, let us turn to the very genesis of the new science.

§ 3. The problem of the unity of the finite with the infinite: from religious experience to philosophical discourse

We have already mentioned the importance of the question of the influence of Christianity on the genesis of the new science and the difficulties accompanying attempts to clarify this issue. Everyone knows that the creators of the new science appealed to the idea of a Christian God to assert the right of the human mind to reliable knowledge. For Galileo and Descartes, the idea of God became the basis that replenishes the inferiority of the human mind, thanks to which a person gained access to the truth, although not in its entirety. It is known that the creators of science themselves presented this kind of involvement precisely as genuine involvement. The history and philosophy of science based on their ideas does not make it possible to question the authenticity of the involvement of the human mind in the mind of God, since here this authenticity is determined by the meaning that the creators of science themselves put into this idea. Here we can only start from their words.

On the other hand, as it was said, in Christianity itself, the question of the authenticity of participation in the divine reality is a very serious question, since here we know a very dangerous state of charm, into which one falls who accepts and pretends to be what he is not. In view of this, doubts were expressed about the optimistic views of the founders of the new science on this problem. In particular, such views were expressed by Mariten, as already mentioned above. However, in this case, as in all similar ones, criticism has the character of a more or less free interpretation, since it is carried out in a language different from the language in which the founders of the new science (Galileo and Descartes) expressed their ideas, and untranslatable into this language. They were talking about an idea God, as the idea of an omniscient and all-perfect being, and, reasoning theoretically, proved how the human mind is involved in omniscience and all-perfection. It should be intuitively more or less clear to the religious consciousness of the researcher of the genesis of a new science how audacious such statements of the founders of a new science may sound and what significance they may have from the point of view of religious experience. However, due to the lack of ways to directly translate the language of philosophy into the language of theology, such meaning cannot be attached to these statements. Proceeding only from the arguments of the founders of science reflected in the history and philosophy of science, we cannot conclude that something happened during the genesis of the new science, which the theology of Christianity warned against. In this situation, the established equivalence of Zeno's philosophical arguments and the gospel parable of the marriage feast (as it was shown above, Zeno's arguments are the philosophical equivalent of the gospel parable of the feast, and this latter is the theological equivalent of Zeno's arguments) can become the bridge that has been missing so far between philosophy and theology, through which it can be established an unambiguous correspondence between the meanings of both. And if it is proved that the reasoning of the creators of the new science appealing to the idea of God is carried out according to the so-called Zeno scheme (which is mentioned above), then based on the equivalence of the Zeno scheme of the gospel parable about the marriage feast, it can be argued that the reasoning of the creators of the new science have the corresponding theological meaning expressed in this gospel parable. Recall Zeno's scheme: the assumption of the existence of the indivisible among the divisible and the action in accordance with such an assumption, which leads not only to the discovery of the groundlessness of the assumption made about the existence of a new nature, but also to the loss of the solidity of the "old" ideas about the reality under study.

First of all, it should be noted that the problem faced by the founders of the new science repeats the essence of the difficulties that Parmenides and Zeno tried to overcome. This is the problem of the unity of two incompatible realities – the reality of the finite created world and the finite human mind, on the one hand, and the actual infinite mind of the Creator God, on the other hand. Despite the fact that the idea of the new, actually infinite reality of the Christian Creator God entered European culture in the first centuries of the new era, the problems associated with this idea for the human mind, by and large, made themselves felt only by the XIII century. Up to 60-70 years of the XII century . in Europe, only 3-4 logical works of Aristotle were known. But after, by the end of the century, the list of Stagirite's writings was supplemented with "Physics", fragments of "Metaphysics" and "Ethics", and some other works ^[2], the Christian world was faced with a highly developed system of ideas about the world, which had a kind of intellectual appeal and in which there was no place for the Christian God. In this situation, the theory of two truths has become an attempt to somehow reconcile Christianity and paganism, delineating the sphere of competence of both. However, this balance turned out to be very unstable. Already in 1277, Bishop Etienne Tampier of Paris solemnly declared that it was impossible in the name of the principles of the Greek world, which at that time was considered real, to forbid God to create one or many worlds of different structures, while he proclaimed it as a theologian, in the name of divine omnipotence" ^{[11, p. 74]}. Thus, the thesis of the omnipotence of the infinite God did not allow any autonomy for the finite human mind, no separate "place" within which the finite human mind would retain its rights to know the truth. This precluded the possibility of solving the problem of the correlation of the finite human and the infinite divine, following the example of Parmenides, who left the two incompatible parts of his poem "On Nature" separate, the image of which was the theory of two truths. Therefore, since the XIII century, we have encountered attempts to combine the finite with the infinite. First of all, among the approaches to this problem, one should point out the arguments expressed in response to the statement of the Bishop of Paris about the possibility of emptiness, which became the prototype of the concept of infinite empty space adopted in Newtonian physics. The historian of science A. Coire among those who reacted to the condemnation of 1277, notes Henry of Ghent, Richard of Middletown, Walter Burley, Robert Holcott, Thomas Bradwardine ^{[11, p. 79]}.

Henry of Ghent was one of those who inspired the public act of 1277. As A. Coire writes about this, "in order to preserve divine omnipotence, he defended the presence of an inner-world void, or at least the possibility of its presence: can't God at any moment destroy this or that part of the world at his discretion?" ^{[11, p. 80]}. Henry of Ghent gives an affirmative answer to the question whether God can create a body or another world outside the last heaven, despite the fact that the consequence of this will be the recognition of emptiness denied by Aristotle. In the reasoning of Heinrich of Ghent, "emptiness is a dimension or distance between the above-mentioned bodies [a body created by God outside of heaven and removed from the last heaven]; as such, it exists accidentally, so that the positively existing distance either positively overlaps with it, or is capable of being below it or next to it. And the void itself has an accidental existence, because the bodies between which it exists are arranged in such a way that a certain bodily dimension can exist between them, but does not exist" ^{[11, p. 63]}. In Walter Burley, the rejection of the Aristotelian doctrine of the impossibility of emptiness and the incomprehensibility of both time preceding the creation of the world and extra-world space forces us to admit that the existence of emptiness preceded creation ^{[11, p. 92]}. But, as A. Coire says, only Thomas Bradwardine can reveal a consistent and conscious statement about the reality of infinite space ^{[11, p. 79]}.

Recognizing the reality of the finite world as dependent on the infinite omnipotence of God in the XIII century, as can be seen, they find an opportunity to combine both on the basis of the concept of emptiness in which God can create another world. We cannot contain with our finite mind all that God can accomplish by His infinite omnipotence. However, even in this case, in the concept of infinite emptiness, a kind of invariant is available to us for all the changes that God can make to his creation by his infinite omnipotence. The recognition of the possibility of this kind of emptiness behind the finite world known to us in experience helps to ensure that our knowledge of the world is invulnerable from the side of divine omnipotence. It can be said that in this case our finite and limited knowledge of the world, as it were, potentially includes and provides for infinite possibilities of interference in the established order of things by divine omnipotence.

Such an interpretation in the context of the problem of the relation of the finite and the infinite could be obtained by the ideas expressed in the XIII century about emptiness. However, according to A. Coire, they were expressed by a cohort of backward intellectuals ^{[11, p. 78]} and then did not pay much attention to themselves. And it may not be by chance, since the development of the problem of the ratio of the finite and the infinite, heading along a different path, revealed the vulnerability of the above approach. It will not be possible to solve the problem of the relationship between the finite and the infinite by simply "superimposing" one on the other, since the infinite enters into a closer connection with the finite, which therefore simply ceases to be itself. This was shown by the skeptics of the XV century .

3.1. Skepticism of the XV century: a view of the finite from the position of the infinite

The surge of skepticism in the XV century was provoked by the following reasoning: since we believe that the world was created by God, then, accordingly, the vision of the world from the position, or from the point of view of God, should be recognized as the main and starting point for judging about it. As is quite understandable, this initial vision remained forever inaccessible to man for understanding by the "x", communicating its quality and all human knowledge enclosed in this context. In view of this, even the most obvious truths for man could no longer be considered by themselves and as such in isolation from the context of infinite divine omniscience and omnipotence that encompassed them, despite the fact that in this context they already ceased to be obvious and indisputable. It is in connection with the transfer of all human knowledge into this context that Montaigne expresses doubt about the obvious and beyond doubt. "We say: "God could not create the world without matter, because nothing can be created out of nothing." How! Has God given us the keys of his power and revealed to us his secrets? Has he committed himself not to go beyond the limits set by our science? Let us assume, O man, that you have managed to notice some traces of his actions here on earth – do you think that he used all his powers and embodied all his thoughts in this creation, that he exhausted all forms at the same time? At best, you see only the structure and orders of the tiny world in which you live; but the divine power extends infinitely beyond its limits; this particle is nothing compared to the whole… You refer to the local law, but you don't know what the universal law is (highlighted in bold by me – M. F.)" ^[19].

Thus, unlike ancient skepticism, where the goal was abstinence from judgments and ataraxia, and the reason for skepticism is the imperfection of the very human possibilities of cognition in the absence of a concept of their perfect state, the skepticism of the Renaissance has another reason. This is the actual infinite divine omniscience and omnipotence. The peculiarity of this type of skepticism is that since faith is higher than knowledge, the idea of the actual infinity as the cause of skepticism at least turns out to be beyond doubt and becomes a kind of fulcrum in the corrosive abyss of skepticism. The concept of actual infinity, inaccessible to the human mind, becomes for the mind, although unattainable, but still a concrete goal, due to which skepticism no longer seems so insurmountable. In this regard, the need to solve the problem of the ratio of the infinite and the finite becomes more urgent than ever.

3.2. Galileo and the attempt to rehabilitate the status of the finite

Another attempt to solve this problem is connected with the name of Galileo. According to I. S. Dmitriev, "in the understanding of Urban VIII, Galileo's ignoring of the argument about Divine omnipotence is the main point of accusation of the Tuscan" ^[8]. Insisting that the ontological essence of the observed phenomena can be accessible to man (against the pragmatist position of Osiander, reflected in the preface to Copernicus' book On the Rotation of the Celestial Spheres), Galileo allowed a kind of autonomy of human knowledge, recognized the possibility of considering the truths about the world created by God available to the finite human mind outside the context of infinite divine omnipotence that encompasses them, thereby at least putting it on the back burner, if not denying it at all. That is why it was so important for Galileo to defend the right of the finite to remain himself in the face of the infinite. The fate of the emerging natural science of Modern times ultimately depended on the solution of this problem. But the option proposed by Galileo was not entirely satisfactory either. As you know, Galileo introduced the idea of a quantitative difference, but a qualitative identity between the knowledge of the infinite God and man. This means that if God, according to Augustine, can contemplate the entire sequence of an infinite series of natural numbers at once, and man is able to grasp only some finite sequence with his finite mind, then this finite knowledge of man is part of the infinite knowledge of God. This is qualitatively the same thing that God knows, only in smaller quantities. Thus, Galileo showed that, in fact, there is nothing more behind the finite, that there is no need for the transition of the finite into a new quality due to the unity with the infinite, which was always assumed and about which Galileo himself spoke in another place after Nicholas of Cusa. It looks as if the transition to unity with the infinite, which Eastern Christianity still longs for, has already taken place.

Despite the fact that such views of Galileo entered the history of science as the ideas of one of its founders, which could not but give them an appropriate status, nevertheless, the authority of Galileo cannot simply cancel the difference between the finite and the infinite, which has always been and remains precisely a qualitative difference. The vision of the entire infinite number series at once, which is possible for the infinite mind of God, is precisely another vision that is inaccessible to the finite mind of man, who perceives the number series as always finite, although capable of unlimited growth. In order to understand the numerical series in both cases as exactly the same series qualitatively, it was necessary at least to show where the transition is located from the finite range of perception of a numerical series accessible to man to the possibility available to God to see the entire infinite numerical series at once. As is quite clear, there is no such transition. This follows from the very definition of a numerical series, explicating its ability to be indefinitely continued. In fact, Galileo tried to solve the problem of the relation of the finite and the infinite in the same way by simply superimposing one on the other, which was mentioned above in connection with the reflections on the possibility of emptiness that took place in the XIII century.

3.3. Descartes' I-cogito: the claim to the unity of the finite with the infinite and the problem of its authenticity

Only Descartes was able to "truly" solve the problem of the ratio of the finite and the infinite. Here, "really", taken in quotation marks, means that Descartes' solution was not in the literal sense a solution to the problem of the ratio of the finite and the infinite, but it became exactly the answer to it that was recognized as such and accepted by the New European philosophy. It was Descartes who opened a new stage in the history of European civilization. Thus, the stage in the development of the problem of infinity, which corresponds to the period from the legalization of Christianity in European culture to Descartes, can be compared with the "Parmenides stage", when, when recognizing both the finite and the infinite, there was no way for a rational explanation of the connection between the two. On the other hand, the new stage in the development of the infinity problem discovered by Descartes corresponds to the "Zeno stage". Unlike Parmenides, who recognized, on the one hand, the existence of the One, and on the other hand, the existence of the sensory world and did not know how to combine them, Zeno raised the question of the existence of the unit as something third between the two, namely, as the possibility of a new reality, a reality of a new quality arising as a result the unity of both. Antiquity did not have and did not see a way for a real recognition of the possibility of such unity, the possibility of the existence of a unit, therefore Zeno admits it only in the course of reasoning from the opposite. But on the other hand, it is impossible not to notice that in such an assumption one can see a kind of anticipation of the real possibility opened in Christianity for the unity of two realities (finite and infinite) and the possibility of the existence of a "unit" in the sensually perceived world, as a result of its unity with another reality.

As already mentioned, in Christianity, along with the actual realization of such unity, the possibility of achieving an imaginary unity and an imaginary "unit" with corresponding ontological properties is provided. Therefore, in the Christian era, it was the question of the imaginary or reality of the "unit" that had to be a matter of paramount importance. However, at the time when Descartes was solving this problem, such a question did not even arise. Instead, the concept of the "two books" neutralized the complications associated with the idea of the possibility of an illegal path to Christian goals. Insisting that the study of the Book of Nature is something different compared to the teaching of Revelation, and determining exactly what the difference here is, Galileo presented mathematical natural science as exactly some new way of relating to the world created by God (and thereby serving God), which is not covered by the criteria of evaluation accepted in Christianity itself. Thus, the possibility of suspecting the enterprise of a new science that it is related to an illegal path to Christian goals and, perhaps, expresses precisely its essence was neutralized.

As will be shown below, the path that Descartes took in the search for the "unit" was the path of imaginary, not actual, finding it. An example of this is known from antiquity as the Zeno way. We will see that he was a kind of model for Descartes.

The historian of science A. Coire considers the "disintegration" of the cosmos to be the decisive event of the genesis of the new science, due to the adoption by the European intellectual world of ideas about the infinite universe ^{[11, p. 16]}. According to Coire, the main revolutionary step of the new science was connected with the revision of the ratio of the finite and the infinite. And Coire recognizes Descartes as the decisive contribution to the cause of such a revision: "Surpassing Cantor in the power and depth of his views, he [Descartes] was able not only to assert the essential legitimacy of the actual infinity and show the impossibility of replacing it with the concept of the indefinite, but, moreover, to make it the basis and beginning of the theory of the finite" ^{[11, p. 40]}. According to A. Coire, for Descartes, "it is the infinite that is the primary and positive concept, so that the finite can be understood only by negating the infinite" ^{[11, p. 42]}. In this sense, Descartes' merit consists in finding and affirming the finite in the infinite, which marked a new stage (one might even say a new era) in the development of ideas about the relationship of both.

In exact accordance with the orthodox Christian ideas about the transformation of the finite and created into unity with the infinite and uncreated, developed in the Christian East, Descartes focuses on the inner Self of man, which should become a new nature, in order to then raise the whole world behind him. About such a cosmic mission of man entrusted to him in Christianity, we read in L. A. Uspensky: "It is in the image of God that the cosmicity of man receives its meaning: through man, the creature receives participation in spiritual life. It was man, placed at the head of all visible creatures, who had to unite everything in himself and through himself unite with God, bring the world to a state in which God is all in everything, for the ultimate goal of the creature is its transformation" ^[25].

As you know, the idea of the Self as the inner center of the personality owes its origin to Christianity. It was not known to pre-Christian Europe, where in the era of antiquity they only knew about the disguise () as a mask that can be changed, but not about the face (or rather, the face as God's plan for man), which remains unchanged. In the non-Christian East, the use of the pronoun I was not allowed even at the level of language communication. Here it is typical for a person to identify himself every time on the basis of the communicative context in which he is currently located. For example, in relation to the older brother – the younger brother, in relation to the husband – the wife, etc. In Islamic culture, for example, the Self of an individual is not considered as such at all, but only as part of the binary relationship I am You (I am a neighbor, a knight is a subject, a military commander is an army) ^[23].

However, do not underestimate the fact that in Christianity, the Self as an internal and unchangeable center of personality has become possible not as such and not by itself, but as a basis for an undivided and inseparable unity with God. As a result of this union, the Self becomes a new nature both in relation to the external created world, and in relation to those ideas about the transcendent beginning of the world that antiquity possessed. In this respect, I am a kind of "unit", that is, a new nature both in relation to the One and in relation to the sensory world. V. N. Lossiy writes about the Ego as the third principle in relation to the two known in the pre-Christian era, "The ecstasy of Dionysius is a way out of being as such, the ecstasy of Plotinus is rather the reduction of being to absolute simplicity. That is why Plotinus defines his ecstasy by a very characteristic name – “simplification". This is a way of reducing the object of contemplation to simplicity, which can be positively defined as a Single One and which in this respect does not differ from the contemplating subject" ^[15]. In Dionysius, the Self of the contemplating subject forms an undifferentiated and inseparable unity with the source of being, to whom such an I is face to face and You tell him. Here the Self turns out to be a new nature, a new kind of being, and even after "coming out of being as such", such an I remains itself.

However, before recognizing all that Dionysius says is possible, and before it is possible to recognize the properties of a new nature for the inner Self of man, it is necessary to take into account the main condition on the path of such transformation – the condition by which, in fact, this path was opened. This is the communion with uncreated nature that has become possible in the Christian Church through the sacrament of Communion. It is the acceptance into oneself of another, new nature in Christianity that is recognized as the basis for the transformation of human nature into a new quality, or, in other words, the achievement of holiness. And the fact that a person does not find the pledge of such a transformation in himself, but receives it, as it were, from the other side, is of fundamental importance, as I. F. Meyendorff points out: "In addressing himself, the hesychast is not looking for a subjective sensation; he does not indulge in self-examination in order to discover only his own created and fallen self but he is looking for Christ, who is objectively present in him by virtue of baptism and communion with the sacraments of the Church and who, however, does not belong to him as property, but is common to all who have believed in Christ" ^[17].

Under the image of the search for a new nature inside (in depth) the "old" it is not difficult to recognize Zeno's approach. Recognizing the futility of such a search, Zeno justified its admissibility by using the method of reasoning from the opposite, which in this case he used. Having stated above that Zeno's path was a kind of model for Descartes' search, we realize how outwardly these two paths were not similar to each other. In his discovery of the I-cogito, Descartes actively engages the idea of God. He argues in such a way that I-cogito really looks based on this idea and as if derived from it. However, if we understand his reasoning, how he connects these two ideas – the idea of God as perfection and the idea of the Ego as imperfection – it becomes clear that something completely different is hidden under the image that Descartes presents. Already Descartes' contemporaries pointed out to him the presence of a kind of vicious circle in his arguments about the Ego-cogito. Nowadays, this problem is once again pointed out by Paul Riker. In the article "The Crisis of Cogito" he writes: "If in our initial consciousness there is an initial and indissoluble unity of the idea of "I" as finiteness and imperfection and the idea of God as infinity and perfection, then how can the initial confidence in the imaginary ignorance about such unity be formed [...] or cogito has the meaning of the foundation, which, however, has the meaning of a barren truth, from which one can draw any conclusions only by breaking with the order of arguments of reason; or cogito as a limited being comes from the idea of perfection and the first cause thus loses its halo of the original foundation" ^[21].

Thus, in his arguments about the I-cogito, Descartes, in fact, does not come to anything new. Insisting on the connection of the limited and imperfect Self with another perfect and infinite reality, the awareness of which (connections) capable of opening up new possibilities for the Ego, Descartes could not satisfactorily clarify the essence of the connection between the infinite and the finite that he allowed. In fact, his Ego-cogito has remained the former Ego of the "old" and not yet renewed human nature, but which already (after Descartes) does not need to be renewed and does not seek it, since it recognizes and pretends to be this new nature. As can be seen, Descartes, like Zeno, tried to find a new nature inside the "old" one. But if Zeno openly acknowledged the impossibility of such an acquisition and allowed it only within the framework of reasoning from the opposite, then Descartes, arranging his thoughts according to the principle of a vicious circle (and an unobvious circle, which had yet to be revealed), gives the new quality of the Self that he discovered for a really new one. In this form, it is accepted and enters the New European culture, becomes the foundation of a new civilization.

The closeness of Descartes and Zeno's approaches makes itself felt also through the absence in both cases of an idea of the essence of the new nature that is thus acquired. In the case of Zeno, who intended to meet the indivisible among the divisible, the lack of a concept of the essence of such an indivisible is understandable. After all, Zeno never met him and, accordingly, never got the opportunity to form an idea about him, despite the fact that Zeno, according to the ancients, said that if someone had explained to him what the one is, he could have said what is (Simplicius 97.13).

The case of Descartes is not too different from the case of Zeno, despite all the apparent difference in the results of their search. The Ego-cogito found by Descartes could only be defined negatively, through the separation from it of everything that is not it. As a result, Descartes calls some further indecomposable (or taken as indecomposable) remainder (an analogue of the indivisible in Zeno) his Ego. For the New European culture based on this discovery of Descartes, the mystery of what such an Ego is and whether it represents anything at all has remained a mystery. As S. V. Month notes, "the introspection undertaken by Descartes was unable to give a thinking subject positive knowledge about his substance… The fundamental unknowability of the subject of thinking is due to the fact that, being aware of his thought, he thereby distinguishes himself from both the thinking process and the object he thinks of, as a result of which he is unable to recognize himself in anything that constitutes the content of his thinking" ^{[18, p. 150, 153]}. As a result, to the question, "then what is our "I", ourselves", Svetlana Viktorovna answers that "within the framework of the New European philosophy, this question is fundamentally insoluble" ^{[18, p. 155]}.

§ 3.3.1. The mission of the I-cogito: the subject-object paradigm as the philosophical equivalent of the cosmic mission of man in Christianity

Recall that Zeno's path was for Descartes the philosophical equivalent of that deviation from the Christian path, which is reflected in the gospel parable about the wedding feast. At the same time, Descartes, as is quite understandable, accepted and gave out the path he had chosen for the true, or at least permissible. Therefore, in Descartes we find, as it were, a continuation of those reflections on the indivisible unit, its meaning for the rest of the divisible existing, which in Zeno were interrupted by the unexpected discovery of a potential infinity instead of the desired unit. And if Zeno had met what he was looking for, that is, if in one way or another Zeno had managed to find the desired transition from a divisible extension to an indivisible unit, then it is quite logical that the next question he would have posed was how to raise everything to the level of a unit, to raise everything to its indivisible and perfect nature the rest is divisible existing. This supposed question is the philosophical equivalent of the cosmic mission of man recognized in Christianity to raise the whole corruptible world after him to incorruption. We find the philosophical equivalent of this Christian cosmic mission of man in Descartes. In an effort to update the entire body of human knowledge, clearing it of unreliability, Descartes intended to acquire some indivisible units of knowledge, or, as he called them, "simple natures". They subsequently became a kind of epistemological atoms of evidence and intelligibility, through which a new world was built in the era of STP.

The problem of obtaining such units of knowledge has guided Descartes' search from the very beginning. For Descartes, the geometry of Euclid, built on the basis of a synthetic method, has always been the ideal of deductive systematization of knowledge. However, in philosophy, the use of the synthetic method has one significant drawback: it leaves unexplained the question of how the initial principles of the system are formed, that is, those epistemological units of knowledge that are used as premises for the implementation of the relevant conclusions. Meanwhile, for Descartes, this question was of paramount importance. Descartes points out the difference between geometry and philosophy. If the initial principles of geometry are recognized by everyone as unquestionable, then the question of the first principles of philosophy leads to endless disputes ^[6].

In Descartes, the ratio of analytical and synthetic methods seems to correspond to the path towards the desired unit and back – in the direction of the world waiting for renewal. The analytical method is designed to show how the initial principles of the system are obtained. Turning to radical doubt, Descartes shows how the very first such unit of the I-cogito, this philosophical equivalent of the new man of Christianity, arises. Then, on the basis of the I-cogito, Descartes philosophically posits the beginning of the renewal of the world, which is recognized as the cosmic mission of man in Christianity. And in this case Descartes already uses a synthetic method. This feature is pointed out by T. A. Dmitriev: "The position "I am, I exist” is the first principle of Descartes' metaphysics, in the form in which it is presented in “Reflections”, a work that uses his analytical method of considering issues. [...] On the contrary, if we use the synthetic order, in the form in which it is embodied in the geometry of Euclid, going from definitions, axioms and postulates to theorems, then the position “I am, I exist"will not fulfill the role of the first principle" ^[9].

This kind of value disparity between the I-cogito and the rest of the world becomes the basis of both the New European subjectcentrism and the subject-object division between the "transformed" nature of the I-cogito and only the nature of the rest of the world transformed by such an I. For the New European science, the subject-object relationship has become paradigmatic. According to B. I. Pruzhinin, it is a "philosophical scheme of representation of cognitive reality" ^{[22, p. 236]}, a "philosophical formula" ^{[22, p. 232]}, which "captures the very essence of scientific knowledge, its very possibility" ^{[22, p. 234]}. In view of this, the modern non-classical stage of the development of science and epistemology, the rejection of the subject-object separation, which put the possibility of the existence of science at risk, looks paradoxical. Clarifying this situation, B. I. Pruzhinin calls non-classics a philosophical problematization of classics. To all those "who naively accept any state of philosophical thought as its self-sufficient stage" ^{[22, p. 242]}, Boris Isaevich declares that "we must look for a form of transformation of the possibilities of cognition, look for a philosophical formula of cognition, and not try to normalize descriptions of various kinds of deviations from it" ^{[22, p. 242]}. c. 246]. In this sense, "non-classics acts as a problem, as a philosophical problematization of the very existence of science, its very possibility" ^{[22, p. 243]}.

However, recognizing non-classics of this kind as a transitional stage and expressing hopes that sooner or later it will be replaced by some new classics, one cannot help but wonder what is the essence of non-classical rejection of subject-object separation. The fundamental importance of this issue is due to the fact that although the value of the subject-object paradigm is beyond doubt, if only because one way or another it became the basis for the most unprecedented enterprise in the history of mankind of a new science that changed the world, however, modern criticism of the subject-object paradigm is also not unfounded. This in itself suggests that most likely there was something with the subject-object paradigm from the very beginningit is "not so" that she really implicated in herself some unprecedented opportunities in the history of mankind for the transformation of the world and sought their realization, but only not on the path on which they opened up to humanity in reality. As it was shown above, this was the way of Zeno, and not the way of Christianity. The subject-object paradigm is the philosophical equivalent of the cosmic mission of man recognized in Christianity to raise the corruptible to the imperishable. Until now, the equivalence of the subject-object paradigm of the Christian mission of man and its correspondence to the Zeno scheme have been discussed and justified by us in relation to the stage of the genesis of science, which corresponds only to the first part of Zeno's reasoning, which admits the existence of a unit and only begins to search for it. But as already mentioned, unlike Zeno, who almost immediately faced the problem of the futility of such searches, Descartes' case is complicated by the attraction of the idea of a Christian God, on the basis of which he seems to be able to find what Zeno was still looking for. This period of recognition as a real, in fact, imaginary unit of the I-cogito, a recognition that opens up new and truly unprecedented opportunities for humanity – this period exactly corresponds to classical science and epistemology. But if we proceed from the equivalence of the approaches of Descartes and Zeno, then another period should have replaced the classical one. Even recognizing the imaginary unit of the I-cogito as a real one and acting in accordance with such recognition, the new person sooner or later had to face what Zeno himself met on his way. The modern crisis of the subject-object paradigm reveals essential features of correspondence to the crisis of Zeno's search and becomes another evidence in favor of the assumption carried out in this study about the equivalence of Zeno's and Descartes' reasoning and, in general, about the ontotheological nature of the genesis of the new science.

§ 4. The identity crisis of the I-subject

4.1. Mobility of the boundary between the subject and reality in quantum physics

The crisis I was discovered in the course of empirical research. At the same time, it is important not to forget that the very possibility of such research, as well as the possibility of a new science in general, was based precisely on this kind of idea of a non-existent Self-unit. The correspondence established in this study of the reasoning of the founders of the new science (Galileo and mainly Descartes) to the Zeno scheme, as well as the equivalence of the last gospel parable about the marriage feast, gives an understanding of how such a paradoxical possibility was realized. But then it must also be recognized that in this case all the new levels of reality with paradoxical properties discovered by science do not relate to reality itself, that is, not to reality as a whole and as such, but only to its "mode", which was discovered in connection with the illegal recognition of the empirical Self for the Self-cogito and which in the parable of the feast is designated as outer darkness. In other words, here we are faced with a kind of vicious circle: the illegal acceptance of the empirical Self for the I-unit (I-cogito) leads to the discovery of a new reality, and the features of this latter reveal the imaginary nature of such an I-unit, which leads to a crisis of the Ego. At the same time, it is important to emphasize that everything connected with the crisis of the Ego takes place only within such a closed circle, and does not characterize the essence of a person's attitude to external reality as such.

First of all, serious problems in the way of localization of the Self-subject of cognition were found in quantum physics. Here there is the so-called mobility of the boundary between the subject and reality. Analyzing the measurement process as a process of obtaining information about a micro–object, A. A. Gribb notes that in quantum mechanics, it is possible to draw the "object-device" boundary between the object of observation and the device in different places. The device used (for example, a spark chamber) can be included in the object under study together with a microparticle. In this case, the observer's eye and his brain will become the device. However, the eye and brain also consist of quantum particles, so that the observer-object boundary can be drawn further inside the observer ^{[4, p. 12]}.

As you can see, it is possible to move the boundary of the object deep into the subject and nowhere to meet the end of this kind of invasion, which is equivalent to the absence of the subject. At the same time, A. A. Gribb insists that "it is impossible to get rid of the subject" ^{[4, p. 12]}, that "the subject differs from the object in that it is not objectified and is not described by anything (no equation, etc.)" ^{[4, p. 12-13]}. The active role of consciousness is a characteristic feature of quantum physics. The study of microobjects is accompanied by an abrupt change in wave functions during measurement, called "reduction of the wave packet" or "collapse of the wave function" ^{[4, p. 8]}. According to von Neumann's interpretation, it is the observer's consciousness that is responsible for the reduction. However, in connection with this interpretation, Wigner formulated the so-called Wigner's friend paradox, the essence of which boils down to the fact that if certain properties of quantum objects are created by the observer's consciousness, then why do different observers observe (or create) the same physical world and observe the same values of the characteristics of micro-objects? ^{[4, c. 13-14]}. As an answer, the distinction between the empirical and the Absolute Self is proposed. "The observer's absolute Self does not coincide with me as Andrey, Natalia or Alexander. I, like Andrey, am already an object, and it would be megalomania to declare that it is Andrey who is reducing the entire universe. The absolute Self does not coincide with the empirical self, with certain physical and psychological characteristics of a person" ^{[4, p. 14]}. Our empirical self is only involved in it, since no cognition is possible without this involvement ^{[4, p. 15]}. In this regard, A. A. Gribb mentions Eddington's statement about the possibility of religion after 1927, as well as Belinfante's somewhat modified idea that quantum indeterminism can be called, if not God, then its attribute ^{[4, p. 15]}. A. A. Gribb points to the closeness of theological ideas about the Christian God, who defines himself the "being" of things and processes, through the separation of being from non-being, with the introduction of the truth function by the absolute subject of cognition in the Neumann interpretation of quantum physics. In connection with the involvement of theological topics, A. A. Gribb makes a number of valuable clarifications in Neumann's idea of the absolute subject. First of all, he reminds us that according to at least Orthodox ideas, not every accidental thing is divine. And as the holy fathers used to say, "discernment of spirits" is necessary. In this regard, he notes that "the dependence of some features of the objective world on the observer and his consciousness may be related to the concept of original sin in the theology of the Apostle Paul, according to which "all creation groans to this day through the fault of man"" ^{[4, p. 21]}. Then the Absolute subject of the Neumann interpretation is identified not with God, but with the universal man. It is through the fault of the observer, as a kind of collective Self-Adam, that we observe the universe as full of suffering and hostile to living chance. ^{[4, c. 21]}. According to A. A. Gribb, this makes it possible to recognize the world studied by quantum physics as not the world that was created by God, that is, not the world as such (in von Neumann's interpretation, the quantum world of non-commuting operators is assumed to already exist, already having existence), but the world after the fall, that is, the world that owes its origin to it is the consciousness of Adam, who broke the law.

Based on the results achieved in this study of the consideration of the problem of the ontotheological nature of the genesis of the new science, we can further clarify and limit the scope of application of the concept of the Absolute subject. This is not the collective Self of Adam, but the collective Self of a New European subject who came to the "wedding feast" without having a "wedding robe" and faced here with all the consequences that are known from the gospel parable.

4.2. The idea of an "extended subject" in the cognitive movement

The rapid development of cognitive sciences today is becoming, perhaps, one of the most serious factors in the problematization of classical ideas about the subject of cognition. Today, the priority of empirical research methods is determined by the so-called naturalistic turn. "According to the latter," writes V. A. Lektorsky, "both philosophy dealing with the research of consciousness and cognition, and special cognitive sciences study real processes taking place in the world itself… In other words, it is believed that cognitive processes can be rationally understood and investigated if we take as a starting point not a linguistic or conceptual framework, but the interaction of a cognizing being as actually existing (having a body, sensory organs, nervous system) with external reality. The cognitive process should be understood as included in the real world" ^[13].

It should be noted that antipsychologism in epistemology, replaced today by a naturalistic turn, was approved in the research of cognition only in the late XIX - early XX centuries and was associated with the names of Kant and Husserl, and then supported by analytical philosophy. Before that, that is, in the XVII and XVIII centuries, epistemological research proceeded from the indisputable premise that knowledge and the process of obtaining it are interrelated (J. Berkeley, D. Hume, etc.). Epistemology, thus, was reduced to empirical studies of human cognitive abilities. At the same time, it should be noted that Husserl himself, whose criticism of psychologism in epistemology reached its apogee, traced the origins of his views precisely to Descartes.

Today it is considered that purely philosophical methods of research of cognition have exhausted themselves. First of all, the antipsychological approach has discredited itself in analytical philosophy. According to V. A. Lektorsky, despite the claims to accuracy and reasonableness, in modern analytical epistemology, almost all epistemological concepts that took place in the past can be found, albeit in a new form, none of which can prove its indisputable advantage over other means of philosophical analysis alone today ^{[14, p. 15]}. All this stimulated a new wave of interest in empirical methods of cognition research. Enriched with modern technical capabilities, cognitive research is combined into a single cognitive science, which includes research in the field of artificial intelligence, cognitive psychology, cognitive linguistics, and subsequently cognitive neuroscience ^{[14, p. 18]}. At the moment, there are three stages in the development of cognitive science. We will point out the changes in the concepts of the subject of cognition characteristic of the last two stages.

At the second stage of the development of cognitive science, the classical model of artificial intelligence, based on sequential processing of information, is replaced by the model of connectionism, or parallel distributed processing of information. As part of the connectionist approach, D. Dennett proposed an understanding of consciousness as a competition of different "interpretive structures" and an understanding of the "I" as a conditional "center of narrative gravity" ^{[14, p. 24]}. According to D. Dennett, the Self exists not as a real, but as an abstract object, which he compares with the Newtonian concept of the "center of gravity" – a fiction accepted within the framework of classical mechanics and working here, despite the fact that this concept is only imaginary. According to Dennett, the Self appears to be the same – it is introduced as an abstraction for the convenience of describing various phenomena of human consciousness ^[7].

In the 1990s, the cognitive movement entered the third stage, characterized by the emergence of the so-called dynamic approach in understanding cognitive systems. The separation of the cognitive system from the external environment is considered today by many researchers as isolationism and the legacy of Cartesianism. Today, a different approach to cognition is becoming more and more popular, not limited to what is happening in the brain or even in the biological body, but focused on the constant interaction of the organism and its environment, the cognizer and the world. This approach is characterized by the idea that the very boundary between the organism and the external environment, between "internal" and "external" processes is conditional. The necessary aspects of the cognitive system are the brain, the body and the external environment. Thus, it is assumed that cognition and consciousness should be understood within the framework of this "expanded subject", and not an individual organism.

According to a number of experts, at the third stage cognitive science moved from the Descartes paradigm to the Aristotle paradigm ^{[14, p. 25]}. At the same time, it seems to be overlooked what fundamental consequences such a revision of Descartes' views has. In fact, the recognition of the absence of that boundary between the subject of the I-cogito and the world, which Descartes carried out, is equivalent to the recognition of the absence in the world of that "new nature" that Descartes allowed in the image of the I-cogito and on the basis of the concept of which a new science became possible, which discovered in its empirical studies the absence of such a Self. As can be seen, the history of the I-cogito repeats the history of the Zeno unit and corresponds to the scheme of Zeno's search for the indivisible among the divisible. Let us recall this scheme: the assumption of the existence of the indivisible among the divisible and the action in accordance with such an assumption, which leads not only to the discovery of the groundlessness of the assumption made about the existence of a new nature, but also to the loss of the solidity of the "old" ideas about the reality under study. Thus, Zeno, as a result of his search for the indivisible, came to the impossibility of filling up to the whole (that is, to the initial state) that divisible quantity that was originally given to him by condition. In turn, the new science, which followed in Descartes' footsteps, eventually came to the loss of those "old" ideas about the Self that Descartes sought to update and improve. If, using the example of the ancient , one could see how the Ego changed depending on the context, without discovering in itself that unchangeable and inseparable core that Descartes was looking for and, as it seemed to him, found in the I-cogito, then using the example of Dennett's position, one can see how against the background of the "emptiness" found in the place of this core there are new ideas about the Self, where there is no place even for such conditional, but complete formations, as, for example, the ancient was.

4.3. The disintegration of the subject-Self into the author's Self and the Hero's Self in social Constructionism

In narrative psychology, which, according to Trufanova, is a subdomain of social constructionism ^{[24, p. 183]}, the results of modern cognitive research receive further theoretical elaboration. Here, the loss of the unchanging core of the identity of the I-individual becomes the basis of the concept of the dialogical I or I as a narrative. According to this concept, the individual's representation of his own Self becomes possible due to the individual's ability to look at himself from the outside, to become the author of himself as a hero. At the same time, the consciousness of the author (as Another) and the consciousness of the hero (asI) "are fundamentally not merged and the consciousness of the hero is specifically localized and completed in the unfinished consciousness of the author (highlighted in bold by me - M. F.)" ^{[24, p. 186]}. The origins of the idea of the Self as a narrative are found in the works of Bakhtin. It is especially vividly presented in the work "The author and the hero in aesthetic activity". Bakhtin shows how "the author by his own efforts gives birth to a new person in a world in which the author himself cannot exist (highlighted in bold by me – M. F.)" ^{[24, p. 185]}. "The hero and his world are in the mind of the author. At the same time, the hero is open and scattered in his world, and the author's task is to assemble him into a single whole" ^{[24, p. 185]}.

In other words, the completeness of individual fragments of the Self (or stories about the Self as the hero of these stories) is achieved at the cost of the incompleteness of the "bracketed" Self of the author of these stories, despite the fact that the author's Self is, in fact, what the real Self should be. And this real Self, "saving" fragmentary Self-stories, itself just gets "hit".

In postmodernism, the spread of the idea of the "death of the subject", the "death of the author" indicates the loss of the idea of the author's Self as the encompassing area in which the author's "creativity" is carried out in the form of stories told by him. Despite the fact that postmodern ideas about the "death of the subject" are often assessed as too hasty and controversial ^{[24, p. 190]}, it is worth recalling that evidence of this kind of result already has a historical precedent in Zeno's reasoning, while the course of Zeno's reasoning and the ways of the New European Self, as has been shown, reveal correspondence between each other.

Thus, on the basis of the assumption put forward in this study about the equivalence of the arguments of Zeno and Descartes and, in general, about the ontotheological nature of the genesis of the new science, one can be convinced that the essence of the modern challenge to the problem of the identity of the Self from the cognitive sciences receives not only an explanation, but also in some sense finds justification. In line with this assumption, the modern crisis should be understood as a necessary consequence of the accepted assumptions, which already has a precedent in history (the case of Zeno). Such an explanation of the modern identity crisis of the Self seems to be more thorough and promising in terms of the possibilities of overcoming it (or at least in terms of localizing the scope of its applicability) than the widespread correlation of the latest results of cognitive research with the concept of the Self, characteristic of religious beliefs of the Ancient East ^[27]. This approach, at the cost of bypassing and displacing Christian ideas about the Self, historically associated with the modern crisis of the Self (and even caused it), allows us to find a precedent for modern ideas about the Self in the non-Christian East, removing the problematic nature of such ideas, legitimizing and justifying them in a religious tradition older than the Christian one.

4.4. An attempt to rehabilitate the ideas of the new Self and the new nature of man in a transhumanistic project

Until now, consideration of the path of the New European I-cogito in the history of modern and modern science has given grounds to assert that it corresponds to the course of Zeno's reasoning. However, today the problem of the Ego is on the threshold of a fundamentally new step that goes beyond the laws of "transformations" discovered by Zeno, reflected in the so-called Zeno scheme, which was mentioned above. And if Zeno, faced with the impossibility of discovering the existence of the indivisible among the divisible, but instead encountering the "disintegration" of the most divisible quantity into potential infinity, stops there, then modern science, having reached this stage, attempts to rehabilitate the ideas of the new Self and the new nature of man, which were original for the New European science. And if the last stage of the path traversed by Zeno, which corresponds to the modern crisis of the problem of the Ego, making it clear that something was "wrong" in the original New European assumptions about the nature of the Ego, gave reason to stop, think and find the root of the problem (and this study, revealing the ontotheological nature of this problem, opens up such an opportunity) then the new step that modern science is ready to take demonstrates its persistence in moving in the chosen direction and its willingness to fully accept all the risks to human nature that have already declared themselves on this path. We are talking about the modern readiness to enter the posthuman era.

The concept of transhumanism can be understood as a kind of return movement of the impulse of the transformation of the world, the source of which was considered to be the transformed and renewed in the Ego-cogito nature of the New European man. After it became clear that the I-cogito was not the core of the New European subject, for which it was accepted and as which it performed its functions of transforming the world (analogous to the cosmic mission of man in Christianity), two possibilities opened up: either to problematize the phenomenon of the new science itself and look for the true foundations of its effectiveness, as has already been said higher, or vice versa, proceeding from the indisputable fact of the effectiveness of science, and relying on its achievements to raise, renew and transform human nature, to give it what, as it turned out, Christianity could not give it, to the possibilities of which the creators of the new science appealed. And if in the latter case the source of the transformation of the world was somehow considered known , it was a good one The God of Christianity, to which the I-cogito claimed to be involved, in the first case, the opportunity is lost to establish the basis for the effectiveness of the renewing abilities of technoscience and to assess the ontological, and not only the pragmatic significance of the changes it makes.

However, the final step on the path opened by the I-cogito, which is maturing in connection with the transhumanist project, is somehow prompted by all the previous logic of moving along this path. It turns out to be a continuation and completion of the topic of the "death of the subject" discussed today, the realization of this death, its embodiment in reality.

Indeed, both the results of cognitive research and the related approaches to the problem of the Ego of social constructionism prepare this "death" and in a sense make it inevitable. Firstly, the absence of a clear boundary between the human body and the outside world allowed in the concept of an "expanded subject" contributed to the legitimization of the key idea for transhumanism of optimizing natural human physicality by replacing it with an artificial analogue. On the other hand, the idea of the dialogical Self of social constructionism, which presupposes the splitting of the subject-Self into the author's Self and the hero's Self, already contains as an embryo the possibility allowed in the transhumanist project to physically embody the hero's Self separately from the author's Self. At the same time, as it is quite clear, such a hero's Self will no longer contain the fullness of the properties of the original dialogical Self. Moreover, it will be deprived of the opportunity to lead a normal human life. Such a Self will lack free will. In addition, it will be deprived of the opportunity to realize itself in sexual love, as well as many other things. The inevitability of such deprivations for a new person may become a reason to recognize the inconsistency of a transhumanist project that reveals its inability to "recreate" a person. However, to what extent is the simple repetition of what already exists in nature included in the tasks of transhumanism? Do not underestimate the intention stated in transhumanism to present an improved version of a person ^[28]. In view of this, it is possible to raise the question of the value of those human abilities that a new person will be deprived of.

Regarding the possibility of realizing oneself in sexual love, it should be noted that not only for Christianity, but also for most non-Christian religions, the rejection of such an opportunity is considered one of the main conditions for entering the path of spiritual perfection. On this path, what is permissible and even necessary for a simple man in the street is cut off for the sake of acquiring a better state than is given to man by nature. The same must be said about free will. Freedom of will is indeed an integral characteristic of a person. It receives special significance in Christianity in connection with the task of a person to self-determine and express his disposition to good or evil, thus attesting to his spiritual choice. However, after the spiritual choice is made, it is obvious that some new stage in the life of a spiritual being begins. And indeed, as should be expected, the saints and angels who are coming to the Throne of God, while remaining free beings, have a different kind of freedom unlike ordinary living people. And if for the latter freedom is the freedom to sin or not to sin, then for the former freedom is primarily freedom from sin. Obviously, this second freedom is higher than the first. However, some statements caused by disputes about the grace of the XVI century are even higher than this possibility of not sinning as freedom from sin, put the impossibility sin ^{[10, p. 527]}. As can be seen, this extremely high state of freedom is based on unfreedom, as the deprivation of the inherent ability of a living person to sin. These statements, regardless of the question of their validity, at least show how, when transferred to a broader context, not limited by ideas about an ordinary living person, the concept of freedom becomes ambiguous. And what in one case should be recognized as unfreedom, in another case, turns out, on the contrary, to be its highest manifestation. But it is in this kind of broader context that transhumanism hopes to bring a person out.

It is also worth noting that the image of the presence of angels and deified saints to the Throne of God is reproduced in the image of the presence of the I-author of the I-hero, physically embodied separately from the I of the author. But if in the first case the saints in deification reach a state of undifferentiated and inseparable unity with the one to whom they are coming, then in the second case, on the contrary, the situation of coming arises as a result of separation within the Self that has lost its integrity, which in modern narratology is called dialogical.

Thus, transhumanistic intentions to improve human nature by "purifying" it from certain properties inherent in its natural state have religious correlations and should be regarded as attempts by modern science to give man a new, better life, the image of which cannot but be recognized as a surrogate of Christian ideas about deification. Here, the fullness of the life of Christian saints and, in fact, the emptiness of the posthuman are close and at the same time extremely far from each other. This is because both of these directions of the transformation of human nature originate from the same source – the possibility of unity of the finite with the actually infinite, which was discovered in Christianity – but they use this opportunity in different ways. Therefore, they turn out to be directed in different directions: in one case – to the full realization of the possibility of deification opened to man, and in the other – to the devastation and, in fact, the loss of those features of human nature that were responsible for the realization of the first possibility (that is, the possibility of completeness) and were evidence of the transitional state of man, indicating thereby thus, the task of self-determination facing him. The "emptiness" of the posthuman is the same answer to this problem as the one that Christianity gives in the image of holiness. In both cases, the problem of self-determination is removed, the task of transforming human nature is solved. But in one case, the result is completeness, and in the other – emptiness.

This kind of closeness of the results testifies to the commonality of the paths leading to them. Therefore, if in the first case these are the spiritual practices of Christianity, and in the other case they are, as is commonly believed, the possibilities of modern technoscience that have nothing in common with the first, then this evidence of the commonality of these two paths becomes at the same time evidence in favor of the thesis defended in this study about the ontotheological nature of the genesis of a new science, putting its possibilities one way or another on a par with the possibilities open in Christianity.